



Dignity, Justice, and Peace

Civilian Transition Framework for Sudan

A Pathway from Crisis to Constitutional Democracy

Prepared by Unite Sudan Initiative
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Executive Summary

Sudan faces an existential crisis. Two years of devastating conflict have destroyed institutional capacity, displaced millions, fractured the economy, and deepened public distrust of all political actors. Neither continued warfare nor rushed political settlements offer sustainable solutions.

This framework presents a **realistic, civilian-led pathway** from crisis to constitutional democracy. It acknowledges current military realities while establishing a clear trajectory toward full civilian governance within 7–8 years of conflict resolution.

Core Premise

Transition cannot begin until military dynamics fundamentally shift. This framework identifies necessary preconditions, prepares civilian capacity during ongoing conflict, and provides a sequenced implementation plan that balances pragmatism with principle.

Key Features

Realistic Sequencing

- Accepts that security must precede political transformation
- Delays civilian platform activation until safe participation is possible
- Sequences justice to strengthen rather than undermine stability
- Conditions each phase on verifiable benchmarks

Civilian Primacy

- Clear timeline for military withdrawal from governance (Month 54)
- Civilian control of key ministries from Phase II
- Merit-based selection of transitional leadership
- Constitutional subordination of military to elected authority

SAF Engagement

- Recognizes SAF as Sudan's legitimate military institution
- Supports SAF position on armed group disarmament
- Offers professionalization pathway with international partnership
- Guarantees institutional survival and dignity in reformed role

Conflict Resolution

- Addresses armed group fragmentation realistically
- Provides framework for militia dissolution and combatant reintegration
- International security guarantees prevent spoiler violence
- Regional powers co-opted through aligned incentives

Economic Recovery

- Parallel track ensuring transition doesn't collapse from economic failure
- Debt relief conditioned on reform progress
- War economy transformation into productive sectors
- Infrastructure and employment programs

Timeline Overview

Pre-Transition (Current–24 months): Build civilian capacity while monitoring for conflict resolution

Phase I (Months 1–18): Security stabilization following conflict resolution

Phase II (Months 12–30): Emergency governance with SAF partnership and civilian ministerial control

Phase III (Months 24–54): Security sector transformation and DDR

Phase IV (Months 36–66): Sequenced justice and reconciliation

Phase V (Months 42–60): Civilian platform activation and leadership selection

Phase VI (Months 60–78): Constitutional development and referendum

Phase VII (Months 78–90): Elections and transfer to full civilian governance

Total Timeline: 90 months (7.5 years) following conflict resolution, plus indefinite pre-transition preparation

What This Achieves

By Month 90:

- Democratically elected civilian government
- Professional military subordinate to civilian authority
- Transformed security sector with armed groups dissolved
- Functioning justice system and ongoing reconciliation
- Recovering economy with manageable debt
- Constitutional framework for sustainable governance

Requirements for Success

- SAF commitment to civilianization timeline
- International community coordinated support
- Regional powers (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia) alignment
- Economic resources (\$15B+ over transition period)
- Sustained political will among all stakeholders

This framework offers Sudan a viable alternative to perpetual conflict or renewed authoritarianism. It requires patience, compromise, and sustained commitment—but provides the best available pathway to a stable, democratic future.

1. Introduction: Sudan's Critical Juncture

1.1 Current Crisis Assessment

As of December 2025, Sudan confronts multiple, compounding crises:

Armed Conflict

- Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023
- Fragmentation into militia warfare across Darfur, Kordofan, and parts of Khartoum
- Estimated 150,000+ deaths, 10+ million displaced

- Ceasefire negotiations repeatedly failed

Institutional Collapse

- Central government authority limited to portions of SAF-controlled territory
- Justice system non-functional in most areas
- Civil service unpaid for months, basic services collapsed
- Educational institutions closed, healthcare system destroyed

Economic Devastation

- Hyperinflation exceeding 1,000% annually
- Currency in freefall, formal economy contracted 70%+
- War economies (gold smuggling, militia taxation, aid capture) dominate
- Food insecurity affecting 25+ million people

Humanitarian Catastrophe

- Famine conditions in multiple regions
- Disease outbreaks (cholera, measles) amid collapsed health systems
- Gender-based violence widespread and systematic
- Entire generation of children out of school

Social Fragmentation

- Ethnic violence and revenge killings
- Deep distrust between communities
- Militarization of civilian life
- Erosion of social cohesion built over generations

1.2 Why Previous Approaches Have Failed

Military-Led Transitions (1985, 2019)

- Military retained ultimate veto power over civilian authority
- Civilians excluded from security decisions
- Coups inevitable when military interests threatened
- Pattern: Promise transition → Consolidate power → Renege

Elite Political Bargains (Juba Peace Agreement, 2019 Power-Sharing)

- Excluded broader society, especially women and youth
- Armed groups rewarded with political positions without demobilization
- Fragmented authority among competing factions
- Economic interests perpetuated conflict

Premature Elections (2010, 2015)

- Conducted under authoritarian control
- Manipulation ensured regime continuity
- International legitimacy without domestic legitimacy
- Reinforced rather than resolved underlying problems

External Mediation Without Leverage

- International community divided on approach
- Mediation without enforcement mechanisms
- Competing regional interests undermined agreements
- Humanitarian aid inadvertently funded war economies

1.3 Foundational Principles

This framework rests on six non-negotiable principles:

1. Civilian Primacy Democratic governance requires civilian control of state institutions. Military participation in transitional governance must be temporary, transparent, and conditioned on verified civilianization.

2. Realism Over Idealism Transition cannot begin while bullets fly. Security stabilization precedes political transformation. Compromises necessary for peace must be distinguished from permanent concessions.

3. Inclusion and Representation Women, youth, displaced populations, and marginalized communities must participate meaningfully, not symbolically. Regional diversity reflected throughout process.

4. Sequenced Accountability Justice strengthens transition when properly sequenced; premature prosecutions can trigger renewed violence. Begin with economic crimes, progress to mass atrocities as security allows.

5. Economic Sustainability Political transition collapses without economic stability. Recovery programs must run parallel to governance reforms.

6. International Partnership, Not Trusteeship Sudan's transition must be Sudanese-led. International role: support, guarantee, and resources—not control.

1.4 Document Purpose and Scope

Primary Audiences:

- Sudanese Armed Forces leadership
- Sudanese civilian professionals and civil society
- Sudanese diaspora
- Regional guarantor states (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Kenya)
- International partners (UN, AU, Arab League, US, UK, EU)
- International financial institutions

Document Objectives:

- Provide realistic assessment of transition requirements
- Outline sequenced implementation pathway
- Identify roles for military and civilian actors
- Specify international support needed
- Establish benchmarks and accountability

What This Is Not:

- Not an immediate action plan (requires preconditions first)
 - Not a peace agreement (addresses post-conflict transition)
 - Not a political party platform
 - Not an international trusteeship proposal
-

2. Strategic Context Analysis

2.1 Military-Political Landscape

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

- Controls Khartoum (contested), River Nile, Northern State, parts of eastern Sudan
- Approximately 100,000 active personnel (down from pre-conflict)
- Aging Soviet-era equipment, limited ammunition sustainability
- Officer corps divided between hardliners and reform-minded factions
- Claims institutional legitimacy as Sudan's national military
- Views RSF as rebel force requiring defeat or unconditional surrender

Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

- Controls most of Darfur, parts of Kordofan, West Khartoum
- Estimated 70,000-100,000 fighters
- Para-state structure with independent revenue streams (gold, smuggling)
- Fragmented command with local warlords gaining autonomy
- International backing from UAE provides resources and legitimacy
- Evolved from Janjaweed militias, no institutional legitimacy

Other Armed Groups

- Darfur tribal militias (some allied with SAF, others RSF, many autonomous)
- Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North factions (Abdel-Aziz al-Hilu, Malik Agar)
- Eastern Sudan militias (Beja, Rashaida groups)
- Community self-defense forces in multiple regions
- Total: 50,000+ additional combatants

Political Actors (Marginalized)

- Formal political parties decimated by repression and exile
- Civil society in survival mode or diaspora
- No neutral political space for organizing
- Deep public distrust of traditional political elites

2.2 SAF Position and Legitimacy Claims

SAF's Core Arguments:

- Constitutional continuity: SAF represents legitimate state military
- RSF as criminal rebellion, not legitimate negotiating partner
- Demand: RSF must disarm, cantonment in designated areas, face justice for war crimes
- Willing to negotiate with political civilians, not armed rebels
- Reform possible from within institution, not through dismantling

SAF Redlines:

- No power-sharing with RSF leadership
- No legitimization of militia rule
- No partition of Sudan
- No international administration

SAF Interests:

- Institutional survival and dignity
- Officer corps economic interests protected
- Avoid Libya/Iraq scenario (military dissolution → chaos)
- International rehabilitation and partnership

2.3 Armed Group Fragmentation

Challenge: RSF is not monolithic; fragmentation creates complexity

RSF Internal Dynamics:

- Hemedti and core leadership (Darfur-based)
- Regional commanders with increasing autonomy
- Tribal militias nominally under RSF but pursuing local agendas
- Economic networks (gold, smuggling) incentivize continued fragmentation

Implications for Transition:

- Cannot negotiate single RSF surrender
- Must address local commanders and militia leaders individually
- Economic incorporation critical to incentivize disarmament
- Regional/international pressure needed on external backers

Other Groups:

- SPLM-N factions seek autonomy, not national power
- Eastern militias driven by marginalization grievances
- Tribal militias pursue local security and resource control

2.4 Economic Collapse and War Economies

Formal Economy Destruction:

- GDP contracted 70%+ since 2021
- Government revenue negligible (cannot pay salaries)
- Banking system fragmented between SAF/RSF territories
- Currency worthless (parallel exchange rates)
- Productive sectors (agriculture, industry) collapsed

War Economies:

- Gold: \$2-4 billion annually (mostly smuggled via UAE)
- Militia taxation of populations and trade
- Aid capture and diversion
- Livestock and agricultural theft
- Cross-border smuggling networks

Economic Power Dynamics:

- RSF commanders enriched, incentivized to continue conflict
- SAF unable to sustain operations from formal revenue
- Both sides dependent on external support (Egypt→SAF, UAE→RSF)
- Population impoverished, desperate

Implications:

- Economic exhaustion may precede military resolution
- Transition must transform war economies or they'll sabotage peace
- Debt relief and international finance critical leverage

2.5 Regional and International Dynamics

Regional Powers:

Egypt

- Interests: Nile water security, prevent Islamist resurgence, refugee containment, strategic depth
- Position: Backs SAF, provides military support

- Concerns: RSF/Wagner links, Sudanese instability spillover
- Leverage: Military support, economic ties, diplomatic weight

United Arab Emirates

- Interests: Port access (Red Sea), gold trade, counter Muslim Brotherhood/Turkey
- Position: Supported RSF, though officially mediating
- Concerns: International pressure, reputational costs
- Leverage: Financial resources, RSF supply lines

Saudi Arabia

- Interests: Red Sea security, Yemen war rear base (historically), regional influence
- Position: Attempting mediation, balancing UAE/Egypt
- Concerns: Instability threatening Gulf security
- Leverage: Financial resources, religious soft power

Ethiopia

- Interests: Border security, refugee burden, trade access
- Position: Neutral but concerned about spillover
- Concerns: Tigray precedent, own stability challenges
- Leverage: Regional force contributions, border control

Kenya/Uganda

- Interests: Regional stability, refugee management
- Position: Supportive of civilian transition
- Concerns: Limited capacity to influence
- Leverage: Diplomatic engagement, hosting capacity

International Community:

United States

- Interests: Counterterrorism, human rights, regional stability
- Position: Supports civilian transition rhetorically, limited engagement
- Leverage: Sanctions, debt relief, diplomatic pressure

United Kingdom

- Interests: Historical ties, development concerns, migration management
- Position: Supports civilian transition, humanitarian focus
- Leverage: Development finance, diplomatic engagement, SSR expertise

European Union

- Interests: Migration management, humanitarian concerns
- Position: Supports civilian transition, primarily humanitarian aid

- Leverage: Aid resources, diplomatic pressure

Russia/Wagner (historical)

- Interests: Gold access, strategic positioning
- Position: Previously backed RSF, diminished presence post-Wagner restructuring
- Concerns: Limited strategic priority now

African Union / Arab League

- Interests: Regional stability, institutional credibility
- Position: Support civilian transition, limited enforcement capacity
- Leverage: Diplomatic legitimacy, potential peacekeeping

Critical Gap: No aligned international strategy. Regional powers pursue competing interests.

3. Preconditions for Transition

3.1 Military Resolution Requirements

Core Reality: Political transition cannot begin during active, high-intensity warfare.

Necessary Military Outcomes (One of Three):

Scenario A: SAF Military Victory

- SAF regains control of Khartoum, major cities
- RSF forced to rural strongholds or surrender
- Armed groups accept SAF authority
- **Timeline:** 12-24 months at current trajectory (uncertain)
- **Transition Implication:** SAF agrees to civilianization in exchange for victory legitimacy

Scenario B: Negotiated Settlement with Disarmament

- SAF and RSF agree to ceasefire
- RSF accepts SAF demands: disarmament, cantonment, withdrawal from occupied areas
- International guarantees for process
- **Timeline:** Requires military stalemate + economic exhaustion (18-36 months)
- **Transition Implication:** Phased disarmament parallel to political transition

Scenario C: Fragmentation and Exhaustion

- Neither side achieves victory
- Fighting decays into localized militia conflicts

- Both SAF and RSF weakened, unable to sustain operations
- **Timeline:** 24-48 months
- **Transition Implication:** Regional stabilization zones → gradual expansion

What Will NOT Work:

- Power-sharing with RSF in national government (SAF will not accept)
- Premature political process while fighting continues
- Elections in conflict conditions

3.2 Monitoring Framework for Conflict Trajectory

Establish Conflict Trajectory Monitoring Cell (operational immediately)

Military Indicators (tracked weekly):

- Territorial control changes
- Combat intensity (ACLED incidents)
- Casualty rates (military and civilian)
- Arms flows and external support
- Desertion rates and morale indicators

Momentum Assessment:

Indicator	SAF Victory Track	Stalemate Track	Fragmentation Track
Territorial control	SAF gains 5%+ monthly	<2% change quarterly	Militia mosaic expanding
Combat intensity	Concentrated SAF offensives	Positional warfare	Dispersed low-intensity
External support	Egyptian supplies increasing	Both sides supplied	Unreliable for both
RSF cohesion	Central command weakening	Intact but stressed	Fragmented, local warlords
Timeline to resolution	12-24 months	24-36 months	36-60 months

Monthly Assessment Report:

- Published by independent research consortium

- Data sources: ACLED, satellite imagery, intelligence community (sanitized), field reports
- Public-facing dashboard with traffic light indicators
- Informs international community when transition window opens

3.3 Economic Exhaustion Indicators

Economic Collapse Thresholds (Increase Transition Likelihood):

Government Finance:

- SAF unable to pay military salaries 6+ months consecutively
- Central Bank reserves depleted (<\$100M)
- Government revenue <10% of minimal operational needs

Currency and Inflation:

- Annual inflation exceeds 2,000%
- Sudanese Pound loses 90%+ value against dollar annually
- Multiple parallel exchange rates (SAF, RSF, black market) diverge >50%

War Economy Stress:

- Gold smuggling revenues decline 30%+ (international pressure effective)
- RSF commanders unable to pay fighters consistently
- Cross-border trade disrupted by sanctions or regional action

Humanitarian Crisis:

- Famine officially declared in 3+ regions
- Mortality rates exceed emergency thresholds
- International aid access <50% of need

Assessment: When 3 of 4 categories meet thresholds, economic exhaustion makes negotiated resolution more likely.

Current Status (December 2025): 2 of 4 categories approaching thresholds.

3.4 Regional Power Alignment Signals

Critical Requirement: Egypt and UAE must reach accommodation for sustainable peace.

Indicators of Regional Alignment:

Diplomatic Signals:

- Joint Egypt-UAE mediation initiative launched
- Cairo-Abu Dhabi summit produces Sudan framework
- Both commit to ceasefire enforcement publicly

Material Actions:

- UAE reduces or suspends RSF support (verifiable via intelligence)
- Egypt commits to SAF civilianization pressure
- Joint economic incentive package announced

International Coordination:

- UN Security Council resolution with Egypt/UAE co-sponsorship
- Arab League unified position (Saudi Arabia bridges differences)
- Coordinated sanctions on spoilers

Timeline: Regional alignment unlikely until both powers see current strategies failing (18-30 months estimated).

Catalysts:

- International pressure (US/EU sanctions on UAE entities supporting RSF)
- Economic costs of prolonged conflict
- Reputational damage
- Spillover threats (refugee flows, extremism, regional instability)

3.5 Transition Readiness Assessment

Objective Assessment (Updated Quarterly):

Security Dimension:

- Combat intensity: ● High / ● Medium / ● Low
- Territorial stability: ● Fluid / ● Contested / ● Consolidated
- Armed group cohesion: ● Intact / ● Fragmenting / ● Dissolved

Political Dimension:

- SAF civilianization signals: ● Absent / ● Rhetorical / ● Concrete commitments
- Regional alignment: ● Competing / ● Coordinating / ● Aligned
- International coordination: ● Divided / ● Engaging / ● Unified strategy

Economic Dimension:

- Government capacity: ● Collapsed / ● Minimal / ● Functional
- War economy stress: ● Thriving / ● Stressed / ● Transforming
- International finance: ● Blocked / ● Conditional / ● Flowing

Social Dimension:

- Humanitarian access: ● <40% / ● 40-70% / ● >70%

- Displacement: ● Ongoing / ● Stabilized / ● Returning
- Civic capacity: ● Suppressed / ● Surviving / ● Organizing

Transition Window Opens When:

- Security: ● in 2 of 3 indicators
- Political: ● in 2 of 3 indicators
- Economic: ● or ● in 2 of 3 indicators
- Social: ● or ● in 3 of 4 indicators

Current Assessment (December 2025): Transition window NOT open. Estimated 18-36 months to potential opening.

4. Pre-Transition Foundation Building (Current State – 24 months)

Strategic Purpose: Use the waiting period productively rather than passively.

4.1 Civilian Capacity Development in Exile

Immediate Priority: Build the civilian infrastructure that will deploy when transition begins.

Diaspora Professional Network (Months 0-12):

Recruitment:

- Identify Sudanese professionals globally (estimated 500,000+ diaspora)
- Sectors: Public administration, finance, justice, health, education, security sector reform
- Platform: Digital registration system (secure, accessible)
- Target: 50,000+ registered professionals by Month 12

Skill Mapping:

- Database of expertise (governance, technical, linguistic)
- Readiness assessment (availability, security clearance, deployment willingness)
- Regional origin tracking (ensure geographic representation)

Community Organizing:

- Diaspora hubs: UK, UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, US, Canada, Kenya
- Regular convenings (virtual and in-person)
- Policy working groups on transition challenges
- Leadership identification and cultivation

Budget: \$3 million annually

Lead: Sudanese diaspora organizations with international NGO support

4.2 Technical Expertise Preparation

Shadow Technical Units (Months 0-24):

Build teams ready to deploy immediately when transition begins.

Unit	Size	Function	Training Location	Ready Date
Public Financial Management	25 experts	Treasury, budget, revenue, audit	IMF/World Bank (Washington), LSE (London)	Month 18
Security Sector Reform	20 experts	DDR, vetting, professionalization, civilian oversight	Geneva Centre, UK MOD	Month 18
Justice Sector Reform	15 experts	Courts, prosecutions, legal framework, transitional justice	The Hague, UK Foreign Office	Month 18
Constitutional Drafting	12 experts	Constitutional law, federalism, comparative analysis	Max Planck Institute, universities	Month 12
Electoral Administration	30 experts	Registration, polling, observation, dispute resolution	IFES, International IDEA	Month 24
Governance and Administration	40 experts	Ministry operations, civil service, local government	Various bilateral programs	Month 18
Economic Recovery	20 experts	Agriculture, infrastructure, private sector, trade	IFC, bilateral development agencies	Month 18

Total: 162 technical experts in shadow government-in-waiting

Training Curriculum:

- Sudan-specific modules (history, political economy, tribal dynamics)
- Technical competency (sector-specific best practices)

- Ethics and integrity (anti-corruption, conflict of interest)
- Cross-cultural competency (working with international partners)

Certification:

- Independent assessment by international institutions
- Public disclosure of credentials
- Ongoing professional development

Budget: \$12 million over 24 months

Partners: IMF, World Bank, UNDP, bilateral development agencies (UK, Norway, US, Canada)

4.3 Documentation and Evidence Preservation

War Crimes and Atrocity Documentation (Months 0-ongoing):

Objective: Preserve evidence for future accountability while protecting witnesses.

Methods:

- Satellite imagery analysis (site identification, damage assessment)
- Encrypted testimony collection (refugees, displaced persons)
- Financial transaction tracking (illicit networks, asset tracing)
- Chain of custody protocols (admissible in future prosecutions)

Categories:

- Mass atrocities (massacres, ethnic cleansing, starvation crimes)
- Gender-based violence (rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage)
- Economic crimes (corruption, embezzlement, illicit enrichment)
- Command responsibility (linking leaders to subordinate actions)

Partnerships:

- International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor
- Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International
- Sudanese lawyers' networks
- Investigative journalists (New Arab, Sudan Tribune)
- Academic institutions (forensic anthropology, digital forensics)

Database:

- Secure, encrypted, redundant storage
- Access protocols (investigators only, anonymized for research)
- Regular reporting to international community (sanitized summaries)

Budget: \$4 million annually

Lead: International justice NGOs with Sudanese civil society partners

4.4 Subnational Stability Zone Identification

Mapping Exercise (Months 0-18):

Objective: Identify areas where civilian governance pilot programs can begin immediately after conflict resolution.

Criteria:

- Violence absent 6+ months
- Humanitarian access consistent
- Local governance structures (formal or traditional) functioning
- Neither SAF nor RSF strategic interest in contesting
- Population receptive to civilian administration

Candidate Regions (Preliminary Assessment, December 2025):

Region	Security Status	Governance Capacity	Humanitarian Access	Pilot Viability
Red Sea State	Relatively stable	Provincial government functions	Good	High
Northern State	Stable (SAF control)	Traditional structures strong	Good	High
Gedaref (parts)	Agricultural areas mostly calm	Local administration surviving	Seasonal	Medium
Blue Nile (periphery)	Depends on SPLM-N agreements	Traditional authorities	Limited	Low-Medium
Kassala	Contested but localized fighting	Mixture of formal/traditional	Moderate	Medium

Pilot Program Design:

- Focus on service delivery (health clinics, schools, water systems)
- Partner with existing authorities (don't displace them)
- International humanitarian NGOs as implementation partners
- Demonstrate civilian governance effectiveness
- Build trust for national expansion

Budget: \$20 million for pilot programs (post-conflict resolution)

Partners: WFP, UNICEF, WHO, local NGOs

4.5 International Leverage Architecture

Months 0-24: Build the toolkit for incentivizing cooperation

A. Debt Relief Conditionality Framework

Sudan's External Debt: ~\$60 billion (World Bank, Paris Club, bilateral)

Milestone	Debt Relief Action	Value	Conditionality
Conflict resolution + SAF commitment to transition	Interim debt service suspension	\$800M/year	Ceasefire holds, civilian governance plan agreed
Phase II: Emergency governance established	HIPC Decision Point	30% principal reduction (~\$18B)	Civilians control key ministries, IMF program initiated
Phase IV: Justice process begins	Interim relief	Additional 20% reduction (~\$12B)	War crimes prosecutions underway, reparations funded
Phase VI: Constitutional referendum	HIPC Completion Point	Final 50% reduction (~\$30B)	Constitution approved, elections scheduled

Total Potential Relief: ~\$60 billion over transition period

Coordination: IMF, World Bank, Paris Club (requires G7 agreement)

B. Sanctions Architecture

Targeted Sanctions (Individuals and Entities):

Current Sanctions (to maintain):

- US sanctions on SAF/RSF leaders for atrocities
- EU arms embargo
- Targeted financial sanctions

Adaptive Sanctions (reward cooperation, punish spoilers):

Actor	Cooperation	Spoiler Behavior
SAF Leadership	Remove sanctions on reformers, international rehabilitation	Escalate sanctions, ICC referrals, asset freezes
RSF Commanders	Conditional amnesty (mid-level), asset legitimization	Full asset freezes, ICC prosecutions, Interpol red notices
Regional Backers	Economic partnership, trade benefits	Sanctions on entities supporting militias, reputational costs
Gold Networks	Legitimate trade certification, banking access	Kimberley Process-style exclusion, sanctions on buyers (UAE)

Enforcement: Requires US Treasury, EU, UK coordination

C. Regional Power Incentive Packages

Egypt:

- Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (water security guarantees)
- Economic integration (electricity interconnection, trade facilitation)
- Security partnership with reformed SAF (training, equipment)
- Refugee return support (orderly, voluntary)
- Red Sea security cooperation

United Arab Emirates:

- Legitimate commercial access to Sudanese gold (regulated, taxed)
- Port Sudan development concession (Red Sea logistics hub)
- Agricultural investment opportunities (food security for Gulf)
- Counter-terrorism cooperation
- Reputational rehabilitation (responsible regional actor)

Saudi Arabia:

- Red Sea security leadership role
- Peacekeeping force contributor (Arab League mission)
- Religious and cultural soft power platform
- Economic partnership (energy, food security, infrastructure)

Ethiopia:

- Border stabilization cooperation (joint patrols, trade facilitation)
- Refugee repatriation support (resources, planning)
- Trade corridor development (Sudan as Ethiopia's outlet to Red Sea)

- Nile Basin coordination (cooperative rather than competitive)

Mechanism: International Sudan Support Group (established Month 0)

- Quarterly meetings coordinating regional powers, international community
- UN/AU co-facilitation
- Align incentives, prevent spoiler competition
- Condition benefits on cooperation with transition

Budget (Coordination): \$2 million annually

4.6 Shadow Governance Structures

Months 12-24: Develop governance frameworks ready for deployment

Policy Development Working Groups:

Thematic Areas:

1. Security sector reform and DDR
2. Economic stabilization and recovery
3. Justice and reconciliation
4. Constitutional framework options
5. Federalism and decentralization
6. Resource governance (oil, gold, land, water)
7. Social services restoration (health, education)
8. Infrastructure reconstruction priorities
9. Youth employment and development
10. Women's empowerment and GBV prevention

Process:

- Each working group: 15-20 Sudanese experts + international advisors
- Research Sudanese context and international best practices
- Produce policy briefs (10-15 pages each)
- Public consultation (diaspora, online forums)
- Iterative refinement

Output: Transition Policy Library

- 50+ policy briefs ready for implementation
- Sudanese-owned solutions informed by international experience
- Public resource for stakeholders

Budget: \$2 million

Partners: Think tanks, universities, international development organizations

5. Phase I: Security Stabilization (Months 1–18)

This phase begins only after preconditions met (Section 3).

5.1 Entry Conditions

Verified prerequisites before Phase I activation:

Military:

- One of three scenarios achieved (SAF victory, negotiated settlement, or exhaustion-based fragmentation stabilization)
- Combat intensity reduced by 70%+ from peak
- Clear framework for armed group disposition agreed (even if implementation pending)

Political:

- SAF leadership commits publicly to civilian transition timeline
- Regional guarantor states (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia) align on support framework
- International Support Group operational with pledged resources

Economic:

- International financial institutions ready to provide emergency budget support (\$500M+ pledged)
- Debt relief interim measures activated

Humanitarian:

- Access to 60%+ of territory for aid delivery
- Population movement (return/relocation) feasible and beginning

Decision Point: International Support Group formally declares "Phase I Entry Conditions Met"

5.2 Military Resolution Scenarios

Implementation varies by how conflict ends:

Scenario A: SAF Military Victory (Most Likely)

Characteristics:

- SAF regains control of Khartoum, major cities, strategic routes
- RSF remnants in rural strongholds or fled to neighboring countries
- Armed groups either defeated, surrendered, or accepted SAF authority

Transition Implications:

- SAF in dominant position, must be convinced to civilianize
- Leverage: International rehabilitation, debt relief, economic recovery
- Risk: SAF triumphalism resists meaningful reform
- Mitigation: Condition all benefits on civilianization timeline adherence

Armed Group Disposition:

- RSF fighters: Disarm → cantonment → vetting → DDR or prosecution
- Other militias: Case-by-case negotiation (integrate, disarm, or pursue)
- Timeline: 18-36 months for full disarmament

Scenario B: Negotiated Settlement

Characteristics:

- Neither side achieves victory, both exhausted
- International/regional pressure forces negotiations
- SAF and RSF agree to ceasefire with RSF disarmament framework
- International security guarantees provided

Transition Implications:

- Requires robust international peacekeeping (8,000-10,000 troops)
- RSF disarmament phased and verified
- SAF civilianization parallel to RSF dissolution
- Higher risk of spoiler violence

Armed Group Disposition:

- RSF: Phased cantonment → disarm → individual vetting → DDR/prosecution/integration
- International force secures process
- Economic incorporation incentives critical

Scenario C: Fragmentation and Exhaustion

Characteristics:

- Both SAF and RSF weakened, fragmented
- Localized militia rule in various regions
- No single actor dominant
- Gradual stabilization zone-by-zone

Transition Implications:

- Most complex scenario
- Requires subnational approach (stable zones first)
- National transition delayed until critical mass of territory stabilized
- Parallel governance arrangements temporarily

Armed Group Disposition:

- Negotiate separately with each militia/regional commander
- Economic incorporation and local power-sharing
- Very gradual consolidation (36-60 months)

5.3-Armed Group Disposition Framework

Guiding Principle: Consistent with SAF position that RSF and militias must disarm.

Tiered Approach:

Tier 1: Top Leadership (RSF, Major Militias)

- **Demand:** Unconditional disarmament and cantonment
- **Process:** International supervised surrender of weapons and territory
- **Accountability:** Subject to war crimes investigations and prosecutions
- **No Political Role:** Excluded from transitional governance
- **Economic:** Assets frozen, subject to confiscation proceedings

Tier 2: Mid-Level Commanders

- **Demand:** Disarmament and cooperation with transition
- **Process:** Case-by-case review
- **Accountability:** Conditional amnesty (cooperation = leniency; obstruction = prosecution)
- **Economic:** Opportunity for legitimate business (if assets legally acquired)
- **Reintegration:** Possible role in local security (reformed, civilian oversight)

Tier 3: Rank-and-File Fighters

- **Demand:** Surrender weapons, enter DDR
- **Process:** Cantonment → screening → reintegration
- **Accountability:** General amnesty (unless individual atrocities documented)
- **Economic:** DDR stipends, vocational training, employment programs
- **Reintegration:** Civilian life with support

Implementation (Months 1-36):

Phase A: Cantonment (Months 1-12)

- Establish 15-20 cantonment sites (international supervision)
- Combatants report to designated locations
- Surrender weapons (documented and destroyed)
- Biometric registration
- Initial screening (war crimes, leadership role)

Phase B: Disarmament (Months 6-24)

- Weapons collection and destruction
- Heavy weapons first, small arms later
- International verification (AU, UN observers)
- Penalties for hidden caches

Phase C: Demobilization (Months 12-36)

- Medical screening and treatment
- Psychosocial support
- Vocational assessment
- Family reunification
- Distribution of DDR benefits

Phase D: Reintegration (Months 18-48+)

- Vocational training (agriculture, construction, services)
- Job placement programs
- Micro-credit and small business support
- Community reconciliation processes
- Monitoring and follow-up

Budget: \$1.2 billion over 36 months

Funding: UN assessed contributions, bilateral donors, IFIs

Lead: UNDP DDR program with AU implementation support

5.4 Humanitarian Access and Confidence Building

Objective: Use humanitarian delivery to build trust and prepare for political transition.

Humanitarian Ceasefires (Months 1-6):

Approach:

- Negotiate 30-day renewable ceasefires in specific zones
- Link to food aid, medical supplies, water system repairs
- Both SAF and armed groups benefit from population goodwill
- Violations trigger suspension of aid to responsible party

Initial Zones (3-5 locations):

- High humanitarian need + strategic location
- Example: Khartoum neighborhoods, Darfur urban centers, agricultural zones

Monitoring:

- International observers (ICRC, UN agencies)

- Community reporting mechanisms
- Satellite imagery verification
- Public reporting of violations

Expansion (Months 6-12):

- Add economic activity to ceasefire zones (markets, agriculture)
- Connect zones with transport corridors
- Create expanding belt of stability

Success Metrics:

- 50% reduction in conflict incidents in target zones
- 3 million+ people in stable humanitarian access areas
- Aid delivery sustained 90+ days

Joint Humanitarian Coordination (Months 6-18):

Mechanism:

- SAF and civilian authorities coordinate aid delivery
- International facilitators (UN agencies, ICRC)
- Focus on non-controversial needs (child vaccination, clean water)
- Build habits of cooperation

Outcome: By Month 18, functional coordination mechanisms operating

Budget: \$2.5 billion (humanitarian aid and delivery infrastructure)

Funding: UN appeals, bilateral donors, WFP, UNICEF

5.5 International Security Guarantees

Problem: Without external security guarantee, spoilers can derail transition.

Solution: Regional Stabilization Force (Months 6-48)

Mandate:

- Ceasefire monitoring and verification
- Protection of humanitarian corridors
- Cantonment site security (DDR process)
- Rapid response to ceasefire violations
- Deterrence against spoiler violence
- **NOT:** Combat operations or regime change

Composition:

- 8,000-10,000 troops

- African Union mission with Arab League participation
- Contributing countries: Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia
- International observers: UN, UK, EU

Command Structure:

- AU-led with UN Security Council mandate
- Egyptian general as force commander (acceptable to SAF)
- Saudi Arabia deputy commander (balances regional interests)
- Civilian oversight board (international + Sudanese)

Rules of Engagement:

- Defensive posture, protection of mission and civilians
- Authority to respond to systematic ceasefire violations
- Coordination with SAF (not subordination)

Deployment Timeline:

- Month 6: Advance team and headquarters
- Month 9: Initial battalions (3,000 troops)
- Month 12: Full operational capacity (8,000 troops)
- Month 48: Begin drawdown (conditions-based)

Budget: \$600 million annually

Funding: UN assessed contributions 60%, Gulf states 30%, bilateral 10%

Legal Framework:

- UN Security Council Resolution (Chapter VII mandate)
- Status of Forces Agreement with Sudanese authorities
- AU Peace and Security Council authorization

5.6 Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification

Ceasefire Monitoring Commission (established Month 1)

Structure:

- Co-chaired by AU and Arab League representatives
- Members: Egypt, UAE, Kenya, South Africa, international observers
- Technical secretariat (international staff)
- Regional offices in 10 locations

Functions:

- Receive and investigate violation reports
- Coordinate with Regional Stabilization Force

- Public reporting (weekly)
- Sanctions recommendations (for systematic violators)
- Mediation of local disputes

Verification Mechanisms:

- Ground observers (Regional Stabilization Force, UN)
- Satellite imagery analysis (commercial and government)
- Community reporting networks (civil society partners)
- Open-source intelligence (media monitoring)

Violation Response Protocol:

Violation Severity	Response	Timeline
Minor (isolated incident, few casualties)	Warning, investigation, public report	48 hours
Moderate (pattern of violations, significant casualties)	Suspension of benefits (aid access), targeted sanctions	7 days
Major (systematic violations, offensive operations)	Full sanctions, Regional Stabilization Force intervention, international condemnation	Immediate

Budget: \$50 million annually

Funding: UN, AU, bilateral donors

6. Phase II: Emergency Governance (Months 12–30)

Purpose: Establish transitional authority that stabilizes state, delivers services, and prepares for full civilianization.

6.1 Transitional Authority Structure

Formation: Month 12 (overlaps with Phase I to ensure continuity)

Constitutional Basis:

- Transitional Constitutional Declaration (negotiated Months 6-12)
- Defines powers, limitations, and sunset clauses
- International witnesses (AU, UN, guarantor states)

Sovereignty Council (Collegial Head of State, 9 members, 24-month term)

Composition:

- 5 civilians (selected via merit-based process - see Phase V methodology applied early)
- 2 SAF representatives (Chief of Staff + designee)
- 2 independent/professional figures (judicial, academic)

Selection:

- Civilians: Independent selection panel (Sudanese professionals + international observers)
- SAF: Internal designation
- Independents: Consensus among stakeholders

Chair:

- Rotating every 6 months among civilian members (not military)
- Ceremonial head of state functions
- No executive power concentration

Decision-Making:

- Supermajority (6/9) for major decisions
- Simple majority (5/9) for routine matters
- Military members cannot block civilian governance reforms

Sunset Clause:

- Month 30: SAF representation reduced to 1 member
- Month 42: SAF exits Sovereignty Council entirely
- Replaced by additional civilians (selected via Phase V process)

Cabinet of Ministers (Executive Authority, 22 ministers)

Composition:

- 18 civilian technocrats (selected via competency-based process)
- 2 military liaison ministers (Defense, one other TBD)
- 2 hybrid positions (Interior, Intelligence - civilian minister, military deputy)

Key Portfolios (Must Be Civilian):

- Finance and Economic Planning (**Critical**)
- Justice
- Foreign Affairs
- Health
- Education
- Agriculture
- Infrastructure
- Women and Social Development
- Youth and Sports

- Trade and Industry
- Information and Communications
- Local Government

Military-Controlled (Temporary):

- Defense (with civilian oversight board)
- One other (negotiated - potentially Border Security or Interior)

Hybrid (Civilian-Led, Military Cooperation):

- Interior (police, civil security)
- Intelligence (with legislative oversight)

Selection Process:

- Open applications (Sudanese professionals globally)
- Assessment panels (technical competency + integrity)
- Sovereignty Council approval
- Public disclosure of qualifications

Term: 24 months, non-renewable (prevents entrenchment)

Legislative Council (150 members, advisory and oversight)

Composition:

- 100 civilians (regional/sectoral representation via selection)
- 30 political party delegates (proportional to pre-conflict support)
- 20 armed forces/security (sunset Month 30)

Functions:

- Budget approval (Cabinet proposes, Council approves)
- Legislative oversight (question ministers, investigate)
- Advisory role on policy
- **Not:** Full legislative power (reserved for elected parliament)

Powers:

- Approve transitional budget
- Confirm key appointments (judges, audit, anti-corruption)
- Investigate government performance
- Recommend policy directions

Limitations:

- Cannot dismiss Cabinet (only Sovereignty Council can)
- Decisions advisory unless specified (budget, appointments)

Sunset:

- Month 30: Armed forces members exit
- Month 66: Dissolved upon civilian authority transition

6.2 SAF Role and Civilianization Timeline

SAF Position in Transition:

Months 12-30: Partnership Phase

- SAF retains 2 seats on Sovereignty Council
- Defense Ministry under SAF (with oversight)
- Participation in security decision-making
- Responsible for armed group disarmament enforcement

Months 30-42: Transition Phase

- Sovereignty Council representation reduced to 1
- Defense Minister remains military but civilian oversight strengthened
- Legislative Council military bloc exits
- SAF Chief of Staff becomes professional advisor (not decision-maker)

Months 42-54: Subordination Phase

- Final SAF member exits Sovereignty Council
- Defense Minister becomes civilian (SAF Chief remains military professional)
- National Security Council established (civilian majority)
- SAF fully subordinate to civilian authority

Months 54+: Professional Military

- SAF as professional, non-political institution
- Subordinate to elected civilian government
- Constitutional role: National defense, border security
- Prohibited: Political activity, commercial enterprises

Verification Mechanisms:

Independent Oversight Board (established Month 12)

- 7 members: 4 Sudanese civilians, 3 international experts
- Monitor civilianization timeline adherence
- Investigate deviations or resistance
- Public quarterly reports
- Recommend sanctions for non-compliance

International Verification:

- Regional Stabilization Force monitors military activities
- Diplomatic reporting by guarantor states
- Condition debt relief and aid tranches on compliance

SAF Incentives for Cooperation:

Institutional:

- Survival and prestige as reformed, professional force
- International partnerships (training, equipment, exchanges)
- Modern capabilities (replacing Soviet-era stock)

Economic:

- Officer corps pensions guaranteed
- Commercial interests divested but compensated
- State budget adequately funds military operations

Legal:

- Amnesty for cooperation (excluding top war criminals)
- Protection from politically-motivated prosecutions
- International security partnerships (legitimacy)

Penalties for Non-Compliance:

- Delay or suspension of debt relief tranches
- Targeted sanctions on resistant officers
- International isolation
- ICC referrals for obstruction

6.3 Civilian Ministerial Control

Critical Success Factor: Civilians must control key ministries from Month 12.

Finance and Economic Planning Ministry

Why Critical:

- Controls state resources
- Approves all government spending (including military)
- Negotiates with IFIs and donors
- Designs economic recovery programs

Powers:

- Countersignature required for all expenditures
- Budget formulation and execution

- Revenue collection and management
- Audit authority over all agencies

Staffing:

- Minister: Civilian technocrat (economist, public finance expert)
- Deputies: Civilian professionals
- International advisors embedded (IMF, World Bank)

Accountability:

- Monthly public financial reports
- Quarterly audits (independent auditor general)
- Legislative Council budget hearings

Justice Ministry

Functions:

- Judicial appointments and reform
- Transitional justice framework
- Legal system reconstruction
- Anti-corruption prosecutions

Independence:

- Minister civilian (jurist or human rights expert)
- Prosecutorial independence guaranteed
- No military interference in justice processes

Foreign Affairs Ministry

Functions:

- Diplomatic relations
- International organization engagement
- Treaty negotiation
- Humanitarian coordination

Civilian Control:

- Minister: Civilian diplomat or international relations expert
- Consults SAF on security matters but leads foreign policy
- Engages international partners on transition support

Other Civilian Portfolios:

All service delivery ministries (Health, Education, Agriculture, Infrastructure) under civilian control from Day 1.

Ensures: Resources directed to public welfare, not military or factional interests.

6.4 Legislative Framework

Transitional Legal Order (Months 12-66):

Hierarchy:

1. Transitional Constitutional Declaration (supreme law)
2. Pre-conflict laws (where not inconsistent)
3. Transitional decrees (Sovereignty Council + Cabinet)
4. Ministerial regulations

Transitional Constitutional Declaration (TCD)

Core Provisions:

- Bill of Rights (comprehensive, immediately enforceable)
- Separation of powers (executive, judicial, legislative oversight)
- Federal structure (principles, details in final constitution)
- Military subordination to civilian authority
- Transitional timeline and sunset clauses
- Amendment requires supermajority (7/9 Sovereignty Council + 2/3 Legislative Council)

Judicial System:

Supreme Court (7 justices, civilian)

- Interprets TCD
- Judicial review of executive actions
- Final appeals court

Appointment:

- Nominated by Justice Minister
- Approved by Legislative Council (2/3 majority)
- Term: Duration of transition + 5 years (ensures independence post-transition)

Lower Courts:

- Gradual restoration and staffing
- Focus on civil and criminal justice
- Transitional justice mechanisms (separate, see Phase IV)

Anti-Corruption Commission (independent)

- 7 commissioners (Sudanese professionals)
- Investigative and prosecutorial powers

- Reports to Sovereignty Council and Legislative Council
- Budget protected (cannot be cut by executive)

Auditor General (independent)

- Audits all government spending
- Public reports
- Refers cases to Anti-Corruption Commission

6.5 Subnational Administration Restoration

Objective: Restore governance at state and local levels.

Phased Approach:

Phase A: Stable Zones (Months 12-24)

Target: Red Sea, Northern State, parts of Gedaref

Approach:

- Appoint civilian governors (technocrats, not political figures)
- Restore provincial administration (staff recalled/hired)
- Focus on service delivery:
 - Health clinics reopening
 - Schools resuming
 - Water and sanitation
 - Local markets and agriculture support

Budget: \$150 million (3 states × \$50M annually)

Phase B: Recovering Zones (Months 24-42)

Target: River Nile, Kassala, Sennar, parts of Kordofan

Approach:

- Civilian governors appointed
- Local councils elected (limited franchise initially: community leaders, professionals)
- Gradual expansion of services as security improves

Budget: \$300 million (6 states × \$50M annually)

Phase C: Contested/Post-Conflict Zones (Months 42-66)

Target: Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile

Approach:

- Hybrid model: Civilian governor + traditional authority partnership
- Reconciliation processes parallel to administration
- Heavy international support (NGOs, UN agencies)

Budget: \$400 million (8 states × \$50M annually)

Governance Models (Flexible by Context):

Model A: Appointed Governor + Local Council

- Urban areas, weak traditional structures
- Governor appointed by central authority
- Council elected after 12 months stability

Model B: Traditional Authority Partnership

- Rural areas, strong customary systems
- Governor coordinates with Nazirs, Omdas, tribal leaders
- Hybrid governance respecting local legitimacy

Model C: Direct Election (Later Phases)

- Stable areas ready for democratic participation
- Mayor and council fully elected
- Month 48+ in pilot locations

6.6 Accountability and Oversight Mechanisms

Preventing Abuse and Ensuring Transparency:

1. Independent Ethics Commission

Functions:

- Vet all transitional officials (conflict of interest, assets)
- Monitor ethical compliance
- Investigate violations
- Recommend sanctions (dismissal, prosecution)

Composition:

- 7 members (Sudanese civil society, legal professionals)
- International advisors (2, non-voting)
- Appointed by Sovereignty Council, approved by Legislative Council

Powers:

- Mandatory asset declarations (public for senior officials)
- Investigate corruption allegations
- Refer cases to Anti-Corruption Commission
- Annual public integrity report

Budget: \$10 million annually

2. Civil Society Oversight Network

Function:

- Monitor government performance
- Community-level accountability
- Amplify citizen voices
- Early warning for abuses

Structure:

- Coordinated civil society organizations
- Regional networks
- Online platform for reporting
- Protection mechanisms for whistleblowers

Support: \$5 million annually (capacity building, security)

3. International Monitoring

Guarantor States Oversight:

- Quarterly review missions
- Verify benchmarks (civilianization timeline, service delivery)
- Reporting to International Support Group
- Condition aid tranches on performance

UN Human Rights Monitoring:

- OHCHR presence (50 monitors)
- Document abuses
- Public reporting
- Support victims

Budget: \$20 million annually

4. Media Freedom and Access to Information

Protections:

- TCD guarantees press freedom
- Access to information law (government transparency)

- Independent media supported (grants, training)
- Protection for journalists

Restrictions:

- Hate speech prohibited
- National security exemptions (narrow, judicially reviewable)

Support: \$15 million (media development, journalist security)

5. Public Participation Mechanisms

Town Halls and Consultations:

- Monthly public forums in each state
- Ministers present and answer questions
- Online participation for diaspora
- Feedback incorporated into policy

Digital Platform:

- Government performance dashboard (public)
- Budget transparency (all expenditures published)
- Service delivery metrics (health, education, water)
- Complaint and feedback system

Budget: \$5 million (platform development, facilitation)

Sections 7-17 and Annexes

7. Phase III: Security Sector Transformation (Months 24–54)

Purpose: Transform Sudan's security architecture from conflict-era fragmentation to professional, civilian-controlled institutions.

7.1 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

Scale: 150,000-200,000 combatants (RSF remnants, militias, excess SAF personnel)

Phased Implementation:

Stage 1: Voluntary DDR (Months 24-36)

Target Population: 40,000 combatants

- RSF rank-and-file willing to demobilize early
- Militia fighters from dissolved groups
- SAF irregulars and volunteers

Process:

1. **Registration and Cantonment** (Months 24-30)
 - Report to designated sites (20 locations nationally)
 - Biometric registration
 - Weapons surrender (documented and destroyed)
 - Initial medical and psychosocial screening
2. **Demobilization** (Months 27-33)
 - Transitional support allowance (\$300/month for 12 months)
 - Health screening and treatment
 - Psychosocial counseling (trauma, PTSD)
 - Family reunification support
3. **Reintegration** (Months 30-48+)
 - Vocational training (6-month programs):
 - Agriculture (35% of participants)
 - Construction trades (25%)
 - Transport and logistics (15%)
 - Small business/services (15%)
 - Other (10%)
 - Job placement assistance
 - Micro-credit schemes (\$500-2,000 startup capital)
 - Community acceptance programs

GIZ Role (German Development Cooperation):

- **Lead Technical Partner for Vocational Training**
- Curriculum development (utilizing GIZ's Technical and Vocational Education and Training [TVET] expertise)
- Training center establishment (utilizing existing GIZ infrastructure where available)
- Trainer training (build Sudanese capacity)
- Quality assurance and certification
- Agriculture extension services (GIZ's rural development programs)
- Small business development support
- **Budget Contribution:** €50 million over Stage 1

Cantonment Site Specifications:

- 20 sites × 2,000 capacity = 40,000 total
- Infrastructure: Housing, medical clinic, mess hall, training facilities
- Security: Regional Stabilization Force + SAF presence
- Administration: UNDP DDR unit + local civilian authorities
- Duration: 3-6 months per combatant

Stage 2: Group-Based DDR (Months 36-48)

Target Population: 80,000 combatants

- Intact militia units negotiated collectively
- RSF regional formations
- Armed groups with command structures

Approach:

- Unit commanders negotiate on behalf of fighters
- Collective cantonment (preserve social cohesion initially)
- Gradual transition from military to civilian structure
- Economic incorporation for commanders (see Section 7.3)

Advantages:

- Faster processing (collective vs. individual negotiations)
- Commanders incentivized to deliver fighters
- Reduces spoiler risk (commanders control units)

Challenges:

- Risk of commanders maintaining parallel authority
- Requires robust monitoring
- Economic benefits must genuinely reach rank-and-file

GIZ Role:

- **Cooperative and Small Business Development**
- Former combatant cooperatives (agriculture, construction)
- Business skills training
- Access to markets and finance
- Monitoring to prevent commander exploitation
- **Budget Contribution:** €40 million

Stage 3: Final Integration/Downsizing (Months 48-54)

Target Population: 40,000-80,000

- SAF force reduction (right-sizing to 80,000-100,000 professional force)
- Remaining RSF/militia holdouts
- Vetting failures (human rights violators ineligible for security forces)

SAF Downsizing:

- Voluntary retirement packages (attractive for older officers/soldiers)
- Pension guarantees
- Transition to civilian employment
- Honoring service while reducing force size

Forced Disarmament:

- Remaining armed groups refusing DDR
- Regional Stabilization Force + reformed SAF operations
- Ultima ratio (last resort after incentives exhausted)

Total DDR Budget: \$1.4 billion over 30 months

Funding Sources:

- UN assessed contributions: \$500M
- World Bank/IFIs: \$400M
- Bilateral donors (Germany/GIZ, UK, US, Norway, Netherlands): \$300M
- Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE rehabilitation): \$200M

7.2 SAF Professionalization Program

Objective: Transform SAF from political actor to professional, civilian-subordinate military.

Assessment and Planning (Months 24-30)

Comprehensive Force Review:

- Current personnel: ~100,000 (down from pre-conflict 120,000+)
- Equipment audit (operational vs. obsolete)
- Organizational structure assessment
- Training needs analysis
- Budget requirements

International Advisory Team:

- UK Ministry of Defence (lead)
- US Africa Command
- German Bundeswehr (training systems)
- Egyptian military (regional context)
- Kenyan Defence Forces (peacekeeping expertise)

Output: SAF Transformation Plan (18-month roadmap)

Vetting and Personnel Reform (Months 30-42)

Leadership Vetting:

- All generals and colonels reviewed
- Criteria:
 - Human rights record (war crimes disqualify)
 - Professional competence
 - Corruption history

- Commitment to civilian subordination

Process:

- Independent vetting panel (Sudanese civilians + international experts)
- Evidence-based assessments
- Due process (officers can respond to allegations)
- Appeals mechanism

Outcome:

- 30-40% senior officers retired (with pensions, not prosecution unless war crimes)
- Promotions from reform-minded mid-level officers
- New command structure

Rank-and-File:

- General screening (identify serious human rights violators)
- Retraining for all personnel
- Career development pathways (meritocratic)

Doctrine and Training Reform (Months 36-54)

New Military Doctrine:

- National defense (not domestic politics)
- Border security and territorial integrity
- Peacekeeping and regional cooperation
- Counterterrorism (not regime protection)
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster response

Training Programs:

Officer Education:

- Staff College reform (curriculum modernization)
- International exchanges (UK, Germany, Kenya, Jordan)
- Civilian-military relations training
- Human rights and laws of armed conflict
- Leadership and ethics

Enlisted Training:

- Basic training standardization
- Technical skills (maintenance, communications, engineering)
- Peacekeeping preparation
- Community engagement

GIZ Role in SAF Professionalization:

- **Civilian Oversight Capacity Building**
 - Train civilian Defense Ministry staff
 - Parliamentary oversight training (Legislative Council defense committee)
 - Civil society monitoring capacity
 - Audit and financial management systems
- **Infrastructure and Logistics Reform**
 - Supply chain management training
 - Maintenance and sustainment systems
 - Resource efficiency (reduce waste/corruption)
- **Community Relations Programs**
 - Civil-military cooperation training
 - Disaster response partnerships
 - Infrastructure development (military engineers for civilian projects)
- **Budget Contribution:** €35 million over 18 months

Equipment and Capability Modernization (Months 42-66)

Philosophy: Sufficient for legitimate defense, not regional power projection

Priorities:

1. Command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)
2. Border surveillance and control systems
3. Airlift and mobility (humanitarian response, peacekeeping)
4. Maintenance and sustainment (repair existing before buying new)
5. Training infrastructure

What NOT to provide:

- Offensive capabilities (long-range missiles, heavy armor beyond defense needs)
- Systems that could threaten neighbors
- Prestige projects (showcase weapons)

Partners:

- UK: Training systems, C3I, peacekeeping equipment
- Germany/GIZ: Logistics, maintenance, sustainment
- US: Counterterrorism capabilities, airlift
- Egypt: Regional standardization, spare parts

Civil-Military Relations Institutionalization (Months 36-66)

Civilian Defense Ministry:

- Full-time civilian minister (Month 42+)
- Professional civilian staff (50-100 personnel)
- Independent from SAF command

- Policy direction, budget control, oversight

National Security Council:

- Chaired by Head of State (civilian)
- Members: PM, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Intelligence, SAF Chief (advisory)
- Civilian majority, military advises
- All major security decisions

Parliamentary Oversight:

- Defense Committee (Legislative Council → Parliament)
- Budget approval
- Investigative authority
- Regular hearings with military leadership

SAF Professionalization Budget: \$450 million over 30 months

Funding:

- UK: £80 million (training, equipment, oversight systems)
- Germany/GIZ: €75 million (capacity building, infrastructure)
- US: \$100 million (counterterrorism, mobility)
- Egypt: \$50 million in-kind (training, facilities)
- IFIs: \$145 million (infrastructure, salaries)

7.3 Militia Dissolution and Combatant Absorption

Challenge: RSF and militias are not just military—they're economic and social networks.

Two-Track Strategy:

Track A: Forced Dissolution (Months 24-42)

Target: Groups with extensive war crimes, non-negotiable leadership

Approach:

- Ultimatum: Disarm or face military action
- Regional Stabilization Force + SAF joint operations (if necessary)
- Combatants eligible for DDR (leaders prosecuted)
- Economic networks dismantled, assets seized

Criteria for Track A:

- Documented mass atrocities (massacres, ethnic cleansing)

- Leadership refuses negotiation
- Groups threatening transition stability

Track B: Economic Incorporation (Months 30-54)

Target: Groups with negotiable commanders, legitimate economic activities mixed with illicit

Philosophy: Transform militia networks into legal businesses, remove weapons while preserving livelihoods.

Economic Sectors:

1. Gold Mining (Largest sector)

Current Reality:

- RSF/militias control artisanal mining (Darfur, Northern State)
- \$2-4 billion annual revenue (mostly smuggled)
- Thousands of miners dependent on militia-controlled supply chains

Incorporation Model:

- Mining licenses issued to former commanders (individually or cooperatively)
- International certification (Kimberley Process adaptation)
- Taxation (15% royalty to state)
- Weapons surrender required for license
- Banking access (legitimate revenue streams)
- International buyers (Dubai, Geneva) accept certified gold only

Implementation:

- Independent audit of mining operations (who owns what)
- Asset declarations (freeze illicit gains, legitimize legal activity)
- Gradual transition (6-12 months per operation)
- Employment for former fighters (legitimate mining jobs)

GIZ Role in Gold Sector Formalization:

- **Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) Formalization**
 - GIZ has extensive experience in ASM governance (projects in Burkina Faso, Colombia, Mongolia)
 - Technical assistance for mining cooperatives
 - Environmental and safety standards
 - Value chain development (processing, marketing)
 - Alternative livelihoods for areas where mining unsustainable
- **Governance and Transparency**
 - Support Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) compliance
 - Revenue tracking systems
 - Community benefit-sharing mechanisms

- **Budget Contribution:** €60 million over 24 months

International Partners:

- Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO): Gold certification
- GIZ: ASM formalization and governance
- World Bank: Mining sector reform
- UAE: Commit to purchasing only certified Sudanese gold

2. Logistics and Transport

Current Reality:

- RSF/militias control cross-border smuggling (Libya, Chad, CAR, South Sudan)
- Also legitimate trade (livestock, goods)

Incorporation Model:

- Customs and border trade licenses
- Legitimate trucking and logistics companies
- Taxation and regulation
- Border patrol cooperation (not control)

GIZ Role:

- **Trade Facilitation and Border Management**
 - GIZ trade facilitation programs (customs modernization, single window systems)
 - Border infrastructure development
 - Training for customs and border officials
- **Budget Contribution:** €20 million

3. Agriculture and Livestock

Current Reality:

- Land grabs during conflict
- Livestock theft and "taxation"
- Control of water points and grazing routes

Incorporation Model:

- Land tenure adjudication (stolen land returned or compensated)
- Legitimate ranching/farming (titled property)
- Veterinary services and market access
- Water resource cooperatives

GIZ Role in Agricultural Reintegration:

- **Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development**
 - GIZ has decades of experience in Sudanese agriculture (pre-conflict programs)
 - Land tenure support (mapping, registration, dispute resolution)
 - Irrigation rehabilitation (small-scale systems)
 - Livestock value chains (veterinary services, marketing)
 - Climate-smart agriculture training
 - Agricultural cooperatives for ex-combatants
- **Food Security Programs**
 - Seed and tool distribution
 - Post-harvest handling and storage
 - Market linkages
- **Budget Contribution:** €80 million over 36 months

Vetting and Accountability:

Commander-Level:

- Forensic audits (asset sources—legal vs. stolen)
- Human rights vetting (war crimes disqualify from economic incorporation)
- Conditional participation (cooperation = legitimization; obstruction = prosecution)

Mid-Level:

- Case-by-case review
- Opportunity for legitimate business if clean record

Rank-and-File:

- Employment in legitimate operations (mining, logistics, agriculture)
- DDR benefits if demobilizing

Enforcement:

- International banking: Only certified operations get accounts
- Sanctions: Illicit networks blocked from formal economy
- Prosecutions: War criminals and obstinate spoilers

Economic Incorporation Budget: \$600 million over 24 months

- Licensing and regulation infrastructure: \$100M
- Gold sector formalization: \$200M (GIZ: €60M)
- Logistics and trade: \$100M (GIZ: €20M)
- Agriculture and land: \$200M (GIZ: €80M)

Total GIZ Agricultural Contribution Rationale: GIZ's long-standing presence in Sudan (programs in agriculture, water, governance since 1960s-1970s, interrupted by conflict but institutional memory remains) makes it ideal lead partner for rural economic reintegration. GIZ can:

- Rapidly re-establish field presence (know the terrain)
- Cultural and linguistic competence (long-term staff relationships)
- Holistic approach (not just agriculture, but livelihoods, governance, environment)
- Link ex-combatants to productive economy sustainably

7.4 Community Security Architecture

Objective: Replace militia "protection" with legitimate community security.

Community Policing Model (Months 30-54)

Approach:

- Recruit local police (5,000-7,000 nationally)
- Community oversight boards
- Training: Service-oriented, human rights, de-escalation
- NOT: Ex-combatants (initially—prevents militia transformation into police)

Recruitment Criteria:

- Local residents (know community)
- Clean record (vetting)
- Women representation: 30% minimum
- Youth inclusion (18-35 age range)

Training Program (6 months):

- Basic policing skills
- Sudanese law and procedures
- Human rights and ethics
- Community engagement
- Gender-based violence response
- Conflict mediation

International Partners:

- UK National Crime Agency: Training curriculum, advisors
- UN Police (UNPOL): Field mentoring
- GIZ: **Community policing infrastructure and governance**
 - Police station construction/rehabilitation
 - Equipment (non-lethal: radios, vehicles, uniforms)
 - Community oversight mechanisms
 - Police-community dialogue forums

- **Budget Contribution:** €25 million

Deployment:

- Urban areas first (Khartoum, Port Sudan, Nyala, El Obeid)
- Gradual expansion to towns and rural areas
- Partnership with traditional authorities (rural areas)

Traditional Security Mechanisms (Months 30-ongoing)

In rural areas, blend formal police with customary systems:

Ajaweed (Local Leaders):

- Authority over community disputes
- Conflict mediation
- Report serious crimes to formal police
- Paid stipend (state recognition)

Community Watch:

- Volunteer neighborhood security
- Liaison with police
- Early warning for threats

Integration:

- Formal police handle serious crimes (murder, rape, armed robbery)
- Traditional mechanisms handle disputes (land, family, livestock)
- Clear jurisdictional boundaries
- Mutual respect and cooperation

GIZ Role in Traditional-Modern Security Integration:

- **Local Governance Strengthening**
 - Training for traditional authorities (legal frameworks, human rights)
 - Community dialogue facilitation
 - Dispute resolution systems documentation and support
 - Women's participation in traditional justice (reform patriarchal biases)
- **Budget Contribution:** €15 million

Specialized Units:

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Response Units:

- Female officers (majority)
- Specialized training (trauma-informed, survivor-centered)

- Medical and psychosocial referrals
- Legal support for survivors
- Target: 50 units nationally (urban areas + conflict-affected regions)

Anti-Corruption Units:

- Economic crimes investigation
- Work with Anti-Corruption Commission
- Financial intelligence

Community Security Budget: \$250 million over 24 months

- Police recruitment and training: \$100M
- Infrastructure and equipment: \$80M (GIZ: €25M)
- Traditional security support: \$30M (GIZ: €15M)
- Specialized units: \$40M

7.5 Regional Peacekeeping Support

Duration: Months 6-66 (overlaps phases)

Regional Stabilization Force (detailed in Section 5.5)

Evolution Over Time:

Months 6-24 (Phase I-II):

- Full deployment (8,000-10,000 troops)
- Active ceasefire monitoring
- Cantonment site security
- Rapid response capability

Months 24-42 (Phase III):

- Gradual drawdown as SAF reforms
- Focus on contested areas (Darfur, Kordofan)
- Support DDR implementation
- Backstop for spoiler management

Months 42-66 (Phase III-IV):

- Reduced presence (3,000-5,000 troops)
- Observation and advisory role
- Quick reaction force (reserve)
- Prepare for withdrawal

Month 66+:

- Exit when civilian authority established
- Conditions: SAF reformed, DDR complete, security stable
- Possible extension if needed (conditions-based)

Total Regional Stabilization Force Budget: \$2.4 billion (Months 6-66)

- \$600M annually (Months 6-30)
- \$400M annually (Months 30-54)
- \$200M annually (Months 54-66)

7.6 Border Security and Control

Challenge: Porous borders facilitate arms smuggling, militia resupply, illicit trade.

Comprehensive Border Management (Months 30-66)

Priority Borders:

1. Libya (arms smuggling, Wagner remnants)
2. Chad (militia cross-border operations)
3. Central African Republic (insecurity spillover)
4. South Sudan (ethnic militias, cattle raiding)
5. Ethiopia (trade and refugee flows)
6. Egypt (legitimate but needs control)

Infrastructure Development:

- Border posts (30 main crossings)
- Surveillance systems (towers, sensors)
- Roads (patrol access)
- Communications (radio network)

GIZ Role in Border Infrastructure:

- **Border Crossing Point Development**
 - Infrastructure design and construction
 - Equipment provision (scanners, computers, vehicles)
 - Facility management systems
 - Environmental and social standards
- **Budget Contribution:** €40 million

Personnel and Training:

- Border guards (5,000 personnel)
- Customs officers (reformed, anti-corruption training)
- Immigration officials
- Joint patrols with neighbors (bilateral agreements)

International Support:

- EU Border Management Program: Training and equipment
- GIZ: Infrastructure and systems
- Bilateral (Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia): Joint patrol agreements
- UNODC: Anti-smuggling capacity

Monitoring and Intelligence:

- Satellite monitoring (commercial imagery)
- Intelligence sharing (regional cooperation)
- Community reporting networks (border residents as eyes and ears)

Border Security Budget: \$400 million over 36 months

- Infrastructure: \$200M (GIZ: €40M)
 - Personnel and training: \$150M
 - Surveillance systems: \$50M
-

8. Phase IV: Justice and Reconciliation (Months 36–66)

Guiding Principle: Justice must strengthen transition, not derail it.

8.1 Documentation and Truth-Telling

National Documentation Center (established Month 36)

Functions:

- Consolidate evidence from pre-transition phase (Section 4.3)
- Ongoing documentation of violations
- Public archive (anonymized victims)
- Research access (scholars, prosecutors, journalists)

Database Categories:

- Mass atrocities (27,000+ incidents documented)
- Gender-based violence (15,000+ cases)
- Economic crimes (3,000+ individuals/entities)
- Forced displacement (2 million+ families)
- Destruction of civilian infrastructure

Truth-Telling Process (Months 36-54)

Community-Level Forums:

- Public hearings in all 18 states
- Survivors share testimonies
- Perpetrators opportunity to confess (not immunity, but considered in sentencing)
- Traditional reconciliation practices incorporated

National Truth, Accountability, and Healing Commission (established Month 36)

Mandate (48 months):

- Document conflict causes and violations
- Identify patterns and responsibility
- Recommend accountability measures
- Propose reparations framework
- Foster national healing

Composition:

- 11 commissioners (Sudanese: 7, International: 4)
- Regional representation
- Women: 40%
- Victim representatives: 3

Selection:

- Nominations from civil society, traditional authorities, international partners
- Vetting by Independent Ethics Commission
- Approval by Sovereignty Council and Legislative Council

Powers:

- Subpoena witnesses and documents
- Hold public and private hearings
- Grant conditional amnesty (political crimes, not mass atrocities)
- Recommend prosecutions to Attorney General

GIZ Role in Documentation and Truth-Telling:

- **Archive and Documentation Systems**
 - Digital archive infrastructure (secure, accessible)
 - Document management training
 - Oral history methodologies
 - Protection protocols for sensitive information
- **Community Dialogue Support**
 - Facilitation training for local leaders
 - Dialogue forum infrastructure
 - Psychosocial support for participants
 - Media and communications (broadcast hearings, accessibility)
- **Budget Contribution:** €20 million

Output (Month 66):

- **Final Report** (comprehensive account of conflict)
- Public launch (ceremony, distribution)
- Educational curriculum (schools teach conflict history)
- Memorial proposals

8.2 Sequenced Accountability Strategy

Critical: Prosecutions sequenced to avoid destabilizing transition.

Sequence:

Stage 1: Economic Crimes (Months 42-54)

Rationale:

- Less politically explosive than war crimes
- Builds judicial capacity and public trust
- Divides elites (clean vs. corrupt)
- Recovers assets for reparations

Target:

- Officials who embezzled state funds
- Illicit enrichment during conflict
- Tax evasion, money laundering
- Procurement fraud

Prosecutions:

- 200-300 cases over 12 months
- Civilian officials, military logistics officers, militia commanders (economic role)
- Asset freezes and recovery

International Support:

- Financial forensics (Swiss, UK, US experts)
- Asset tracing (banking cooperation: Switzerland, UAE, Kenya)
- Legal assistance (prosecution training)

Stage 2: Gender-Based Violence (Months 48-60)

Rationale:

- Victim-centered justice
- Strong international support and norms
- Less likely to trigger coup/spoiler violence

- Builds momentum for broader accountability

Target:

- Rape and sexual slavery cases (individual and command responsibility)
- Forced marriage and abduction
- Gender-based torture

Prosecutions:

- 150-200 cases
- Commanders (command responsibility) + direct perpetrators
- Specialized GBV courts

Support for Survivors:

- Legal representation (pro bono lawyers)
- Psychosocial services
- Protection from retaliation
- Reparations (priority group)

GIZ Role in GBV Justice:

- **Survivor Support Systems**
 - Safe houses and counseling centers
 - Legal aid clinics
 - Economic empowerment for survivors
 - Community reintegration programs
- **Judicial Capacity for GBV Cases**
 - Training for judges and prosecutors (trauma-informed)
 - Witness protection systems
 - Court infrastructure (private testimony rooms)
- **Budget Contribution:** €25 million

Stage 3: Mass Atrocities (Months 54-66)

Rationale:

- Security sector reform must be sufficiently advanced
- SAF professionalized, Regional Stabilization Force still present
- Public demand and international pressure

Target:

- Massacres and ethnic cleansing
- Starvation crimes
- Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure

- Top architects (generals, RSF leadership, militia commanders)

Prosecutions:

- 50-100 cases (focus on leaders, not all foot soldiers)
- Hybrid approach: National courts + ICC cooperation

Challenges:

- Coup risk (prosecuting generals)
- Spoiler violence (militia leaders' followers)
- Political backlash

Mitigation:

- International guarantees (Regional Stabilization Force)
- Condition debt relief on cooperation (not obstruction)
- Focus on worst offenders (not every mid-level officer)
- SAF reformers protected (vetting separated clean from criminal officers)

Stage 4: Political Repression and Pre-2023 Crimes (Months 60-72)**Target:**

- 2019 revolution massacres (June 3 sit-in)
- Darfur genocide perpetrators (2003-2004, ongoing accountability)
- Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile crimes (2011 onward)
- Intelligence and security apparatus abuses

Rationale:

- Addresses historical grievances
- Completes accountability arc
- By Month 60, security sector fully reformed, civilian authority established

International Criminal Court (ICC) Cooperation:**Existing ICC Investigations:**

- Darfur situation (Omar al-Bashir et al.)
- 2023 conflict (potential new investigations)

Sudanese Approach:

- Complementarity principle: Sudanese courts prosecute where capable
- ICC handles cases Sudanese courts cannot (lack of custody, insufficient capacity)
- Cooperation agreement (evidence sharing, witness protection)

Al-Bashir and Former Regime Leaders:

- Transfer to ICC (Darfur charges)
- Domestic prosecution (economic crimes, repression)
- Timing: Month 48-60 (after transition stabilized)

8.3 Reparations Framework

Objective: Acknowledge harm, support recovery, prevent recurrence.

Reparations Fund (Target: \$5 billion)

Sources:

- Recovered stolen assets: \$2-3 billion (economic crimes prosecutions)
- International contributions: \$1.5 billion (pledged at reconstruction conference)
- Domestic resource mobilization: \$500 million (gold royalties, budget allocation)
- Asset confiscations: \$500 million (war criminals, militias)

Priority Beneficiaries:

Tier 1: Gender-Based Violence Survivors (30%)

- Medical and psychosocial care
- Economic empowerment (training, micro-credit)
- Housing and relocation support
- Education for children
- Legal assistance

GIZ Role in GBV Survivor Reparations:

- **Economic Empowerment Programs**
 - Vocational training for survivors
 - Micro-credit and business development
 - Cooperative formation (survivor-led businesses)
 - Market linkages and mentorship
- **Psychosocial and Health Services**
 - Training for service providers
 - Mobile health clinics (conflict-affected areas)
 - Mental health integration in primary care
- **Budget Contribution:** €30 million

Tier 2: Families of Killed and Disappeared (25%)

- Financial compensation (\$5,000-10,000 per victim)
- Educational scholarships for orphans

- Healthcare access
- Memorial participation

Tier 3: Displaced Communities (25%)

- Return and resettlement support
- Housing reconstruction
- Land restitution or compensation
- Livelihood restoration (agriculture, small business)

GIZ Role in Displacement Reparations:

- **Sustainable Return and Reintegration**
 - Community infrastructure (water, schools, health centers)
 - Livelihoods restoration (seeds, tools, livestock)
 - Land tenure regularization
 - Social cohesion programs (returnees and host communities)
- **Budget Contribution:** €45 million

Tier 4: Destroyed Infrastructure (20%)

- Schools and hospitals rebuilding
- Water and sanitation systems
- Community centers and markets
- Cultural and religious sites

Symbolic Reparations:

- National memorial (Khartoum)
- Regional memorials (each state)
- Days of remembrance
- Official apologies (government, institutions)
- Educational curriculum (conflict history)

Reparations Administration:

- Independent Reparations Commission (7 members)
- Application and verification process
- Transparent distribution
- Anti-fraud measures
- Quarterly public reporting

GIZ Contribution to Reparations Administration:

- **Systems and Governance**
 - Beneficiary registration database
 - Payment systems (mobile money, banks)
 - Monitoring and evaluation
 - Fraud prevention

- Grievance mechanisms
- **Budget Contribution:** €10 million

Total GIZ Justice and Reparations Budget: €130 million (Months 36-72)

8.4 Traditional Justice Integration

Principle: Formal courts for serious crimes; traditional mechanisms for community disputes.

Traditional Justice Systems in Sudan:

Ajaweed (Native Administration):

- Village and tribal leaders
- Authority over customary law
- Dispute resolution (land, water, family, livestock)
- Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile particularly strong

Judiya (Reconciliation Conferences):

- Inter-tribal conflict resolution
- Blood money (diya) for killings
- Compensation for property damage
- Restores relations between groups

Mechanisms:

For Community-Level Disputes:

- Land and water conflicts
- Family disputes (marriage, inheritance)
- Livestock theft or damage (small-scale)
- Inter-personal conflicts

Process:

- Traditional authorities mediate
- Community participation
- Restorative outcomes (compensation, apology)
- Social cohesion restored

Limitations:

- NOT for mass atrocities, war crimes, GBV (formal courts handle these)
- Women's rights protected (traditional systems can be patriarchal)
- Appealable to formal courts if unjust

Integration Framework:

Legal Recognition:

- Customary Law Act (enacted Month 42)
- Defines jurisdiction and limitations
- Requires gender equality compliance
- Appeals mechanism to formal courts

Support and Reform:

- Training for traditional leaders (human rights, gender equality)
- Resource allocation (stipends, office space)
- Documentation of processes (transparency)
- Community oversight (prevent abuse)

GIZ Role in Traditional Justice:

- **Customary Justice Reform**
 - Training for traditional authorities (rights-based approach)
 - Women's participation mechanisms (female elders, advisors)
 - Documentation and case management
 - Formal-customary justice linkages
 - Community dialogue on justice reform
- **Budget Contribution:** €18 million

Case Study: Inter-Tribal Reconciliation (Darfur):

Challenge: Arab-Fur violence (legacy of Janjaweed/RSF) **Approach:**

- Judiya conferences (both tribes represented)
- Compensation for killings and property destruction
- Land sharing agreements (grazing routes, farming areas)
- Joint security committees (prevent future violence)
- Traditional leaders enforce agreements

Support:

- Neutral facilitators (respected elders from other tribes)
- International observers (UNAMID legacy, UN)
- Financial support (compensation funds)
- Government recognition and enforcement

Target: 200 inter-tribal reconciliation conferences (Months 48-72)

8.5 National Healing Process

Beyond Legal Justice: Social and Psychological Healing

National Dialogue Process (Months 48-66)

Structure:

- Inclusive conference (1,000+ participants)
- Representation: All regions, ethnicities, sectors, genders, youth
- Thematic working groups:
 - Causes of conflict
 - Identity and belonging (Sudanese nationalism vs. fragmentation)
 - Resource sharing and inequality
 - Governance and power
 - Future vision

Process:

- Regional consultations (Months 48-54)
- National conference (Month 60, 2-week intensive)
- Output: **National Compact** (shared vision and principles)

GIZ Role in National Dialogue:

- **Dialogue Facilitation and Infrastructure**
 - Professional facilitation training
 - Conference logistics and infrastructure
 - Documentation and media coverage
 - Accessibility (translation, disability accommodations)
 - Follow-up mechanisms (implementing compact recommendations)
- **Budget Contribution:** €12 million

Psychosocial Healing Programs:

Community Trauma Healing:

- Group therapy and support circles
- Trauma-informed community workers (training 5,000 workers)
- Traditional healing practices (integration with modern psychology)
- Arts and culture (theater, music, storytelling for processing grief)

GIZ Role:

- **Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)**
 - Train local MHPSS workers
 - Community-based support structures
 - Integration into primary healthcare
 - Specialized services (PTSD, complex trauma)
 - Schools-based programs (children and youth)
- **Budget Contribution:** €20 million

Youth Reconciliation Programs:

Challenge: Entire generation grew up in conflict, militarization **Approach:**

Unite Sudan Initiative

- Youth exchange programs (across regions and former conflict lines)
- Peace education (schools and community centers)
- Sports and arts for social cohesion
- Youth councils (voice in reconstruction)
- Economic opportunity (prevent recruitment)

Target: 500,000 youth participants (Months 48-78)

Women's Healing and Empowerment:

Beyond GBV survivors, broader women's participation:

- Women's peace committees (community level)
- Economic empowerment (post-conflict livelihoods)
- Political participation (leadership training)
- Legal rights education and support

GIZ Women's Empowerment Role:

- **Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment**
 - Women's business development
 - Financial inclusion (savings groups, credit)
 - Leadership and political participation training
 - Legal literacy and rights advocacy
 - GBV prevention (community-based)
- **Budget Contribution:** €25 million

Memorialization:

Sites of Memory:

- National memorial (Khartoum) - Month 66 dedication
- Regional memorials (each state)
- Site-specific memorials (massacre sites, destroyed villages)
- Digital archive (accessible online)

Educational Integration:

- Conflict history in school curriculum
- Museum and documentation centers
- Annual days of remembrance
- Survivor testimony preservation (video, audio)

8.6 International Justice Cooperation

Sudan's International Justice Obligations:

ICC Cooperation Agreement (signed Month 42):

- Surrender of indictees (al-Bashir, others)
- Evidence sharing
- Witness protection
- Court orders enforcement

Regional Justice Mechanisms:

- African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
- Regional cooperation on cross-border crimes
- Extradition agreements

International Support:

- Capacity building (prosecutors, judges, forensics)
- Funding for trials and witness protection
- Technical expertise (complex cases)

Total Phase IV Budget: \$2.2 billion (Months 36-66)

Breakdown:

- Documentation and truth-telling: \$150M (GIZ: €20M)
- Prosecutions and courts: \$400M
- Reparations fund: \$1.2B (GIZ: €85M for implementation)
- Traditional justice: \$100M (GIZ: €18M)
- National healing: \$250M (GIZ: €57M)
- International cooperation: \$100M

Total GIZ Phase IV Contribution: €215 million

9. Phase V: Civilian Platform Activation (Months 42–60)

Timing Rationale: Delayed until security exists and meaningful participation possible.

9.1 Civic Registration Process

Launch: Month 42 (after DDR substantially complete, security stabilized)

Eligible Participants:

Categories:

1. **Professional and Technical Experts**
 - Doctors, engineers, lawyers, economists, educators, scientists

- Minimum qualification: University degree or equivalent professional certification
- Target: 200,000 registrants
- 2. **Civic and Community Leaders**
 - NGO executives and activists
 - Traditional authorities (Nazirs, Omdas, tribal leaders)
 - Religious leaders
 - Community organizers
 - Target: 100,000 registrants
- 3. **Women's Organizations Representatives**
 - Women's rights activists
 - Women's unions and cooperatives
 - Professional women's networks
 - Target: 80,000 registrants
- 4. **Youth Representatives**
 - Student leaders
 - Youth organizations
 - Young professionals and entrepreneurs
 - Age: 18-35
 - Target: 100,000 registrants
- 5. **Displaced Persons Representatives**
 - IDP and refugee community leaders
 - Representatives of displacement camps
 - Returnee community representatives
 - Target: 50,000 registrants
- 6. **Diaspora**
 - Sudanese professionals abroad
 - Diaspora organizations
 - Remote registration (digital platform)
 - Target: 70,000 registrants

Total Registration Target: 600,000 participants (2.5% of adult population)

Registration Infrastructure (Months 42-48):

Physical Centers:

- 18 state capitals: Main registration centers
- 50 towns: Secondary centers
- 100 rural locations: Mobile registration teams

Digital Platform:

- Online registration (diaspora, urban professionals)
- Biometric verification (prevent duplication)
- Secure database (encrypted, redundant)
- Public transparency (aggregated data, not individual details)

GIZ Role in Registration Infrastructure:

- **Digital Platform Development**
 - Secure, user-friendly registration system
 - Biometric integration (partnering with UNDP)
 - Data protection and privacy compliance
 - Accessibility features (multiple languages, disability accommodations)
 - Mobile app development
- **Physical Infrastructure**
 - Registration center equipment (computers, biometric devices, furniture)
 - Mobile team vehicles and equipment
 - Communications infrastructure (internet connectivity in remote areas)
- **Capacity Building**
 - Training for registration staff (data entry, verification, customer service)
 - Community outreach training
 - Information security training
- **Budget Contribution:** €15 million

Registration Process:

Step 1: Application

- Online or in-person
- Basic information (name, age, region of origin, current location, education/experience, sector)
- Category selection (professional, civic leader, women's, youth, displaced, diaspora)

Step 2: Verification

- Document review (ID, credentials, references)
- Biometric registration (fingerprints, photo)
- Anti-fraud checks (cross-reference databases)

Step 3: Approval

- Independent verification team reviews
- 7-14 day processing time
- Notification of approval or requests for additional information

Outreach and Inclusion (Months 42-54):

Challenge: Ensure marginalized groups participate

Strategies:

- Community mobilization (CSO partners conduct outreach)
- Women-only registration sessions (cultural sensitivity)
- Mobile teams (reach remote/rural areas)
- Diaspora hubs (London, Cairo, Dubai, Nairobi, Jeddah)
- Multiple languages (Arabic, English, local languages)
- Disability accommodations

- Low literacy support (assisted registration)

Budget: \$35 million (registration infrastructure and process)

- Physical infrastructure: \$15M (GIZ: €5M)
- Digital platform: \$10M (GIZ: €8M)
- Staffing and operations: \$7M (GIZ: €2M for training)
- Outreach and inclusion: \$3M

9.2 Leadership Selection Methodology

Purpose: Identify competent, ethical leaders for Phase VI civilian authority.

Positions to Fill (Month 60 selections for Month 66 transition):

1. **Sovereignty Council** (9 civilian members)
2. **Cabinet** (20 ministers, all civilian)
3. **Constitutional Conference Delegates** (150 civilian members)
4. **Electoral Commission** (7 members)
5. **Human Rights Commission** (7 members)
6. **National Audit Office** (Auditor General + 5 deputies)

Total Positions: ~200 leadership roles

Selection Process (Months 48-60):

Phase A: Expressions of Interest (Month 48-50)

- Registered platform members apply for specific roles or general participation
- Application components:
 - CV and credentials
 - Policy statement (vision for role)
 - Ethics declaration (assets, conflicts of interest)
 - References (3 professional, 2 character)
 - Regional/demographic information (for representation balance)

Phase B: Written Assessments (Month 51-52)

Objective: Evaluate policy knowledge, analytical skills, ethical reasoning

Assessment Components:

1. **Policy Knowledge Exam** (sector-specific)
 - Constitutional Conference delegate: Constitutional law, governance systems
 - Finance Minister: Public financial management, macroeconomics
 - Justice Minister: Legal frameworks, transitional justice
 - Electoral Commission: Electoral systems, administration
2. **Scenario-Based Problem Solving**

- Present complex governance challenges
 - Candidates propose solutions
 - Evaluated for: feasibility, creativity, stakeholder consideration, ethical awareness
- 3. Ethical Reasoning Case Studies**
- Conflict of interest scenarios
 - Resource allocation dilemmas
 - Pressure from powerful interests
 - Evaluated for: integrity, principle, transparency

Assessment Development:

- Sudanese experts + international advisors
- Validated by independent educational assessment specialists
- Standardized scoring rubrics

GIZ Role in Assessment Process:

- **Assessment Systems Development**
 - Exam design and validation
 - Scoring systems (transparent, fair)
 - Digital assessment platform (online exams for diaspora)
 - Proctoring systems (prevent cheating)
 - Data analysis (identify bias, ensure fairness)
- **Budget Contribution:** €5 million

Phase C: Background Screening (Month 52-54)

Comprehensive vetting:

- 1. Financial Probity**
 - Asset declarations reviewed
 - Sources of wealth verified
 - Debt and financial obligations checked
 - Red flags: Unexplained wealth, corruption allegations
- 2. Human Rights Record**
 - Cross-reference with documentation database (Section 8.1)
 - Interview survivors/witnesses if allegations exist
 - Disqualifiers: War crimes, serious human rights violations
- 3. Conflict of Interest**
 - Business interests identified
 - Family connections to armed groups, political parties
 - Foreign funding or affiliations
 - Mitigation plans required if conflicts identified
- 4. Criminal Record**
 - Sudanese and international databases checked
 - Disqualifiers: Violent crimes, fraud, corruption convictions

Screening Team:

- Independent Integrity Unit (20 Sudanese investigators + 5 international experts)
- Partnerships: Interpol, financial intelligence units, human rights organizations
- Confidentiality and due process (candidates can respond to adverse findings)

Phase D: Structured Interviews (Month 54-56)

Panel Composition:

- 5-7 members per panel
- Sudanese professionals (majority)
- International observers (2 per panel, non-voting but input provided)
- Rotated to prevent bias

Interview Format:

- 90 minutes per candidate
- Competency-based questions (past experience, problem-solving)
- Values and ethics probing
- Stakeholder management scenarios
- Public accountability understanding

Evaluation Criteria:

- Technical competence (40%)
- Leadership and integrity (30%)
- Communication and collaboration (20%)
- Commitment to democratic values (10%)

GIZ Role in Interview Process:

- **Interview Training and Systems**
 - Train interview panelists (bias reduction, effective questioning)
 - Interview rubrics and scoring systems
 - Facility arrangements (neutral, professional settings)
 - Recording and documentation systems
- **Budget Contribution:** €3 million

Phase E: Scoring and Shortlisting (Month 56-57)

Composite Scoring:

- Written assessments: 30%
- Background screening: Pass/Fail (disqualifiers eliminate)
- Interviews: 70%

Regional and Demographic Balance:

- Shortlists must reflect Sudan's diversity
- Regions: North, South, East, West, Central (proportional representation)
- Gender: 40% women minimum
- Youth: 20% under age 40
- Diaspora: 15% maximum (ensure ground connection)

Shortlist: 3-5 candidates per position (exposed to public for review)

Phase F: Oversight Council Review (Month 57-58)

Independent Oversight Council:

- 11 members
 - 7 Sudanese (civil society, academia, retired jurists)
 - 4 international (AU, UN, bilateral partner representatives)
- Appointed Month 42 (before selection process begins)
- Mandate: Ensure integrity, fairness, and transparency

Functions:

- Review entire selection process
- Audit scoring and decisions
- Investigate complaints or irregularities
- Public reporting (transparency)
- Final approval of selections

Powers:

- Disqualify candidates (integrity concerns)
- Order re-assessments (if bias detected)
- Recommend improvements to process

Phase G: Public Endorsement Period (Month 58-60)

Public Review:

- Shortlisted candidates' profiles published
 - Qualifications and experience
 - Policy statements
 - Assessment scores (aggregated, not detailed)
 - Regional origin and demographics
- 30-day public comment period
- Civil society reviews and feedback
- Media scrutiny and investigation

Complaint Mechanism:

- Substantive concerns (e.g., hidden corruption, false credentials) investigated
- Frivolous complaints filtered

- Oversight Council adjudicates

Phase H: Final Selection and Appointment (Month 60)

Decision-Making:

- Oversight Council selects from shortlists
- Considerations: Scores, public feedback, regional balance, demographic representation
- Consensus preferred; voting (2/3 majority) if necessary

Announcement:

- Public ceremony
- Selected leaders introduced
- Transition preparation begins (briefings, handovers)

Month 66: Selected leaders assume positions (Phase VI begins)

9.3 Competency Assessment Framework

Detailed Competency Models by Role:

Executive Leadership (Sovereignty Council, Cabinet):

- Strategic thinking and vision
- Policy formulation and implementation
- Stakeholder management (domestic and international)
- Crisis management and decision-making under pressure
- Integrity and ethical leadership
- Communication and public accountability

Legislative/Oversight (Constitutional Conference, Legislative Council):

- Legal and constitutional knowledge
- Deliberation and negotiation skills
- Representativeness (constituency connection)
- Analytical and critical thinking
- Consensus-building
- Transparency and accountability

Technical/Regulatory (Electoral Commission, Audit Office, Human Rights Commission):

- Technical expertise (sector-specific)
- Independence and impartiality
- Attention to detail and process
- Transparency and reporting
- Resistance to political pressure
- Public trust and credibility

Assessment Calibration:

- Pilot testing (Month 45-47): Test assessments with sample group, refine
- Inter-rater reliability (ensure panelists score consistently)
- Continuous improvement (feedback from process participants)

9.4 Ethics and Integrity Standards

Transitional Ethics Charter (binding on all selected leaders):

Core Principles:

1. **Public Service** - Serve Sudan's interests, not personal or factional
2. **Integrity** - Honest, transparent, incorruptible
3. **Impartiality** - Fair, non-discriminatory, evidence-based decisions
4. **Accountability** - Answer to public, accept scrutiny
5. **Respect for Rights** - Uphold human rights and rule of law

Specific Obligations:

Financial Integrity:

- Asset declarations (public for senior roles)
- No conflicts of interest (divest or recuse)
- No acceptance of gifts or benefits
- No use of position for personal gain

Political Neutrality:

- No political party affiliation during service
- No campaigning or partisan activity
- Represent all Sudanese, not factions

Transparency:

- Decision-making processes documented
- Public reporting on activities
- Accessibility to media and civil society

Prohibitions:

- No nepotism or favoritism
- No foreign political financing
- No violence or threats
- No discrimination

Enforcement:

Ethics Commission (independent, established Month 42)

- Receives complaints
- Investigates violations
- Recommends sanctions:
 - Warning (minor violations)
 - Suspension (pending investigation)
 - Dismissal (serious violations)
 - Prosecution (criminal violations)

Due Process:

- Accused leaders can respond
- Evidence-based determinations
- Appeals to judicial review

Public Accountability:

- Annual ethics reports (aggregated violations, trends)
- Named officials only if dismissed or prosecuted
- Transparency builds trust

9.5 Regional and Demographic Representation

Balancing Meritocracy and Inclusion:

Principle: Excellence is non-negotiable, but Sudan's diversity must be reflected.

Representation Targets:

Geographic:

- North (15%)
- South (20%: Kordofan, Darfur)
- East (15%)
- West (30%: Darfur, West Kordofan)
- Central (20%: Khartoum, Gezira)

Gender:

- Women: 40% minimum (constitutional conference, cabinet, all bodies)

Age:

- Youth (18-35): 20% minimum

Diaspora:

- 10-15% (contribute expertise but ensure ground connection)

Implementation:

- Recruitment actively targets underrepresented groups
- Assessment and scoring blind to demographics initially
- Regional balance applied at shortlist/final selection stage
- If qualified candidates from underrepresented group vs. slightly higher-scoring from overrepresented group, choose underrepresented (affirmative representation)

Special Measures:

- Women-only shortlists (some positions)
- Youth reserved seats (constitutional conference)
- Diaspora tracks (remote participation options)

9.6 Oversight and Transparency Mechanisms

Public Dashboard (Live, Month 48 onward):

Real-Time Data:

- Registration numbers (by region, gender, age, category)
- Application numbers (by position)
- Assessment progress
- Timelines and milestones

Transparency Reports:

- Weekly updates during selection process
- Methodology documentation (public)
- Complaint numbers and resolutions
- Oversight Council observations

GIZ Role in Transparency Systems:

- **Digital Transparency Platform**
 - Public dashboard development and hosting
 - Data visualization (accessible, understandable)
 - Mobile access (SMS updates for low-connectivity areas)
 - Multilingual interface
- **Budget Contribution:** €4 million

Independent Observers:

- International: AU, UN, bilateral partners (UK, Norway, Germany, US)

- Domestic: Sudanese CSOs, media, academic institutions
- Access: Full process observation, interviews with participants
- Reporting: Independent assessments published

Media Access:

- Press briefings (weekly during selection process)
- Interviews with Oversight Council and participants (voluntary)
- Investigative journalism supported (not restricted)

Appeals and Complaints:

- Formal mechanism (online, in-person)
- Independent review (Oversight Council)
- Timely resolution (7-14 days)
- Public reporting (aggregated, anonymized)

Total Phase V Budget: \$75 million (Months 42-60)

- Registration: \$35M (GIZ: €15M)
- Assessment and selection: \$25M (GIZ: €12M)
- Oversight and transparency: \$10M (GIZ: €4M)
- Public engagement: \$5M

Total GIZ Phase V Contribution: €31 million

Sections 10-17 and Annexes

10. Phase VI: Constitutional Development (Months 60–78)

Purpose: Establish permanent constitutional framework for democratic Sudan.

10.1 Constitutional Conference Structure

National Constitutional Conference (18-month process)

Convening: Month 60

Delegates (300 total):

1. **Platform-Selected Representatives (150)**
 - Selected via Phase V process
 - Regional representation: 25 per region (6 regions)

- Gender balance: 60 women minimum
- Youth: 30 delegates under 35
- Expertise: Constitutional law, governance, human rights, economics
- 2. **Political Party Representatives (50)**
 - Proportional to pre-conflict political support
 - Traditional parties: Umma, DUP, Communist, Congress
 - New parties (formed post-conflict)
 - Selection: Internal party processes (democratically)
- 3. **Traditional and Religious Leaders (30)**
 - Traditional authorities (Nazirs, tribal leaders): 20
 - Religious leaders (Muslim, Christian): 10
 - Regional representation
- 4. **Women's Organizations (25)**
 - Selected by women's networks and coalitions
 - Represent diverse women's interests (professional, rural, displaced, youth)
- 5. **Youth Representatives (20)**
 - Selected by youth organizations
 - Student unions, young professionals, rural youth
- 6. **Civil Society and Professional Associations (20)**
 - Lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers unions
 - Human rights organizations
 - Business associations
- 7. **Armed Forces (Advisory, 5)**
 - SAF Chief of Staff + 4 senior officers
 - **Advisory role only, NO voting rights**
 - Ensure military concerns addressed but don't control process

Selection Process:

- Platform representatives: Via Phase V process
- Other categories: Nominated by constituent groups, vetted by Oversight Council
- All delegates publicly disclosed (transparency)

Conference Governance:

Steering Committee (15 members):

- Chair: Prominent jurist or respected elder (consensus selection)
- 14 members: Representing major delegate categories
- Functions: Agenda, facilitation, conflict resolution

Secretariat (International + Sudanese):

- 50 staff (legal experts, researchers, administrators, translators)
- Technical support to delegates
- Documentation and drafting

GIZ Role in Constitutional Conference:

- **Conference Infrastructure and Logistics**
 - Venue preparation and equipment
 - Information technology systems
 - Document management and translation
 - Accessibility accommodations
- **Technical Support**
 - Comparative constitutional expertise (facilitate exchanges with constitutional experts from Germany, South Africa, Kenya, Tunisia)
 - Research and drafting support
 - Legal analysis
- **Public Engagement Systems**
 - Live streaming and media coverage
 - Public consultation platforms (online, regional forums)
 - Civic education on constitutional issues
- **Budget Contribution: €25 million**

Conference Phases:

Phase A: Preparatory Work (Months 60-63)

Activities:

- Delegates orientation and training
- Comparative constitutional study (field visits to South Africa, Kenya, Germany, Tunisia)
- Public consultations (all 18 states, online diaspora forums)
- Background papers on key issues
- Preliminary positions and proposals

Public Input:

- Regional consultations (town halls in 50+ locations)
- Online platform (proposals, comments, voting)
- Submissions from organizations and experts
- Target: 1 million+ Sudanese engaged

Phase B: Thematic Committee Deliberations (Months 63-69)

Seven Thematic Committees:

1. **State Structure and Federalism Committee (45 delegates)**
 - Federal vs. unitary vs. confederal
 - Power distribution (federal, state, local)
 - Fiscal federalism (revenue sharing)
 - Special status regions (Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, East)
2. **Bill of Rights and Freedoms Committee (40 delegates)**
 - Civil and political rights
 - Economic, social, cultural rights

- Women's rights and gender equality
- Minority rights
- Balancing rights with public interest
- 3. **Security and Military Committee (35 delegates)**
 - Military role and subordination to civilian authority
 - National security institutions
 - Intelligence oversight
 - Emergency powers and limitations
 - Disarmament and demilitarization constitutional protections
- 4. **Resource Governance and Economy Committee (40 delegates)**
 - Natural resources ownership and management (oil, gold, land, water)
 - Revenue sharing formulas
 - Economic system (market economy with social protection)
 - Property rights and land tenure
 - Debt and fiscal responsibility
- 5. **Justice System Committee (35 delegates)**
 - Judicial independence
 - Court structure (constitutional court, appeals, lower courts)
 - Prosecutorial independence
 - Legal education and bar
 - Traditional justice constitutional status
- 6. **Governance Institutions Committee (45 delegates)**
 - Executive system (presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential)
 - Legislative structure (unicameral vs. bicameral)
 - Electoral system
 - Political party regulation
 - Independent commissions (electoral, human rights, anti-corruption, audit, media)
- 7. **Transitional Provisions Committee (30 delegates)**
 - Implementation timeline
 - Existing laws status
 - Transitional justice and amnesty provisions
 - First elections arrangements
 - Amendment procedures

Committee Work:

- Internal deliberations (consensus-building)
- Expert consultations (domestic and international)
- Public hearings (testimony from stakeholders)
- Draft text production

Phase C: Plenary Debates and Negotiation (Months 69-72)

Process:

- Committee reports presented to full conference
- Plenary debates (all delegates participate)
- Controversial issues negotiated
- Multiple draft iterations

- Consensus-building (aim for 70%+ support)

Facilitation:

- Professional mediators for contentious issues
- International constitutional experts available
- Private negotiation sessions when needed

Key Contentious Issues (Anticipated):

Issue 1: Sharia and State Religion

- Spectrum: Islamic state → Secular state
- Likely compromise: Islam as religion of majority, but equal citizenship and freedom of religion guaranteed
- Personal status laws (family law) may remain religious-based but reformed for gender equality

Issue 2: Federalism Degree

- Spectrum: Strong central government → Confederal autonomy
- Likely compromise: Asymmetric federalism (more autonomy for conflict-affected regions)

Issue 3: Presidential Powers

- Spectrum: Strong executive → Parliamentary system
- Likely compromise: Semi-presidential (president + prime minister, power-sharing)

Issue 4: Resource Revenue Sharing

- Producing regions demand higher share
- Non-producing regions demand equalization
- Likely compromise: 50% federal, 30% producing state, 20% equalization fund

Issue 5: Military Role

- Spectrum: Military in politics → Strictly professional
- Likely compromise: Constitutional subordination to civilians, banned from business, cooling-off period before politics

Phase D: Drafting and Refinement (Months 72-75)

Drafting Committee (15 legal experts):

- Converts conference decisions into legal text
- Ensures internal consistency

- Technical legal precision
- Multiple language versions (Arabic, English)

Review Process:

- Draft circulated to all delegates
- Amendments proposed and debated
- Final plenary vote (requires 70% supermajority)

Phase E: Public Consultation on Draft (Months 75-77)

Nationwide Consultation:

- Draft constitution published (print, online, radio broadcast)
- Civic education campaign (what's in it, what it means)
- Public comment period (60 days)
- Regional forums (discuss and feedback)
- Amendments considered if broad public concern

GIZ Role in Public Consultation:

- **Civic Education Campaign**
 - Simplified constitutional guides (plain language)
 - Radio and TV programs (explain provisions)
 - Community facilitators training
 - Schools and universities engagement
- **Consultation Infrastructure**
 - Regional forum logistics
 - Online feedback platform
 - Mobile accessibility (SMS feedback)
- **Budget Contribution:** €15 million

10.2 Federalism and Power Distribution

Rationale: Sudan's diversity and size require devolution.

Proposed Federal Structure:

National (Federal) Government:

Exclusive Powers:

- Foreign affairs and defense
- Monetary policy and currency
- Interstate commerce and customs
- Citizenship and immigration

- National infrastructure (highways, railways)
- Higher education standards

State (Regional) Governments (18 states):

Exclusive Powers:

- Local police and security
- Primary and secondary education (delivery)
- Local health services
- State infrastructure
- Land use planning
- Local taxation

Concurrent Powers (Shared):

- Economic development
- Environmental protection
- Agriculture and water
- Cultural affairs
- Social services

Special Autonomy Arrangements:

Darfur (5 states):

- Additional powers: land management, traditional authority recognition
- Greater revenue retention
- Regional development fund
- Truth and reconciliation mandate

South Kordofan and Blue Nile (2 states):

- Similar to Darfur provisions
- Recognition of ethnic diversity
- Local governance autonomy

Eastern Sudan (3 states: Red Sea, Kassala, Gedaref):

- Port revenue sharing (Red Sea state)
- Agricultural development authority
- Border trade autonomy

Revenue Sharing Formula:

Natural Resource Revenues (Oil, Gold, Minerals):

- 50% Federal government
- 30% Producing state

- 20% Equalization fund (non-producing and poor states)

Tax Revenues:

- Federal taxes (customs, income tax, VAT): 100% federal
- State taxes (property, local business, licenses): 100% state
- Shared taxes (corporate): 60% federal, 40% state

Intergovernmental Transfers:

- Equalization grants (federal → poor states)
- Conditional grants (specific programs like education, health)
- Formula-based (population, need, fiscal capacity)

Dispute Resolution:

- Intergovernmental Relations Commission
- Mediation before litigation
- Constitutional Court final arbiter

10.3 Military Role Definition

Constitutional Provisions (Non-Negotiable):

Article: The Armed Forces

- 1. Subordination to Civilian Authority**
 - Military subordinate to elected president and parliament
 - Military budget approved by parliament
 - Military deployment requires parliamentary authorization (except immediate defense)
 - Civilian Defense Minister (military Chief of Staff professional advisor)
- 2. Mandate**
 - National defense and territorial integrity
 - Border security
 - Support to civil authorities (disaster response, at government request)
 - Regional peacekeeping (with parliamentary authorization)
- 3. Prohibitions**
 - NO role in domestic politics
 - NO commercial business or economic activities
 - NO detention or arrest of civilians (except war zones with judicial oversight)
 - NO interference in elections or governance
- 4. Political Participation**
 - Active military members: NO political party membership, NO voting, NO candidacy
 - Retired members: 5-year cooling-off period before political candidacy (officer ranks)
 - Transparency: Military cannot secretly fund parties or politicians

5. **Accountability**
 - Subject to civilian courts (except internal military discipline)
 - Parliamentary oversight (Defense Committee access to information)
 - Independent ombudsman for military complaints
 - Regular audits (Auditor General)
6. **National Security Council**
 - Chaired by President
 - Members: PM, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Intelligence, SAF Chief (advisory)
 - Civilian majority
 - Decisions by consensus or presidential authority
7. **Emergency Powers**
 - State of emergency: Parliamentary approval required within 7 days
 - Duration: Max 3 months, renewable once (parliamentary supermajority)
 - Rights protections maintained (no suspension of core rights)
 - Military deployment domestically: Judicial oversight, time-limited

Enforcement Mechanisms:

- Constitutional Court judicial review
- Parliamentary investigations
- Criminal prosecution for coup attempts (treason)
- International monitoring (5-year period post-transition)

10.4 Resource Governance

Land:

Principles:

- State ownership with use rights (customary and statutory)
- Customary land rights protected
- Land Commission: Resolve disputes, prevent grabs
- Gender equality in land rights (women can own independently)

Reforms:

- Land audit (identify illegal grabs during conflict)
- Restitution or compensation for displaced
- Transparent allocation for investment (not corruption)

Water:

Nile Waters:

- Constitutional commitment to existing international agreements (Egypt sensitivity)
- Cooperative management with upstream/downstream states
- Equitable domestic allocation

Domestic Water:

- Human right to water
- Sustainable management (drought/climate)
- Community participation in local management

GIZ Role in Water Governance:

- **Integrated Water Resources Management**
 - Water sector reform support
 - Transboundary cooperation facilitation
 - Community water management
 - Climate adaptation (water scarcity)
- **Budget Contribution:** €30 million (Months 60-90)

Oil and Minerals:

Ownership: Federal government holds title, revenues shared

Management:

- National Petroleum Commission (independent, professional)
- Transparent contracting (international standards)
- Environmental and social impact assessments
- Local community consultation and benefit-sharing

Transparency:

- EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) membership
- All contracts published
- Revenue flows audited and published
- Parliament oversight

GIZ EITI Support:

- **Extractive Sector Transparency**
 - EITI implementation support
 - Multi-stakeholder group facilitation
 - Revenue tracking systems
 - Beneficial ownership transparency
- **Budget Contribution:** €20 million (Months 60-90, ongoing)

10.5 Rights and Freedoms

Comprehensive Bill of Rights:

Civil and Political Rights:

- Life, liberty, security
- Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment
- Fair trial and due process
- Freedom of expression, press, assembly, association
- Freedom of movement and residence
- Political participation (vote, run for office)

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:

- Education (free and compulsory primary)
- Health (access to basic healthcare)
- Housing (adequate standard)
- Work (fair wages, safe conditions, organize)
- Social security (vulnerable groups)

Special Protections:

Women's Rights:

- Equality before law (no discrimination)
- Equal political participation (quotas during transition, aspirational thereafter)
- Protection from violence and harmful practices (FGM prohibited)
- Equal rights in marriage, divorce, inheritance (reform of discriminatory personal status laws)
- Economic empowerment (property, credit, employment)

Children's Rights:

- Protection from exploitation, abuse, armed conflict
- Education and health
- Juvenile justice (separate from adults)

Minority Rights:

- Ethnic, religious, linguistic minorities protected
- Cultural expression and language preservation
- Non-discrimination
- Participation in governance

Internally Displaced and Refugees:

- Right to return voluntarily
- Protection during displacement
- Participation in governance
- Reparations for conflict-related displacement

Limitations:

- Rights may be limited by law (proportionate, necessary, democratic society)

- Derogation only in genuine emergency (narrowly defined)
- Core rights (life, torture prohibition, slavery) never suspended

10.6 Referendum Process

Month 78: National Referendum

Preparation (Months 75-78):

Electoral Commission:

- Independent (established Phase V)
- Register voters (biometric, prevent fraud)
- Civic education campaign
- Ballot design and printing
- Polling stations (5,000+ nationally)
- Observer accreditation (domestic and international)

GIZ Referendum Support:

- **Voter Registration Systems**
 - Biometric registration technology
 - Database management
 - Mobile registration teams (rural/remote)
- **Civic Education**
 - Radio and TV campaigns (explain constitution, voting process)
 - Community facilitators (50,000+ trained)
 - Printed materials (simplified guides)
- **Logistics Support**
 - Polling station equipment
 - Ballot box and materials
 - Transportation (especially remote areas)
- **Budget Contribution: €30 million**

Campaign Period (60 days):

YES Campaign:

- Government and constitutional conference promote
- Civil society endorsements
- Emphasize: Stability, democracy, rights protection, development

NO Campaign (if exists):

- Opposition free to campaign
- Equal media access

- Concerns addressed through debate

Voting:

- Universal suffrage (18+)
- Simple majority required (50%+1)
- Turnout target: 70%+ (legitimacy)

Observation:

- AU Election Observation Mission (1,000 observers)
- International: EU, Arab League, Carter Center, bilateral
- Domestic: Sudanese CSOs (5,000+ observers)
- Media freedom (full access, live coverage)

Results:

- Counted at polling stations (transparency)
- Results announced by Electoral Commission (within 72 hours)
- Published by station (prevent fraud)

If YES (Expected):

- Constitution enters force (30 days after promulgation)
- President promulgates (ceremonial signing)
- Implementation begins (elections preparation)

If NO (Contingency):

- Constitutional Conference reconvenes (60 days)
- Address public concerns (amendments)
- Second referendum (6 months)

Post-Referendum:

- Constitutional Court established (interpret and enforce constitution)
- Legislative framework alignment (laws reviewed for constitutional compliance)
- Elections preparation (Phase VII)

Total Phase VI Budget: \$350 million (Months 60-78)

- Constitutional Conference: \$120M (GIZ: €25M)
- Public consultations: \$80M (GIZ: €15M)
- Drafting and technical: \$50M
- Referendum: \$100M (GIZ: €30M)

Total GIZ Phase VI Contribution: €120 million (including EITI and water governance)

11. Phase VII: Electoral Transition (Months 78–90)

Purpose: Transfer power to elected civilian government.

11.1 Electoral System Design

Determined by Constitutional Conference, likely framework:

Presidential Election:

System: Two-round majority

- First round: All candidates compete
- If no candidate achieves 50%+1: Runoff between top two (30 days later)
- Direct popular vote (not electoral college)

Eligibility:

- Sudanese citizen by birth
- Age 35-70
- No criminal record (serious crimes)
- Not serving in transitional authority (prevented candidacy)

Term: 5 years, maximum two terms

Powers (Balanced):

- Head of state and government
- Appoints Prime Minister (with parliamentary approval)
- Commander-in-chief (civilian control)
- Foreign affairs leadership
- Limited veto power (parliamentary override possible)

Parliamentary Elections:

Lower House (300 members):

- 200 Single-Member Constituencies (First-Past-The-Post)
 - One representative per district
 - Plurality wins
 - Ensures geographic representation
- 100 Party List (Proportional Representation)
 - National or regional lists
 - Voters choose party
 - Seats allocated proportionally (min 3% threshold)

Women's Representation:

- 30% quota (enforced via party lists and reserved constituencies)
- Temporary measure (2-3 election cycles), then aspirational

Upper House (100 members):

- State representation (equal or weighted by population, determined by constitution)
- Elected by state legislatures OR direct popular vote
- Ensures regional interests represented

Term: 5 years (concurrent with presidential)

State and Local Elections:

State Governors:

- Direct election in each state
- 5-year terms
- Powers defined by constitution

State Legislatures:

- Mixed system (constituency + proportional)
- 30-50 members per state (based on population)

Local Councils:

- Mayors and councils
- Direct election
- Municipal governance

11.2 Sequenced Elections (Local to National)

Phased Approach (Builds Capacity and Confidence):

Phase A: Local Elections (Month 78-81)

Target: Municipalities and districts (100 major localities)

Timing:

- Voter registration: Month 78-79
- Campaign period: Month 80 (60 days)
- Voting: Month 81
- Results and inauguration: Month 81

Purpose:

- Test electoral systems and logistics
- Build Electoral Commission capacity
- Accustom population to democratic process
- Manageable scale (identify and fix problems)

GIZ Local Elections Support:

- **Electoral Administration Capacity**
 - Training for electoral officials (returning officers, polling staff)
 - Logistics systems (materials distribution, results transmission)
 - Voter education (how to vote, candidate information)
- **Infrastructure**
 - Polling stations setup
 - Equipment provision
 - Communications systems
- **Budget Contribution:** €20 million

Phase B: State Elections (Month 84-87)

Target: 18 state governors and legislatures

Timing:

- Voter registration update: Month 84
- Campaign period: Month 85-86 (90 days)
- Voting: Month 87
- Results and inauguration: Month 87

Significance:

- Activates federal system (states gain elected leadership)
- Broader scale (test national capacity)
- Political parties compete (coalition-building begins)

Phase C: Parliamentary Elections (Month 87-90)

Lower and Upper Houses

Timing:

- Candidate nomination and vetting: Month 87-88
- Campaign period: Month 88-89 (120 days)
- Voting: Month 90
- Results and inauguration: Month 90

Complexity:

- National scope (200 constituencies + party lists)
- Multiple parties and coalitions
- Simultaneous voting (lower and upper house)

GIZ Parliamentary Elections Support:

- **National Electoral Infrastructure**
 - Scaling up systems from local/state elections
 - Results transmission and aggregation (secure, transparent)
 - Training additional electoral officials (5,000+)
- **Media and Transparency**
 - Media monitoring (prevent hate speech, disinformation)
 - Campaign finance oversight
 - Results publication systems (real-time, verifiable)
- **Budget Contribution:** €25 million

Phase D: Presidential Election (Month 90)

Timing:

- Held concurrently with parliamentary elections
- Potential runoff: Month 91 (if needed)

Campaign:

- Presidential candidates (likely 5-10 serious contenders)
- Nationally televised debates
- Intensive media coverage
- Regional campaign tours

Security:

- Peaceful campaign environment (SAF, police, international observers ensure safety)
- Prevent violence and intimidation

11.3 Political Party Framework

Party Registration and Regulation:

Eligibility:

- Minimum 1,000 members (nationally distributed)
- Democratic internal structure
- Transparent financing
- Non-violent principles
- Non-discrimination (ethnic, religious, gender)

Prohibitions:

- Armed wings or militias
- Foreign funding (political activities)
- Hate speech or incitement to violence
- Anti-constitutional activities

Campaign Finance:

Transparency Requirements:

- Disclosure of donations (above \$500)
- Spending limits (prevent vote-buying)
- No state resources for campaigns (level playing field)
- Audits by Electoral Commission

Public Financing:

- Matching funds for small donations (encourage grassroots)
- Equal free media time (state TV/radio)
- Reimbursement (parties achieving 3%+ vote share)

GIZ Political Party Support:

- **Multiparty Democracy Strengthening**
 - Training for party administrators (finance, organization, communications)
 - Women and youth party participation programs
 - Internal democracy promotion (primaries, member participation)
 - Policy development capacity (research, platforms)
- **Campaign Finance Systems**
 - Financial management training
 - Disclosure platforms (online transparency)
 - Audit capacity building
- **Budget Contribution: €15 million**

Traditional Parties (Re-emerging):

- Umma Party (centrist, Ansar base)
- Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, traditional base)
- Sudanese Communist Party (secular left)
- National Congress Party (Bashir's party, reformed/renamed)

New Parties:

- Pro-democracy movements (from 2019 revolution)
- Regional parties (Darfur, East, Nuba)
- Youth and women-focused parties
- Islamic and secular parties (spectrum)

Coalition Building:

- Parliamentary system likely requires coalitions
- Formal coalition agreements
- Cabinet formation negotiations (post-election)

11.4 International Observation

Comprehensive Monitoring:

African Union (Lead Observer Mission):

- 1,500 observers (all phases)
- Long-term (3 months before) and short-term (election day)
- Technical assessment and reporting

International Organizations:

- EU Election Observation Mission: 300 observers
- Arab League: 200 observers
- Carter Center: 100 observers
- Commonwealth (if Sudan rejoins): 50 observers

Bilateral:

- US: State Department observers
- UK: Foreign Office observers
- Germany/GIZ: Technical assessment team
- Nordic countries: Joint mission

Domestic:

- Sudanese CSOs: 10,000+ observers (nationwide coverage)
- Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT): Statistical verification
- Media monitoring: Prevent bias and disinformation

GIZ Observation Support:

- **Domestic Observer Capacity**
 - Training for Sudanese observers (observation methodology, reporting)
 - Coordination systems (communication, data collection)
 - PVT technical support (statistical sampling, analysis)
- **International Observer Facilitation**
 - Logistics support (accommodation, transportation)
 - Briefings and coordination meetings
- **Budget Contribution: €10 million**

Observation Criteria:

- Voter registration (inclusive, accurate)
- Campaign environment (free, fair, peaceful)
- Media access (balanced coverage)
- Voting process (secret ballot, no intimidation)
- Counting (transparent, accurate)
- Results (timely, credible, accepted)

Reporting:

- Preliminary statement (24-48 hours post-election)
- Comprehensive report (60 days)
- Recommendations (future improvements)

Credibility:

- Observer consensus validates results
- Domestic and international alignment crucial
- Contested elections: Mediation and legal resolution

11.5 Transfer of Power Protocol

Month 90: Historic Transition

Post-Election (Results Certified):

Presidential Inauguration (Day 1):

- Ceremony (national, televised)
- Oath of office (Chief Justice administers)
- Address to nation (president's vision)
- International dignitaries attend

Transitional Authority Dissolution:

- Sovereignty Council dissolves (ceremonial transfer)
- Cabinet resigns (president appoints new cabinet)
- Legislative Council ends mandate (parliament assumes)

New Government Formation:

Presidential Actions:

- Nominate Prime Minister (within 7 days)
- Parliament confirms (simple majority)
- PM forms cabinet (ministerial appointments)
- Parliament confirms cabinet (within 30 days)

Parliamentary Actions:

- Elect Speaker and Deputy Speakers
- Establish committees (including defense and oversight)
- Begin legislative work

State Governments:

- Inaugurate governors and state legislatures
- Begin functioning (service delivery, local governance)

Symbolism and Continuity:

Honoring Transitional Leaders:

- Public recognition (ceremony, awards)
- NOT prosecution (unless serious crimes, independent of service)
- Retirement benefits (pensions, healthcare)
- Continued civic participation (elders, advisors)

National Unity:

- Inclusive inaugural events (all regions, groups)
- Reconciliation message (forward-looking)
- Recommitment to constitution and democracy

International Recognition:

- Diplomatic congratulations
- Bilateral meetings (new president with international partners)
- Continued support commitments (development, partnership)

11.6 Post-Election Governance

First 100 Days (New Government Priorities):

- 1. Consolidate Democratic Institutions**
 - Appoint independent commission members (human rights, anti-corruption, audit)
 - Judicial appointments (Supreme Court justices)
 - National security architecture (civilian oversight)
- 2. Economic Recovery Acceleration**
 - Present economic recovery plan to parliament
 - Secure international financing (post-transition support)
 - Job creation programs launch
- 3. Service Delivery**
 - Health and education budgets (restore services)
 - Infrastructure projects (quick wins)
 - Rural development focus
- 4. Reconciliation and Healing**
 - National healing process continuation

- Reparations distribution
- Memorial dedications
- 5. Regional Relations**
 - Normalize relations with neighbors
 - Regional integration (AfCFTA, IGAD, Arab League)
 - Border cooperation agreements

Democratic Consolidation (Months 90-120):

Institutionalization:

- Parliament establishes rules and procedures
- Committee system functioning
- Legislative agenda (priority laws)
- Oversight of executive (accountability)

Civil-Military Relations:

- Civilian Defense Minister confirmed
- SAF Chief of Staff reports to minister
- Defense Committee oversight active
- Military budget reviewed and approved

Decentralization:

- State governments functioning
- Federal-state relations framework operational
- Resource transfers initiated
- Dispute resolution mechanisms active

Political Competition:

- Governing coalition and opposition defined
- Constructive opposition (critique and alternatives)
- Media freedom and pluralism
- Civil society watchdog role

Challenges (Anticipated):

Governance Capacity:

- New officials learning (inexperience)
- Systems establishment (time-consuming)
- Competing demands (expectations vs. capacity)

Economic Constraints:

- Limited fiscal space (debt, revenue)
- High expectations (jobs, services)

- External dependencies (donor support)

Political Tensions:

- Coalition management (disagreements)
- Opposition legitimacy (accept electoral loss)
- Regional grievances (periphery vs. center)

Security:

- Residual armed groups (complete DDR)
- Communal conflicts (localized violence)
- Regional instability spillover

Mitigation:

- Realistic public communication (manage expectations)
- International support continuation (technical, financial)
- Strong institutions and rule of law (prevent backsliding)
- Inclusive governance (prevent marginalization)

Total Phase VII Budget: \$280 million (Months 78-90)

- Voter registration: \$50M
- Local elections: \$40M (GIZ: €20M)
- State elections: \$60M
- Parliamentary elections: \$80M (GIZ: €25M)
- Presidential election: \$30M
- Observation and monitoring: \$20M (GIZ: €10M)

Total GIZ Phase VII Contribution: €90 million

12. Economic Recovery and State Rebuilding (Parallel Track)

Runs Throughout Transition (Months 1-90+)

12.1 Emergency Economic Stabilization (Months 1–24)

Immediate Priorities:

A. Hyperinflation Control

Challenge: 1,000%+ annual inflation destroys purchasing power

Measures:

- IMF Staff-Monitored Program (SMP)
 - Fiscal discipline (balanced budgets)
 - Monetary discipline (Central Bank independence)
 - Exchange rate unification (end parallel markets)
- Target: Reduce inflation to sub-100% by Month 12, sub-50% by Month 24

B. Currency Stabilization

Intervention:

- Central Bank independence (constitutional protection)
- Foreign exchange reserves replenishment (international support)
- Monetary policy credibility (inflation targeting)

External Support:

- IMF: Technical assistance and monitoring
- Bilateral currency swaps (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China)

C. Civil Service Salaries

Critical for State Functionality:

- Teachers, doctors, nurses, administrators unpaid during conflict
- Priority: Restore salaries (public service delivery resumes)

Phased Approach:

- Month 1-3: Emergency health and education workers (30% of civil service)
- Month 3-6: Additional essential services (60%)
- Month 6-12: Full civil service (100%)

Funding:

- International budget support: \$500 million annually (Months 1-24)
- Donors: World Bank, AfDB, bilateral (UK, Germany, US, Norway, Saudi Arabia)

GIZ Budget Support Program:

- **Public Financial Management (PFM) Reform**
 - Payroll systems modernization (prevent ghost workers)
 - Treasury single account (expenditure control)
 - Budget execution monitoring
 - Capacity building for Finance Ministry
- **Budget Contribution:** €40 million (Months 1-24)

D. Basic Services Restoration

Electricity:

- Emergency generation (diesel generators)
- Merowe Dam full capacity restoration (currently underutilized)
- Solar expansion (Khartoum, major towns)
- Target: 12 hours/day electricity (urban areas) by Month 12

Water and Sanitation:

- Urban water systems repair (Khartoum, Port Sudan, Nyala, El Obeid)
- Rural boreholes and hand pumps (5,000+ new/rehabilitated)
- Target: 70% population access to clean water by Month 24

GIZ Infrastructure Support:

- **Water and Sanitation**
 - Systems rehabilitation (pipes, pumps, treatment plants)
 - Decentralized renewable energy (solar-powered water pumps)
 - Community-base
- **Renewable Energy**
 - Solar mini-grids (rural areas and IDP camps)
 - Technical training (installation, maintenance)
 - Public-private partnerships (solar investment)
- **Budget Contribution:** €60 million (Months 1-36)

E. Food Security

Humanitarian-Development Nexus:

- Transition from emergency aid to development support
- Cash-based assistance (stimulate local economies)
- Support local agriculture (not displace with imports)

Agricultural Recovery:

- Seeds and tools distribution (500,000 farming families)
- Fertilizer subsidies (temporary, targeted)
- Irrigation system repair (Gezira Scheme priority)
- Livestock restocking (pastoralists)

GIZ Agricultural Recovery (Early Phase):

- **Emergency Agriculture Support**
 - Input distribution (seeds, tools, fertilizer)
 - Agricultural extension services (technical advice)
 - Veterinary services (livestock health)

- Storage and post-harvest facilities (reduce losses)
- **Budget Contribution:** €50 million (Months 1-24)

Budget (Phase 1 Stabilization): \$2.5 billion (Months 1-24)

- Budget support (salaries): \$1 billion
- Basic services (electricity, water): \$800M (GIZ: €60M)
- Food security and agriculture: \$500M (GIZ: €50M)
- Currency stabilization support: \$200M

12.2 War Economy Transformation (Months 18–48)

Objective: Redirect resources from conflict to production.

A. Gold Sector Formalization (detailed in Section 7.3)

Current: \$2-4 billion annually (smuggled)

Target: \$3 billion annually (formal, taxed at 15% = \$450M revenue)

Transformation:

- Licensing and regulation
- International certification
- Banking system integration
- Employment formalization

GIZ Gold Sector Role: €60 million (see Section 7.3)

B. Border Trade Legalization

Current: Informal/smuggling (livestock to Saudi/Gulf, goods to/from Libya, Chad, Ethiopia)

Transformation:

- Customs modernization (reduce bureaucracy and corruption)
- Border crossing infrastructure (efficient processing)
- Regional trade agreements (facilitated movement)

Revenue:

- Customs duties: \$200-300 million annually (currently lost to smuggling)

GIZ Trade Facilitation: €20 million (see Section 7.3)

C. Agriculture Commercialization

From Subsistence to Commercial:

- Value chain development (gum arabic, sesame, livestock, horticulture)
- Processing facilities (add value domestically)
- Quality standards and certification (export markets)
- Farmer cooperatives (collective bargaining power)

Export Potential:

- Gum arabic: \$200-300M annually (Sudan has 70% global supply)
- Sesame: \$150-200M
- Livestock: \$500-700M (Gulf markets)

GIZ Value Chain Development:

- **Agricultural Value Chains**
 - Processing facility development
 - Quality certification systems
 - Market linkages (domestic and export)
 - Farmer organization strengthening
 - Post-harvest technology
- **Budget Contribution:** €70 million (Months 18-48)

D. Dismantling Illicit Networks

Targets:

- Arms smuggling networks
- Human trafficking
- Drug trafficking (Sudan as transit route)

Approach:

- Intelligence cooperation (regional and international)
- Border control (see Section 7.6)
- Banking system monitoring (anti-money laundering)
- Prosecutions (serious transnational crimes)

E. Private Sector Revival

Business Environment Reform:

- Reduce bureaucracy (business registration: 30 days → 7 days)
- Corruption reduction (transparent processes, digitalization)
- Contract enforcement (functional courts)
- Property rights (land titling, registry)

Access to Finance:

- SME lending programs (microfinance, commercial banks)
- Credit guarantee schemes (reduce risk for lenders)

- Diaspora investment incentives

GIZ Private Sector Development:

- **MSME (Micro, Small, Medium Enterprise) Support**
 - Business development services
 - Access to finance programs
 - Entrepreneurship training
 - Value chain financing
 - Women and youth entrepreneurship focus
- **Investment Climate Reform**
 - Regulatory simplification
 - One-stop shops (business registration)
 - Public-private dialogue platforms
- **Budget Contribution:** €50 million (Months 18-60)

12.3 Productive Economy Restoration (Months 36–90)

A. Infrastructure Reconstruction

Roads:

- Khartoum-Port Sudan highway (economic artery, Red Sea access)
- Khartoum-El Obeid (Kordofan connectivity)
- Regional networks (connect states)
- Target: 5,000 km roads rehabilitated/constructed

GIZ Transport Infrastructure:

- **Rural Roads and Connectivity**
 - Labor-intensive road construction (employment generation)
 - Community contracting (local ownership)
 - Maintenance systems (sustainability)
- **Budget Contribution:** €40 million

Railways:

- Khartoum-Port Sudan line (freight and passengers)
- Agricultural region connections (Gedaref, Sennar)
- Regional integration (connect to Egypt, Ethiopia)

Electricity:

- Merowe Dam optimization
- New hydropower (Kajbar, Dal Dams if feasible)
- Solar farms (10 sites, 500MW total)
- Grid expansion (rural electrification)
- Target: 70% population access by Month 90

Telecommunications:

- 4G/5G rollout (national coverage)
- Fiber optic backbone
- Digital economy enablement

Total Infrastructure Investment: \$4 billion (Months 36-90)

- Roads: \$1.5 billion
- Railways: \$800 million
- Electricity: \$1.2 billion
- Telecoms: \$500 million

Funding:

- IFIs (World Bank, AfDB): \$2 billion (concessional loans)
- Bilateral (China, EU, Gulf): \$1 billion
- Private sector (PPPs): \$500 million
- Sudan budget (post-debt relief): \$500 million

B. Youth Employment

Challenge: 60%+ youth unemployment/underemployment

Programs:

1. Vocational Training (100,000 youth annually)

- Construction, electrical, plumbing, mechanics
- ICT and digital skills
- Agriculture and agribusiness
- Healthcare and services

GIZ TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training):

- **National TVET Strategy**
 - Curriculum development (labor market-relevant)
 - Instructor training
 - Industry partnerships (apprenticeships)
 - Quality assurance systems
 - Recognition of prior learning (ex-combatants, informal workers)
- **TVET Infrastructure**
 - Training centers construction/rehabilitation
 - Equipment provision
 - Management systems
- **Budget Contribution:** €80 million (Months 24-90)

2. Public Works Programs (50,000 jobs)

- Infrastructure maintenance (roads, water, sanitation)
- Environmental rehabilitation (tree planting, soil conservation)
- Community facility construction (schools, clinics, markets)
- Time-bound (6-12 months), bridge to permanent employment

3. Entrepreneurship Support (20,000 startups)

- Business training and mentoring
- Seed capital (grants and loans)
- Incubation and acceleration
- Digital economy focus (tech startups)

4. Agriculture and Rural Employment (200,000 jobs)

- Modern farming techniques training
- Agribusiness entrepreneurship
- Rural infrastructure (irrigation, storage)
- Value chain employment (processing, marketing)

Budget: \$600 million (Months 36-90)

- Vocational training: \$250M (GIZ: €80M)
- Public works: \$150M
- Entrepreneurship: \$100M (GIZ portion of private sector development)
- Agriculture: \$100M (GIZ agricultural programs)

C. Export Diversification

Beyond Oil and Gold:

Agriculture:

- Gum arabic (expand production and processing)
- Sesame (organic certification, premium markets)
- Livestock (live animals and meat, halal certification)
- Horticulture (fruits, vegetables for Gulf markets)

Light Manufacturing:

- Textiles and garments (cotton production base)
- Food processing (value-added agricultural products)
- Leather goods (livestock base)
- Construction materials (cement, bricks)

Services:

- Regional logistics hub (Port Sudan, Khartoum airport)
- Tourism (historical sites: Meroe pyramids, Red Sea diving)
- ICT services (call centers, software development)

Support:

- Export promotion agency
- Trade missions and exhibitions
- Quality standards and certification
- Trade finance (export credit)

Target: Non-oil, non-gold exports reach \$2 billion annually by Month 90

12.4 Debt Relief Strategy

Sudan's Debt: ~\$60 billion (unsustainable)

Tiered Relief (Conditioned on Transition Progress):

Milestone 1: Conflict Resolution + Transition Commitment (Month 1)

- **Action:** Interim Debt Service Suspension
- **Benefit:** \$800 million annually (not paid, fiscal space created)
- **Conditions:** Ceasefire holds, transitional authority established, IMF program initiated

Milestone 2: Phase II Completion (Month 30)

- **Action:** HIPC Decision Point
- **Benefit:** 30% principal reduction (~\$18 billion)
- **Conditions:** Civilians control key ministries, economic stabilization underway, SAF civilianization timeline on track

Milestone 3: Phase IV Progress (Month 54)

- **Action:** Interim HIPC Relief
- **Benefit:** Additional 20% reduction (~\$12 billion)
- **Conditions:** War crimes prosecutions initiated, reparations funded, DDR substantially complete

Milestone 4: Constitutional Referendum (Month 78)

- **Action:** HIPC Completion Point
- **Benefit:** Final 50% reduction (~\$30 billion)
- **Conditions:** Constitution approved, elections scheduled, democratic institutions functioning

Post-HIPC (Month 90+):

- **Remaining Debt:** ~\$10-15 billion (manageable)
- **Paris Club:** Bilateral debt cancellation (additional relief)
- **Access:** Concessional lending (IDA, AfDB) reopened
- **Credit Rating:** Gradual improvement, market access (long-term)

Total Debt Relief Value: ~\$45-50 billion over transition

Fiscal Impact:

- Debt service: \$800M annually → \$200-300M annually
- Fiscal space: \$500M+ annually for development spending

12.5 Infrastructure Reconstruction

(Covered in Section 12.3A, summarized here)

Priorities:

1. Transport (roads, railways, ports, airports)
2. Energy (electricity generation, transmission, distribution)
3. Water and sanitation (urban and rural)
4. Telecommunications (digital infrastructure)
5. Social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, government buildings)

Approach:

- Quick wins first (repair existing infrastructure)
- Regional balance (not just Khartoum-centric)
- Climate resilience (adaptation to water scarcity, extreme weather)
- Public-private partnerships (where appropriate)

Employment:

- Labor-intensive methods (maximize job creation)
- Skills training (on-the-job learning)
- Local procurement (support Sudanese businesses)

12.6 Youth Employment and Development

(Covered in Section 12.3B, summarized here)

Recognition: Lost generation requires targeted investment

Four Pillars:

1. Education and skills (TVET, higher education reform)
2. Employment creation (public works, private sector, entrepreneurship)
3. Social inclusion (political participation, civic engagement)

4. Protection (prevent re-recruitment, support vulnerable youth)

Special Focus:

- Ex-combatants (DDR reintegration)
- Displaced youth (catch-up education, psychosocial support)
- Rural youth (agriculture, migration alternatives)
- Women and girls (gender-specific barriers addressed)

Total Economic Recovery Budget (Parallel Track, Months 1-90): \$12 billion

Breakdown:

- Emergency stabilization (Months 1-24): \$2.5B
- War economy transformation (Months 18-48): \$1.5B
- Infrastructure (Months 36-90): \$4B
- Youth employment (Months 36-90): \$600M
- Agriculture and rural development (ongoing): \$1.5B
- Private sector and trade (ongoing): \$800M
- EITI and governance (ongoing): \$200M
- Contingency and other: \$900M

GIZ Total Economic Recovery Contribution: €500 million (Months 1-90)

GIZ thematic focus:

- Agriculture and rural development: €200M
- TVET and youth employment: €100M
- Water, energy, infrastructure: €100M
- Private sector and trade: €50M
- Governance (PFM, EITI, transparency): €50M

13. International Partnership Framework

13.1 Guarantor States and Organizations

Core Guarantors (Political and Financial Commitment):

African Union:

- Peace and Security Council: Authorization and oversight
- Peacekeeping: Regional Stabilization Force deployment
- Mediation: Conflict resolution and transition facilitation
- Election Observation: Credibility and legitimacy

Arab League:

- Political legitimacy: Arab world engagement
- Funding: Gulf states mobilization
- Cultural bridge: Sudan's Arab-African identity

United Nations:

- Security Council: Peacekeeping mandate, sanctions enforcement
- Development System: UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO coordination
- Human Rights: Monitoring and reporting (OHCHR)
- Specialized Agencies: Technical support (ILO, FAO, UNESCO)

International Financial Institutions:

- IMF: Macroeconomic stabilization, debt relief, technical assistance
- World Bank: Development finance, budget support, sector programs
- African Development Bank: Infrastructure, regional integration

Regional Organizations:

- IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development): Regional stability, economic integration
- East African Community: Potential membership, trade benefits
- Arab Maghreb Union: North African connectivity

13.2 Conditionality and Verification Mechanisms

Principle: Aid and benefits linked to verified progress, not promises.

Conditionality Matrix:

Phase	Key Milestones	Benefits Unlocked	Verification
Phase I	- Ceasefire holds 6 months	- Debt service suspension (\$800M/year)	- Ceasefire Monitoring Commission
	- Humanitarian access 60%+	- Emergency budget support (\$500M)	- UN humanitarian access reports
Phase II	- Transitional authority formed	- Peacekeeping deployment	- International Support Group assessment
	- Civilians control Finance, Justice, Foreign Affairs	- HIPC Decision Point (30% debt reduction)	- International observers (embedded advisors)
	- SAF sunset clause (Month 36) adhered to	- Development financing (\$1B)	- Ministerial performance reports
		- SSR support (\$300M)	- Service delivery data

Phase	Key Milestones	Benefits Unlocked	Verification
	- Basic services restored (3 states)		
Phase III	- 50,000 combatants in DDR - SAF reform underway (vetting complete) - Security stabilized (incidents down 70%)	- DDR funding (\$800M) - Military modernization support - Additional debt relief (20%)	- UNDP DDR reports - SSR advisory team assessments - Conflict incident data (ACLED)
Phase IV	- War crimes prosecutions initiated (50+ cases) - Reparations funded (\$3B+) - Truth Commission report published	- Asset recovery cooperation (Swiss, UAE banks) - Justice sector support (\$150M) - Reconciliation funding (\$100M)	- Attorney General reports - International justice observers - Public documentation
Phase V	- 500,000 registered in civic platform - Leadership selected (transparent process) - Oversight verified	- Constitutional conference funding (\$120M) - Electoral preparation support (\$50M)	- Independent Oversight Council reports - International observer assessments - Public transparency data
Phase VI	- Constitutional referendum (65%+ turnout, approved) - Elections scheduled	- HIPC Completion Point (50% debt relief) - post-transition support pledge (\$2B)	- AU/UN election observation - Referendum results certification
Phase VII	- Free and fair elections (international certification) - Peaceful transfer of power	- Paris Club debt cancellation - Full IFI access - Bilateral normalization - Investment guarantees	- Election observer consensus - Transfer of power documentation

Enforcement for Non-Compliance:

Yellow Flag (Minor Delays):

- Diplomatic engagement (high-level missions)

- Technical assistance intensified
- Timeline extensions (reasonable, justified)

Orange Flag (Serious Concerns):

- Aid tranche suspension (partial, targeted)
- Sanctions warnings
- International pressure (public statements)

Red Flag (Major Violations):

- Full aid suspension (humanitarian exempted)
- Targeted sanctions (individuals, entities)
- Peacekeeping mandate review (potential enforcement actions)
- ICC referrals (serious crimes)

Snapback Provisions:

- Automatic triggers (e.g., coup attempt → immediate sanctions)
- Restoration upon compliance (incentivize correction)

13.3 Funding and Resource Mobilization

Total Transition Cost: \$15-18 billion (Months 1-90)

Funding Strategy:

Phase I-II (Humanitarian and Stabilization, Months 1-30):

- **Sources:** Humanitarian appeals, bilateral grants, emergency funding
- **Amount:** \$4-5 billion
- **Donors:**
 - UN assessed contributions: \$1.5B (peacekeeping)
 - World Bank/IMF: \$1B (budget support)
 - Bilateral (US, UK, EU, Germany, Norway, Saudi Arabia, UAE): \$1.5B
 - Humanitarian (WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR): \$1B

Phase III-V (Transition and Reform, Months 30-66):

- **Sources:** Development assistance (grants and concessional loans)
- **Amount:** \$6-7 billion
- **Donors:**
 - IFIs (World Bank, AfDB): \$3B (concessional loans, grants)
 - Bilateral development (Germany/GIZ, UK, US, EU, Japan, China): \$2.5B
 - UN agencies: \$500M
 - Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar): \$1B

Phase VI-VII (Democracy and Recovery, Months 66-90):

- **Sources:** Investment, private sector, diaspora, Sudan budget
- **Amount:** \$5-6 billion
- **Sources:**
 - Private investment (infrastructure PPPs, FDI): \$2B
 - Diaspora remittances and investment: \$1.5B
 - Sudan budget (post-debt relief, revenue recovery): \$1B
 - Continued development assistance: \$1.5B

Debt Relief (Fiscal Space):

- Value: \$45-50 billion (not direct funding, but budgetary relief)
- Annual fiscal space: \$500M+ (available for development spending)

Funding Coordination:

International Sudan Recovery Conference (Month 24):

- Pledge event (donors commit resources)
- Target: \$5 billion initial pledges
- Hosted by: UN, AU, Arab League (co-sponsors)
- Participants: Bilateral donors, IFIs, private sector, diaspora

Mid-Term Review Conference (Month 54):

- Progress assessment
- Additional pledges (Phases V-VII)
- Target: \$3 billion additional commitments

Post-Election Investment Forum (Month 93):

- Private sector focus
- Investment opportunities (infrastructure, agriculture, energy, telecoms)
- Diaspora investment incentives
- Target: \$2 billion private commitments

13.4 Regional Power Management

Objective: Align regional interests with transition, prevent spoiler behavior.

Egypt:

Interests:

- Nile water security
- Border security (prevent instability spillover)
- Counter Muslim Brotherhood influence
- Economic integration

Engagement Strategy:

- Constitutional guarantee of Nile agreements (address water security)
- Security partnership with reformed SAF (Egypt trains and equips)
- Economic corridor development (Khartoum-Aswan, electricity interconnection)
- Refugee management cooperation (orderly return)

Egypt's Role:

- Regional Stabilization Force contributor (largest contingent)
- SAF professionalization partner
- Economic investment (agriculture, infrastructure)
- Political support (Arab League, AU)

Incentives:

- Stable southern neighbor
- Economic opportunities (transit trade, investment)
- Regional leadership (peacemaker role)

United Arab Emirates:

Interests:

- Red Sea ports (logistics, trade)
- Gold sector access
- Counter-terrorism
- Regional influence

Engagement Strategy:

- Legitimate commercial access (Port Sudan development concession)
- Gold sector formalization (certified Sudanese gold trade)
- Counter-terrorism cooperation
- Investment opportunities (agriculture, renewable energy, infrastructure)

UAE's Role:

- Cease support to armed groups (verified)
- Economic investment anchor (\$1-2 billion commitments)
- Gold sector international certification partner
- Financial hub (Sudanese diaspora, trade finance)

Incentives:

- Legal, profitable economic access
- Regional stability (enhances Gulf security)
- Reputational rehabilitation (responsible actor)

Saudi Arabia:

Interests:

- Red Sea security
- Regional stability (Yemen war spillover prevention)
- Islamic leadership
- Economic diversification (Sudan as breadbasket potential)

Engagement Strategy:

- Peacekeeping leadership (Regional Stabilization Force deputy command)
- Religious and cultural soft power (Islamic university partnerships, Hajj facilitation)
- Agricultural investment (food security for Saudi Arabia)
- Counter-terrorism cooperation

Saudi Arabia's Role:

- Major financial contributor (\$500M-1B)
- Peacekeeping troops and leadership
- Mediation between Egypt and UAE (bridge differences)
- Economic investment (agriculture, energy)

Incentives:

- Regional stability
- Food security (Sudan agricultural potential)
- Religious and cultural influence
- Counter Iranian influence

Ethiopia:

Interests:

- Border security
- Refugee burden sharing (Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia)
- Trade access (Sudan as outlet to Red Sea)
- Nile Basin cooperation

Engagement Strategy:

- Border security cooperation (joint patrols, intelligence sharing)
- Refugee return support (voluntary, resourced)
- Trade corridor development (Sudan-Ethiopia connectivity)
- Nile Basin dialogue (cooperative rather than competitive)

Ethiopia's Role:

- Regional Stabilization Force contributor

- Border security partner
- Trade partner (Ethiopia imports through Sudan)

Incentives:

- Stable western neighbor
- Trade access to Red Sea
- Nile cooperation (mutual benefit)

Regional Coordination Forum:

Structure:

- Quarterly ministerial meetings
- Guarantor states: Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Kenya
- International observers: UN, AU, Arab League, US, UK, EU
- Sudan government: Full participant

Functions:

- Coordinate support and policies
- Resolve disputes or tensions
- Monitor progress and commitments
- Mobilize resources

Conflict Resolution:

- Mediation if regional powers interfere or compete
- International community pressure (unified front)
- Sanctions threat for spoiler behavior

13.5 Bilateral Partnership Opportunities

United Kingdom:

Interests:

- Historical ties (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan legacy)
- Development priorities (fragile states, good governance)
- Migration management (reduce irregular migration to UK)
- Regional stability (Horn of Africa, Sahel)

Contribution:

- Development finance: £300-400 million (Months 1-90)
- SSR lead partner: £80 million (training, equipment, advisory)
- Justice sector: £50 million (rule of law, transitional justice)
- Humanitarian: £150 million (early phases)

GIZ Role: Partner with UK on complementary programs (e.g., GIZ on economic governance, UK on political governance)

United States:

Interests:

- Counterterrorism (prevent safe havens)
- Regional stability
- Human rights and democracy promotion
- Economic opportunities

Contribution:

- Development and humanitarian: \$500-700 million
- Security assistance: \$150 million (counterterrorism, border security)
- Debt relief advocacy (leadership in IFIs)
- Sanctions enforcement and removal (incentivize compliance)

Germany (via GIZ and bilateral):

Interests:

- Development cooperation (longstanding programs in Sudan)
- Migration management (reduce irregular migration to Europe)
- Renewable energy and climate
- Good governance and rule of law

Contribution:

- GIZ programs: €850-900 million (Months 1-90, detailed throughout this document)
- Bilateral development: €200 million additional
- Debt relief (Paris Club member)
- Technical expertise (TVET, governance, agriculture, renewable energy, water)

Total German Contribution: ~€1.05-1.1 billion (one of largest bilateral contributors)

GIZ Comparative Advantage:

- Long-term Sudan presence (institutional memory, relationships)
- Holistic approach (not just grants, but capacity building and systems)
- Technical excellence (TVET, agriculture, water, governance)
- Sustainability focus (systems that endure beyond project cycles)

Other Bilateral Partners:

Norway:

- Peacebuilding and mediation: \$100 million
- Humanitarian: \$150 million
- Oil sector governance (if Sudan restarts production)

Netherlands:

- Water and agriculture: €100 million
- Justice and rule of law: €50 million

Sweden:

- Humanitarian and development: \$100 million
- Gender equality and women's empowerment

Canada:

- Humanitarian: \$80 million
- Extractive sector governance

Japan:

- Infrastructure: \$300 million (roads, electricity)
- Private sector development

China:

- Infrastructure (railways, electricity): \$500 million (loans, not grants)
- Oil sector (if production resumes)
- Trade and investment

Gulf States (collective):

- Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait
- Development and budget support: \$1.5-2 billion
- Investment: \$1-2 billion (agriculture, infrastructure, trade)

13.6 Diplomatic Coordination Architecture

International Sudan Support Group (ISSG):

Established: Month 0 (Pre-Transition Phase)

Membership:

- **Core Group:** US, UK, Germany, France, Norway (Western)
- **Regional:** Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Kenya (Regional)

- **Organizations:** UN, AU, Arab League, EU, World Bank, IMF
- **Sudan:** Transitional authority (from Phase II onward)

Functions:

- Political coordination and strategy alignment
- Resource mobilization and allocation
- Monitoring and verification of benchmarks
- Conflict resolution among members
- Policy recommendations and adjustments
- Public communication (unified messaging)

Governance:

- Co-chairs: UN (rotating annually), AU, Arab League
- Secretariat: UN DPPA (Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs)
- Meetings: Monthly (senior officials), Quarterly (ministerial)
- Working Groups: Security, Economic Recovery, Justice, Elections

Decision-Making:

- Consensus preferred
- Majority voting (2/3) if consensus fails
- Sudan has consultative voice (not veto)

Transparency:

- Public communiqués after meetings
- Annual progress reports
- Civil society consultation mechanisms

Diplomatic Channels:

Bilateral Track:

- Embassy presence (re-establish in Khartoum)
- Ambassadorial engagement (regular dialogue)
- Special envoys (high-level missions for critical issues)

Multilateral Track:

- UN Security Council: Resolutions, sanctions, peacekeeping mandates
- AU Peace and Security Council: Regional authorization
- Arab League Council: Political support
- G7/G20: Advocacy for debt relief and support

Civil Society Track:

- Regular consultations (ISSG meets Sudanese civil society quarterly)
- Feedback mechanisms (civil society input on international support)
- Independent monitoring (civil society shadow reports)

14. Risk Management and Mitigation

14.1 Spoiler Management Protocols

Definition: Actors who benefit from conflict or oppose transition (armed groups, war economy profiteers, regional spoilers).

Identification:

Internal Spoilers:

- SAF hardliners (oppose civilianization)
- RSF remnants (refuse DDR)
- Militia commanders (prefer local control)
- Corrupt officials (lose illicit revenue)
- Excluded political elites (lose power)

External Spoilers:

- Regional powers (if interests threatened)
- Arms dealers and smugglers
- Illicit gold buyers
- Mercenary groups

Spoiler Typologies:

Limited Spoilers:

- Have limited goals (local power, economic interests)
- Can be co-opted (incentives and inclusion)
- **Strategy:** Negotiation, economic incorporation, local power-sharing

Greedy Spoilers:

- Maximize position (total power or unlimited wealth)
- Strategic actors (respond to incentives and threats)
- **Strategy:** Carrots and sticks (rewards for compliance, punishment for obstruction)

Total Spoilers:

- Ideological or existential opposition to transition
- Cannot be co-opted

- **Strategy:** Isolation, sanctions, military action if necessary

Management Strategies:

Preventive:

- Include potential spoilers in process (where possible)
- Address grievances (economic, political marginalization)
- Transparent communication (reduce misunderstandings)

Co-optive:

- Economic incorporation (Section 7.3)
- Political participation (legitimate channels)
- Amnesty (conditional, for cooperation)

Coercive:

- Targeted sanctions (individuals, entities, assets)
- International arrest warrants (ICC, Interpol)
- Military action (Regional Stabilization Force, reformed SAF)

Case Management:

SAF Hardliner Faction:

- **Risk:** Coup attempt to prevent full civilianization
- **Preventive:** Gradual sunset clauses (not abrupt), economic incentives (pensions, partnerships)
- **Coercive:** Regional Stabilization Force deterrent, international sanctions threat
- **Mitigation:** Identify and promote reform-minded officers, isolate hardliners

RSF Commander Holdouts:

- **Risk:** Refuse DDR, maintain armed groups
- **Preventive:** Economic incorporation offers (legitimate wealth)
- **Coercive:** Military operations (SAF + Regional Stabilization Force), asset seizures, prosecutions
- **Mitigation:** Negotiate with mid-level commanders (peel away from leadership)

Regional Power Spoiler (hypothetical: UAE continues RSF support):

- **Risk:** Re-arm militias, undermine transition
- **Preventive:** UAE economic incentives (see Section 13.4)
- **Coercive:** US/EU sanctions on UAE entities, diplomatic isolation, public attribution
- **Mitigation:** Saudi Arabia mediation (Gulf internal diplomacy)

14.2 Regional Interference Countermeasures

Scenarios and Responses:

Scenario A: Egypt Undermines Civilian Control (fears losing SAF ally)

Indicators:

- Egyptian support for SAF hardliners
- Resistance to civilianization timeline
- Arms supplies to prevent military reform

Countermeasures:

- US/EU diplomatic pressure on Egypt
- Nile Basin cooperation threat (leverage)
- AU/Arab League mediation
- Condition debt relief on civilian control (Egypt cannot block alone)

Scenario B: UAE Restarts RSF Support (seeks to preserve proxies)

Indicators:

- Financial flows to former RSF commanders
- Gold smuggling networks revived
- Arms shipments (intelligence detected)

Countermeasures:

- US Treasury sanctions (OFAC designations)
- EU asset freezes
- Public attribution (reputational costs)
- Saudi mediation (Gulf unity vs. UAE unilateralism)

Scenario C: Ethiopia-Sudan Border Conflict (spillover from internal Ethiopian conflict)

Indicators:

- Cross-border militia raids
- Refugee flows increase
- Territorial disputes (al-Fashqa)

Countermeasures:

- AU mediation (border dispute resolution)
- Joint border patrols (agreed zones)
- IGAD engagement (regional stability mechanism)
- International support for border infrastructure

Scenario D: Libya Spillover (arms, militants, Wagner remnants)

Indicators:

- Weapons smuggling from Libya
- Mercenaries crossing into Sudan
- Darfur militia rearmament

Countermeasures:

- UN Libya mission coordination
- Border security enhancement (Section 7.6)
- Intelligence sharing (France, US, regional partners)
- Regional Stabilization Force deployments to western border

General Countermeasures:

Diplomatic:

- Multilateral pressure (UN, AU, Arab League)
- Bilateral engagement (US, UK, EU with spoiler states)
- Public attribution (shame and reputational costs)

Economic:

- Sanctions (targeted, entity-level)
- Trade restrictions (arms embargoes, financial sanctions)
- Aid conditionality (regional cooperation required)

Military:

- Regional Stabilization Force (deterrent)
- Intelligence sharing (monitor and detect interference)
- Border control (prevent arms flows)

Legal:

- ICC referrals (for serious violations)
- International tribunals (accountability for spoilers)

14.3 Economic Collapse Scenarios

Scenario A: Hyperinflation Persists (IMF program fails)

Triggers:

- Continued conflict or instability
- Aid flows insufficient
- Central Bank independence compromised
- External shocks (global food prices, oil prices)

Impacts:

- Currency worthless (barter economy)
- Civil service unpaid (state collapse)
- Food insecurity (famine)
- Social unrest (riots, violence)

Mitigation:

- Front-load international budget support (stabilize quickly)
- Central Bank technical assistance (embed IMF advisors)
- Emergency food aid (prevent starvation)
- Accelerate timeline if rapid stabilization achieved

Contingency:

- If collapse imminent: International financial administration (temporary, like Liberia 2003)
- Ensure Sudanese face and participation (not full trusteeship)

Scenario B: Debt Relief Delayed (international coordination fails)

Triggers:

- G7 disagreement on Sudan eligibility
- Conditionality disputes
- Bureaucratic delays

Impacts:

- Fiscal space limited (debt service consumes budget)
- Development spending insufficient
- Public frustration (transition not delivering)

Mitigation:

- Early diplomatic engagement (build G7 consensus)
- Clear conditionality (transparent, achievable)
- Interim debt service suspension (immediate relief)

Contingency:

- Bilateral debt forgiveness (even if multilateral delayed)
- Grant-based support (compensate for loan unavailability)

Scenario C: War Economies Persist (transformation fails)

Triggers:

- Militia commanders prefer illicit profits
- International sanctions ineffective
- Corruption enables smuggling

Impacts:

- State revenue low (cannot fund services)
- Armed groups self-sustaining (DDR fails)
- Insecurity persists (militias maintain power)

Mitigation:

- Robust international enforcement (UAE, Kenya banking cooperation)
- Alternative livelihoods (economic incorporation, see Section 7.3)
- Law enforcement capacity (anti-smuggling units)

Contingency:

- Military operations against holdouts
- Prolonged Regional Stabilization Force presence

14.4 Popular Unrest Management

Scenario A: Public Impatience (demands immediate elections)

Triggers:

- Transition timeline perceived as too long
- Service delivery insufficient
- Distrust of transitional authority

Impacts:

- Mass protests (2019-style mobilization)
- Demands for acceleration
- Potential violence if repressed

Management:

- **DO NOT SUPPRESS** (loses legitimacy, repeats past mistakes)
- **Engage constructively:**
 - Transparent communication (explain sequencing rationale)
 - Incorporate protesters into platform (channel energy)
 - Quick wins (visible service improvements)
 - Timeline adjustments (if safe to accelerate)

GIZ Role in Civic Engagement:

- **Dialogue and Communication Infrastructure**
 - Public forums and town halls
 - Online platforms (feedback, proposals)
 - Media campaigns (explain transition complexities)
 - Protest liaison mechanisms (communication channels)
- **Budget:** Included in governance programs

Scenario B: Regional Grievances (periphery feels excluded)

Triggers:

- Khartoum-centric focus (resources, attention)
- Marginalized regions see little benefit
- Representation insufficient

Impacts:

- Regional protests and demands
- Renewed calls for autonomy or secession
- Ethnic tensions

Management:

- Ensure regional representation (platform, constitutional conference)
- Visible investment in periphery (infrastructure, services)
- Federalism (constitutional guarantee of autonomy)
- Regional leaders in transitional authority

Scenario C: Women and Youth Mobilization (demands for inclusion)

Triggers:

- Gender quotas insufficient
- Youth unemployment high
- Exclusion from decision-making

Impacts:

- Organized protests and advocacy
- Political pressure on transitional authority

- International attention and support

Management:

- **Positive scenario** (constructive pressure for inclusion)
- Increase quotas and participation
- Youth and women employment programs (Section 12.3B, 8.5)
- Constitutional guarantees (gender equality, youth voice)

GIZ Women and Youth Empowerment:

- Ongoing programs (Sections 8.5, 12.3B)
- Political participation support
- Economic empowerment

14.5 Contingency Planning

Scenario A: SAF Coup (Phase II or III)

Triggers:

- Hardline officers fear prosecution or loss of power
- Transitional authority perceived as weak
- Regional Stabilization Force insufficient deterrent

Immediate Response:

- Regional Stabilization Force protection of civilian leaders
- International condemnation (UN Security Council emergency session)
- Sanctions snapback (immediate, comprehensive)
- ICC arrest warrants (coup leaders)

Medium-Term:

- Isolation (diplomatic, economic)
- Support to resistance (civil disobedience, not armed)
- Negotiated return to transition (with guarantees)

Long-Term:

- If coup consolidated: Prolonged isolation (Myanmar model)
- If overturned: Accountability for coup leaders, transition resumes

Prevention:

- Gradual civilianization (not abrupt, reduces coup incentive)
- Economic incentives (pensions, partnerships)
- Regional Stabilization Force deterrent (credible response capability)

- International monitoring (early warning of coup plotting)

Scenario B: Renewed Large-Scale Violence (Phase III or IV)

Triggers:

- DDR fails (armed groups return to violence)
- Ethnic revenge killings escalate
- Regional spillover (Libya, Ethiopia, CAR)

Response:

- Regional Stabilization Force deployment (reinforce affected areas)
- SAF operations (if reformed and capable)
- Humanitarian corridors (protect civilians)
- Mediation (address underlying grievances)

Contingency:

- Pause political transition (focus on stabilization)
- Return to Phase I approaches (localized ceasefires)
- International peacekeeping enforcement (UN Chapter VII if needed)

Scenario C: Constitutional Referendum Fails (Phase VI)

Triggers:

- Draft constitution too controversial
- Public rejects (below 50% YES)
- Low turnout (legitimacy questioned)

Response:

- Constitutional Conference reconvenes (60 days)
- Address public concerns (consultations, amendments)
- Second referendum (6 months)

If Second Failure:

- Extended transitional period (constitutional crisis)
- International mediation (help forge consensus)
- Alternative: Interim constitution (temporary, elections proceed, permanent constitution later)

Scenario D: Transitional Leaders Resist Leaving (Phase VII)

Triggers:

- Enjoy power and privilege

- Fear prosecution or loss of status
- Attempt to extend mandate or manipulate elections

Response:

- International pressure (guarantor states enforce sunset)
- Sanctions threat (individual leaders)
- Civil society mobilization (protests, demands)
- Regional Stabilization Force (prevent power grab)

Prevention:

- Constitutional prohibition on transitional leaders in first elections
- Economic security (pensions, dignified exit)
- International monitoring (ensure compliance)

14.6 Adaptive Implementation

Principle: No plan survives contact with reality—build in flexibility.

Quarterly Review Process:

Oversight Mechanism:

- **Transition Review Board** (established Month 12)
 - 9 members: 5 Sudanese (civil society, academia, retired officials), 4 international (ISSG representatives)
 - Independent from transitional authority
 - Mandate: Monitor progress, recommend adjustments

Functions:

- Assess progress against benchmarks (Section 15)
- Identify risks and bottlenecks
- Recommend timeline or tactical adjustments
- Report publicly (transparency and accountability)

Quarterly Activities:

- Data review (quantitative indicators)
- Stakeholder consultations (government, civil society, international partners)
- Field assessments (visit states, affected communities)
- Report production (findings and recommendations)

Adaptation Authority:

Minor Adjustments (± 3 months per phase):

- **Decision Maker:** Transition Review Board recommends, Oversight Council approves
- **Examples:**
 - DDR takes 15 months instead of 12 (more combatants than expected)
 - Constitutional conference extends to 20 months (complex negotiations)

Major Adjustments (±6+ months, structural changes):

- **Decision Maker:** ISSG (International Sudan Support Group) approves
- **Examples:**
 - Phase III extended due to persistent insecurity
 - Civilianization timeline accelerated (SAF cooperation exceeds expectations)
 - Electoral system changed (constitutional conference decision)

Process Failure (fundamental rethink required):

- **Decision Maker:** UN Security Council or AU Peace and Security Council
- **Examples:**
 - Renewed large-scale war (return to conflict resolution)
 - Coup (sanctions, isolation, negotiated return)
 - Economic collapse (international financial administration)

Communication:

- All adaptations publicly explained (rationale, evidence-based)
- Stakeholder consultation (Sudanese civil society input)
- Maintain transparency (build public trust)

Learning and Iteration:

- Document lessons learned (what works, what doesn't)
- Share with other transitions (Sudan's experience benefits others)
- Continuous improvement (adapt best practices)

15. Success Metrics and Benchmarks

15.1 Phase Transition Criteria

Objective, measurable criteria for advancing between phases:

Pre-Transition → Phase I:

- Two of three preconditions met (military stalemate, economic exhaustion, regional alignment)
- International Support Group operational
- Civilian capacity prepared (shadow units ready)

Phase I → Phase II:

- National ceasefire holds 6+ months (verified by Ceasefire Monitoring Commission)
- Combat incidents reduced 70%+ from peak
- Humanitarian access to 70%+ of territory
- SAF and stakeholders agree to transitional authority structure
- International pledges: \$2 billion+ for stabilization

Phase II → Phase III:

- Transitional authority functioning 12+ months
- Civilians control Finance, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Health, Education (verified)
- SAF sunset clause (Month 36) implemented (2 of 4 Sovereignty Council seats relinquished)
- Basic services restored in 10+ states (electricity, water, health clinics)
- Public approval: 60%+ (independent polling)

Phase III → Phase IV:

- 50,000+ combatants completed DDR (verified by UNDP)
- SAF vetting complete, command structure reformed
- Regional Stabilization Force deployed and operational
- No major ceasefire violations for 12 months
- Militia violence reduced 80%+ from peak

Phase IV → Phase V:

- Economic crimes prosecutions: 100+ cases initiated
- War crimes prosecutions: 20+ cases initiated
- Reparations fund: \$3 billion+ collected
- Truth Commission report published
- Public reconciliation forums held in 15+ states

Phase V → Phase VI:

- Civic platform: 500,000+ registered (verified, biometric)
- Leadership selection complete (200+ positions filled)
- Oversight Council certifies process integrity
- Public confidence: 65%+ approve selected leaders (polling)

Phase VI → Phase VII:

- Constitutional referendum: 65%+ turnout, 65%+ approval
- Electoral Commission: Independent, resourced, operational
- Voter registration: 70%+ of eligible adults

- International observers accredited

Phase VII → Post-Transition:

- Elections held (local, state, parliamentary, presidential)
- International observers certify free and fair
- Turnout: 70%+ (presidential), 65%+ (parliamentary)
- Results accepted (peaceful, no major disputes)
- Power transferred to elected government

15.2 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Data Collection Systems:

Quantitative Indicators:

- Conflict incidents (ACLED database, real-time)
- Humanitarian access (UN OCHA, monthly)
- Economic data (inflation, exchange rates, GDP—IMF, Central Bank, monthly/quarterly)
- Service delivery (electricity hours, water access, school enrollment—sector ministries, quarterly)
- DDR progress (UNDP, monthly)
- Prosecution data (Attorney General, quarterly)
- Registration and participation (platform, real-time)
- Public opinion (independent polling, quarterly)

Qualitative Assessments:

- Stakeholder interviews (government, civil society, international—quarterly)
- Field assessments (visit states, communities—semi-annually)
- Expert analysis (academics, practitioners—annually)
- Civil society shadow reports (independent monitoring—annually)

GIZ M&E Support:

- **Monitoring and Evaluation Systems**
 - Data management platforms (centralized, accessible)
 - Training for M&E officers (government, civil society)
 - Third-party evaluation (independent assessments of GIZ programs)
 - Results-based management systems
 - Real-time dashboards (public transparency)
- **Budget:** €15 million (integrated into program budgets)

Evaluation Cycle:

Quarterly Reviews:

- Progress against indicators

- Risks and challenges identification
- Recommendations for adjustments

Annual Evaluations:

- Comprehensive assessment (all phases/sectors)
- Impact evaluation (outcomes, not just outputs)
- Learning and adaptation
- Public reporting (transparency)

Mid-Term Evaluation (Month 45):

- Independent external evaluation (hired by ISSG, not government)
- Assess overall transition trajectory
- Major course corrections if needed

Final Evaluation (Month 96):

- Comprehensive lessons learned
- Document successes and failures
- Recommendations for post-transition government
- Contribution to global transitional justice and peacebuilding knowledge

Public Dashboard (Live, Online):

Indicators Displayed:

- Security: Conflict incidents (weekly updated map)
- Humanitarian: Access percentage, food insecurity levels
- Economic: Inflation rate, exchange rate, employment estimates
- Services: Electricity hours/day, water access %, school enrollment
- DDR: Combatants demobilized (cumulative graph)
- Justice: Cases prosecuted (by category: economic, GBV, war crimes)
- Civic platform: Registration numbers, demographics
- Elections: Voter registration progress, turnout results

Access:

- Public website (no login required)
- Mobile-friendly (low bandwidth)
- Multiple languages (Arabic, English, others)
- Data downloadable (transparency, research)

15.3 Early Warning Indicators

Purpose: Detect problems before they become crises.

Security Deterioration:

- ● Red: Conflict incidents increase 50%+ in single month
- ● Orange: Sustained increase (20%+) over 3 months
- ● Yellow: Localized flare-ups (contained but concerning)

Economic Crisis:

- ● Red: Monthly inflation exceeds 20% (hyperinflation)
- ● Orange: Currency loses 30%+ value in single month
- ● Yellow: Fiscal deficit exceeds 10% of GDP

Political Instability:

- ● Red: Coup attempt or government collapse
- ● Orange: Mass protests (100,000+) demanding government resignation
- ● Yellow: Coalition tensions, ministerial resignations

Social Unrest:

- ● Red: Widespread violence (riots, ethnic clashes, multiple cities)
- ● Orange: Large protests (50,000+) with violence
- ● Yellow: Localized protests, non-violent

International Relations:

- ● Red: Regional power actively sabotages transition (arms, funding spoilers)
- ● Orange: Diplomatic tensions escalate (threats, sanctions discussions)
- ● Yellow: Disagreements but dialogue continues

Response Protocols:

Yellow Alert:

- Enhanced monitoring (daily instead of weekly)
- Diplomatic engagement (messages to relevant actors)
- Contingency planning activation (prepare responses)

Orange Alert:

- High-level missions (Special Envoys, ministerial visits)
- ISSG emergency meeting (coordinate response)
- Warnings and pressure (public statements, sanctions threats)

Red Alert:

- Crisis response (immediate action—sanctions, peacekeeping, mediation)
- ISSG mobilization (all resources, coordinated)
- UN Security Council (emergency session if needed)

15.4 Course Correction Mechanisms

When early warnings triggered, how to respond:

Scenario: Security Deterioration (Orange Alert)

Example: Darfur violence increases, 20%+ over 3 months

Analysis:

- Transition Review Board investigates causes (DDR delays? Spoilers? Resource disputes?)
- Field assessment (visit affected areas)
- Stakeholder consultations (community leaders, government, armed groups)

Recommendations:

- Accelerate DDR in affected area (additional resources)
- Regional Stabilization Force deployment (reinforce)
- Mediation (address underlying grievances)
- Economic incentives (livelihood programs for affected communities)

Implementation:

- ISSG approves recommendations
- Resources mobilized (within 30 days)
- Progress monitored (weekly reports)

Scenario: Economic Crisis (Red Alert)

Example: Monthly inflation hits 25%, hyperinflation spiral

Analysis:

- IMF emergency assessment (causes: money printing? Supply shocks? Confidence collapse?)
- Finance Ministry review (fiscal and monetary policies)

Recommendations:

- Emergency IMF program (aggressive stabilization)
- International budget support (increase, front-load)

- Central Bank interventions (foreign exchange, interest rates)
- Social protection (prevent starvation—food aid, cash transfers)

Implementation:

- ISSG emergency pledges (\$500M within 60 days)
- IMF team embedded (daily oversight)
- Public communication (restore confidence)

Scenario: Political Crisis (Orange Alert)

Example: Large protests demanding faster transition, coalition tensions

Analysis:

- Transition Review Board consultations (protest leaders, civil society, government)
- Public opinion polling (what do people want?)

Recommendations:

- Dialogue (government meets protesters, address grievances)
- Timeline acceleration (if safe—e.g., compress constitutional conference by 3 months)
- Quick wins (visible service improvements, anti-corruption actions)
- Inclusive outreach (incorporate protest leaders into process)

Implementation:

- Public forums (transitional authority explains and listens)
- Adjustments announced (with rationale)
- Civil society engagement intensified

16. Implementation Roadmap

16.1 Immediate Actions (Months 0–6)

Pre-Transition Phase (Current state):

Month 0-1:

- Establish Conflict Trajectory Monitoring Cell (operational immediately)
- Launch diaspora professional network recruitment (target: 10,000 by Month 6)
- Begin documentation and evidence preservation (war crimes, economic crimes)
- Initiate International Sudan Support Group formation (convene inaugural meeting)

Month 1-3:

- Develop policy briefs (10 thematic areas, working groups)
- Identify and map subnational stability zones
- Establish shadow technical units (recruit and begin training)
- Conduct first quarterly preconditions assessment

Month 3-6:

- Complete diaspora capacity mapping (50,000 registered professionals)
- Develop and test civilian platform prototype (digital infrastructure)
- Produce International Leverage Toolkit (sanctions, debt relief, incentives frameworks)
- Convene first International Sudan Recovery Conference (virtual, pledge preparatory)

Budget (Months 0-6): \$8 million

- Monitoring and capacity building: \$3M
- Documentation: \$2M
- Platform development: \$2M
- Coordination: \$1M

16.2 Medium-Term Milestones (Months 6–36)

Phase I: Security Stabilization (Months 1-18, after preconditions met):

Key Milestones:

- Month 1: Ceasefire declared, humanitarian corridors established
- Month 6: Regional Stabilization Force deployed (initial battalions)
- Month 12: Transitional authority formed, Sovereignty Council inaugurated
- Month 18: Phase I exit criteria met, transition to Phase II

Phase II: Emergency Governance (Months 12-30):

Key Milestones:

- Month 12: Cabinet appointed, civilians control key ministries
- Month 18: Civil service salaries restored (60% of workforce)
- Month 24: Basic services functioning in 10 states, debt relief (HIPC Decision Point)
- Month 30: SAF Sovereignty Council representation reduced (4 → 2 members), Phase II exit criteria met

Budget (Months 6-36): \$7 billion

- Peacekeeping: \$1.8B
- Humanitarian and stabilization: \$3B
- Budget support: \$1.5B

- Infrastructure and services: \$700M

16.3 Long-Term Objectives (Months 36–90)

Phase III: Security Sector Transformation (Months 24-54):

Key Milestones:

- Month 30: DDR begins (first cantonment sites operational)
- Month 36: SAF vetting complete, 50,000 combatants in DDR
- Month 42: Military exits Legislative Council, Defense Minister civilian nominee
- Month 54: SAF fully subordinate to civilian authority, Phase III complete

Phase IV: Justice and Reconciliation (Months 36-66):

Key Milestones:

- Month 42: Documentation Center and Truth Commission established
- Month 48: Economic crimes prosecutions begin (100+ cases)
- Month 54: War crimes prosecutions begin (50+ cases)
- Month 60: Truth Commission report published, reparations distribution begins

Phase V: Civilian Platform Activation (Months 42-60):

Key Milestones:

- Month 42: Civic registration opens
- Month 48: 300,000 registered
- Month 54: Leadership selection process (assessments and interviews)
- Month 60: 200+ leaders selected, ready for Phase VI transition

Phase VI: Constitutional Development (Months 60-78):

Key Milestones:

- Month 60: Constitutional Conference convenes
- Month 66: Full civilian authority (Sovereignty Council, Cabinet entirely civilian)
- Month 72: Draft constitution completed
- Month 78: Constitutional referendum (approved), elections scheduled

Phase VII: Electoral Transition (Months 78-90):

Key Milestones:

- Month 81: Local elections completed
- Month 87: State elections completed

- Month 90: Parliamentary and presidential elections, new government inaugurated

Budget (Months 36-90): \$8 billion

- DDR and SSR: \$2.2B
- Justice and reconciliation: \$2.2B
- Civic platform and elections: \$800M
- Infrastructure and economic recovery: \$2.8B

16.4 Institutional Development Timeline

Key Institutions and Formation Schedule:

Institution	Formation	Full Operational	Transition/Sunset
Conflict Monitoring Cell	Month 0	Month 3	Continues post-transition (research)
International Sudan Support Group	Month 0	Month 6	Month 96+ (transformed to development partners forum)
Ceasefire Monitoring Commission	Month 1	Month 6	Month 66 (security stabilized)
Regional Stabilization Force	Month 6	Month 12	Month 66 (gradual drawdown)
Sovereignty Council (Hybrid)	Month 12	Month 12	Month 66 (becomes fully civilian)
Cabinet (Hybrid)	Month 12	Month 18	Month 66 (becomes fully civilian)
Legislative Council	Month 12	Month 18	Month 90 (replaced by elected parliament)
Independent Ethics Commission	Month 12	Month 18	Permanent (continues post-transition)
Anti-Corruption Commission	Month 18	Month 24	Permanent
Auditor General Office	Month 18	Month 24	Permanent
DDR Implementation Unit	Month 24	Month 30	Month 60 (DDR complete, office closes)

Institution	Formation	Full Operational	Transition/Sunset
SSR Advisory Group	Month 30	Month 36	Month 66 (SAF reformed, advisory ends)
Documentation Center	Month 36	Month 42	Permanent (becomes national archive)
Truth Commission	Month 36	Month 42	Month 66 (report complete, closes)
Transitional Courts (GBV, War Crimes)	Month 42	Month 48	Integrated into permanent judiciary
Reparations Commission	Month 42	Month 48	Month 90 (initial distribution complete, then permanent oversight)
Civic Platform Oversight Council	Month 42	Month 48	Month 66 (selection complete, advisory role continues)
Constitutional Conference	Month 60	Month 63	Month 78 (constitution finalized, dissolves)
Electoral Commission	Month 60	Month 72	Permanent (ongoing elections)
Transition Review Board	Month 12	Month 18	Month 96 (final evaluation, then advisory)

17. Conclusion: A Viable Path Forward

The Realist Assessment

This framework offers no illusions. **Sudan's transition will take 7-10 years from conflict resolution**, cost \$15-18 billion, require unprecedented international coordination, and demand patience from a traumatized population. There will be setbacks, crises, and moments when failure seems inevitable.

But it is possible.

Why This Approach Can Succeed

1. Grounded in Reality

- Accepts that security must precede politics
- Recognizes armed actors cannot be wished away
- Addresses economic drivers of conflict
- Anticipates spoiler behavior and plans countermeasures

2. Balanced Pragmatism and Principle

- Allows temporary military role with clear sunset clauses
- Sequences justice to avoid destabilizing transition
- But never compromises on ultimate goal: civilian primacy

3. Comprehensive and Integrated

- Political, security, economic, and social dimensions addressed simultaneously
- Parallel tracks prevent single-point failures
- Holistic approach to complex crisis

4. Sudanese-Led with International Support**

- Sudanese professionals and civil society at center
- International role: support, guarantee, resources—not control
- Builds national ownership and legitimacy

5. Inclusive and Representative

- Women, youth, displaced, and marginalized communities centered
- Regional diversity reflected throughout
- Merit-based but ensures representation

6. Accountable and Transparent

- Independent oversight at every stage
- Public dashboards and reporting
- Conditionality ensures compliance

7. Adaptable and Learning

- Built-in flexibility for course corrections
- Quarterly reviews and adjustments
- Learning from Sudan's own experience and global best practices

What Success Looks Like (Month 96 and beyond)

Immediate Post-Transition (Months 90-120):

- Democratically elected government functioning
- Parliament legislating, executive governing, judiciary independent
- Military professional and subordinate to civilians

- Basic services restored nationwide
- Economy growing (5%+ annually)
- Debt sustainable, investment flowing

Medium-Term (Years 3-5 Post-Election):

- Democratic consolidation (second elections, peaceful alternation of power)
- Regional inequalities reducing (periphery development visible)
- Social cohesion rebuilding (communities reconciling)
- Rule of law strengthening (corruption declining, justice accessible)
- Regional integration (trade, cooperation with neighbors)

Long-Term Vision (Years 5-10+):

- Stable, democratic Sudan (norm, not exception)
- Inclusive and prosperous (economic opportunity for all regions, groups)
- Peaceful and cooperative (with neighbors and internally)
- Respected internationally (contributor to regional stability, global community)

A Sudan where:

- Children attend school without fear
- Farmers cultivate land with secure tenure
- Businesses operate in transparent, predictable environment
- Women participate fully in economy and governance
- Youth see future of opportunity, not conflict
- Displaced return home with dignity and support
- Justice is accessible, not privilege of powerful
- Military protects nation, not regime
- Government serves people, not elites
- Diversity is strength, not source of conflict

The Alternative

Without this pathway:

- Prolonged conflict (more deaths, displacement, destruction)
- State collapse (Libya/Somalia scenarios)
- Regional instability (spillover to neighbors)
- Humanitarian catastrophe (famine, disease, refugee crisis)
- Extremist safe haven (terrorism threat)
- Lost generation (youth militarized, traumatized, hopeless)

The cost of inaction far exceeds the cost of this transition.

A Call to Action

To the Sudanese People: This is your transition. International support can provide resources and guarantees, but only Sudanese can build a democratic Sudan. Participate, demand accountability, and remain patient through setbacks. The alternative to patience is perpetual conflict.

To the Sudanese Armed Forces: Your institution can survive this transition with dignity and honor—as a reformed, professional military respected nationally and internationally. The alternative is destruction (Libya's fate) or perpetual pariah status. Choose reform.

To Regional Powers (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia): Stable, democratic Sudan serves your interests better than proxy competition. Align behind this transition, reap economic and security benefits. The alternative is chaos on your borders.

To the International Community (UN, AU, US, UK, EU, Germany, others): Sudan offers a test case for comprehensive, realistic peacebuilding. Invest resources, coordinate efforts, enforce conditionality. Success in Sudan demonstrates that even the most complex conflicts can transition to democracy. Failure reinforces cynicism about international community capacity.

To Germany and GIZ Specifically: Your decades of engagement in Sudan position you as ideal lead technical partner. This framework envisions €850-900 million GIZ contribution across agriculture, TVET, governance, water, energy, gender equality—areas where GIZ has proven expertise and Sudanese relationships. This is an opportunity to demonstrate comprehensive development cooperation at scale.

Final Word

Sudan's future is not predetermined. The path outlined here is difficult but achievable. It requires courage from Sudanese civilians to demand democracy, wisdom from military leaders to accept reform, cooperation from regional powers to stop zero-sum competition, and sustained commitment from the international community.

The question is not whether Sudan can transition. The question is whether Sudan will have the chance.

This framework provides the chance. **Now it requires the will.**

Annexes

Annex A: Conflict Resolution Scenarios and Contingencies

Scenario 1: SAF Military Victory (Probability: 40%)

Timeline: 18-30 months from December 2025

Characteristics:

- SAF regains Khartoum, major cities, strategic corridors
- RSF fragmented, leadership killed/captured/fled
- Other armed groups surrender or accept SAF authority

Transition Entry:

- SAF in dominant position (leverage)
- International leverage: Debt relief, recognition, economic recovery
- SAF motivated by exhaustion and desire for rehabilitation

Implementation Adjustments:

- Accelerated DDR (fewer combatants to process)
- Focus on SAF reform (dominant institution)
- Economic incorporation less relevant (militias defeated, not negotiated)
- Justice sequencing critical (cannot prosecute SAF immediately after victory)

Risks:

- SAF triumphalism (resist civilianization)
- Revenge killings (against former RSF areas)
- Periphery alienation (victor's justice perception)

Mitigation:

- Strong international conditionality (no debt relief without civilianization)
- Regional Stabilization Force (deterrent and witness)
- Inclusive transitional authority (not SAF monopoly)

Scenario 2: Negotiated Stalemate (Probability: 35%)

Timeline: 24-42 months from December 2025

Characteristics:

- Neither SAF nor RSF achieve victory
- Both exhausted (casualties, economics, morale)
- Regional powers align on imposed settlement
- International community coordinates pressure

Transition Entry:

- Negotiated ceasefire (international guarantees)
- Power-sharing initially (contested but necessary)
- Phased disarmament (RSF first, SAF reform parallel)

Implementation Adjustments:

- Robust peacekeeping essential (8,000-10,000 troops minimum)
- Longer Phase I and II (trust-building needed)
- Economic incorporation critical (incentivize disarmament)
- Higher risk of spoilers (neither side defeated)

Risks:

- Ceasefire violations (both sides test resolve)
- Power-sharing deadlocks (decision-making paralysis)
- Regional spoilers (resume support to proxies)

Mitigation:

- Strong enforcement (Regional Stabilization Force, sanctions)
- Clear sunset clauses (no indefinite power-sharing)
- International mediation (resolve disputes)

Scenario 3: Fragmentation and Exhaustion (Probability: 25%)

Timeline: 36-60 months from December 2025

Characteristics:

- Both SAF and RSF weakened and fragmented
- Warlord mosaic (localized militia rule)
- No national authority
- Gradual stabilization zone-by-zone

Transition Entry:

- Subnational approach (stable zones first)
- No immediate national transition (wait for critical mass)
- Parallel governance (local arrangements while building national)

Implementation Adjustments:

- Longest timeline (60-90 months to full national transition)
- Bottom-up (local governance → state → national)
- Multiple negotiations (each militia/warlord separately)
- Most complex DDR (thousands of armed groups)

Risks:

- Partition de facto (regions never rejoin)
- Prolonged instability (endless militia conflicts)
- Humanitarian catastrophe (statelessness, famine)

Mitigation:

- Strong international commitment (don't abandon Sudan)
- Economic incentives (legitimate governance = resources)
- Regional pressure (neighbors want stability)

Annex B: Armed Group Disposition Matrix


Group Type	Estimated Size	Disposition Strategy	Timeline	Resources Needed
RSF Core (Hemedti loyalists)	20,000-30,000	Defeat or negotiate leadership exit → DDR rank-and-file	Months 1-30	\$300M (DDR), Regional Force
RSF Regional Warlords	40,000-50,000	Economic incorporation (gold, logistics) + DDR	Months 12-48	\$400M (incorporation, DDR)
Darfur Arab Militias (Janjaweed, others)	15,000-20,000	Community-based DDR, traditional reconciliation	Months 24-54	\$150M
Darfur Non-Arab Militias	10,000-15,000	DDR, land restitution, governance participation	Months 24-54	\$100M
SPLM-N (Hilu faction)	5,000-8,000	Political negotiation (autonomy), selective DDR	Months 12-36	\$50M
SPLM-N (Agar faction)	3,000-5,000	Integration (already cooperative), DDR	Months 12-36	\$30M
Eastern Sudan Militias (Beja, Rashaida)	5,000-8,000	Economic development, political participation, DDR	Months 18-42	\$50M
SAF Irregulars/Volunteers	20,000-30,000	Voluntary retirement, DDR	Months 24-42	\$200M
SAF Force Reduction (right-sizing)	20,000-30,000	Retirement packages, civilian employment	Months 42-66	\$150M

Group Type	Estimated Size	Disposition Strategy	Timeline	Resources Needed
Community Self-Defense	10,000-15,000	Integration into community police or DDR	Months 30-54	\$80M

Total Combatants: 150,000-210,000
Total DDR/Disposition Budget: \$1.5 billion

Annex C: Transitional Authority Organizational Chart

TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE (Months 12-66)



- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| Key Civilian | • Oversight |
| Portfolios: | • Appointments confirmation |
| • Finance ★ | |
| • Justice ★ | |
| • Foreign Affairs | |
| • Health | |
| • Education | |
| • Agriculture | |

★ = Critical civilian control (non-negotiable)
 (Overseen by)



- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT BODIES | |
| | |
| | • Independent Ethics Commission (investigates officials) |
| | • Anti-Corruption Commission (prosecutes) |
| | • Auditor General (financial oversight) |
| | • Human Rights Commission (monitors abuses) |
| | • Oversight Council (civic platform integrity) |
| | • Transition Review Board (progress monitoring) |
| | |
| | All independent of executive, report to Sovereignty |
| | Council and Legislative Council |

Annex D: Civilian Selection Process Flowchart

CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION PROCESS (Months 48-60)

Month 48: OPEN REGISTRATION

|
 | → 600,000 registered platform members
 |



Month 48-50: EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST

|

- | → Applications for 200+ positions
- | → Submit: CV, policy statement, ethics declaration, references



Month 51-52: WRITTEN ASSESSMENTS

- | → Policy knowledge exams (sector-specific)
- | → Scenario-based problem solving
- | → Ethical reasoning case studies
- | → Scored by independent panels



Month 52-54: BACKGROUND SCREENING

- | → Financial probity (asset declarations)
- | → Human rights record (war crimes check)
- | → Conflict of interest (business, family connections)
- | → Criminal record (disqualifiers)
- | → PASS/FAIL (disqualifiers eliminate candidates)



Month 54-56: STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

- | → 5-7 member panels (Sudanese majority, international observers)
- | → 90-minute competency-based interviews
- | → Evaluated: technical competence, leadership, integrity, communication
- | → Scored via standardized rubrics



Month 56-57: COMPOSITE SCORING & SHORTLISTING

- | → Written assessments: 30%
- | → Interviews: 70%
- | → Regional/demographic balance applied
- | → 3-5 candidates shortlisted per position



Month 57-58: OVERSIGHT COUNCIL REVIEW

- |
- | → Independent council (7 Sudanese, 4 international)
- | → Audit process integrity
- | → Investigate irregularities
- | → Final vetting



Month 58-60: PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT PERIOD

- |
- | → Shortlists published (qualifications, scores, demographics)
- | → 30-day public comment period
- | → Civil society review
- | → Media scrutiny
- | → Complaints investigated



Month 60: FINAL SELECTION & APPOINTMENT

- |
- | → Oversight Council selects from shortlists
- | → Consensus or 2/3 vote
- | → Public announcement and ceremony



Month 66: SELECTED LEADERS ASSUME POSITIONS

Annex E: Economic Recovery Timeline and Targets

Sector	Baseline (2025)	Month 24 Target	Month 54 Target	Month 90 Target
GDP Growth	-10% (contraction)	0% (stabilization)	+5% annual	+6-7% annual
Inflation	1,000%+	50%	15%	<10%
Exchange Rate	Collapse (parallel markets)	Unified, stable	Stable, convertible	Market- determined, stable

Sector	Baseline (2025)	Month 24 Target	Month 54 Target	Month 90 Target
Government Revenue	<\$1B	\$2-3B	\$4-5B	\$7-8B
Debt Stock	\$60B	\$42B (HIPC Decision Point)	\$30B (Interim relief)	\$10-15B (HIPC Completion)
Electricity Access	30% population	50%	70%	80%
Water Access	50%	70%	80%	90%
Agricultural Production	40% of pre-conflict	60%	80%	100%
Gold Exports (Formal)	\$0 (all smuggled)	\$1B	\$2.5B	\$3B
Non-Oil/Gold Exports	\$500M	\$800M	\$1.5B	\$2B
Youth Unemployment	60%+	50%	35%	25%
FDI Inflows	-\$500M (outflows)	\$300M	\$1B	\$2B+
Remittances	\$1B	\$1.5B	\$2.5B	\$3B

Annex F: International Leverage Toolkit

Debt Relief Instruments:

1. **Interim Debt Service Suspension** (Month 1)
 - Mechanism: Paris Club coordinated standstill
 - Value: \$800M annually (not paid)
 - Conditions: Ceasefire, transitional authority formed, IMF program
2. **HIPC Decision Point** (Month 24-30)
 - Mechanism: IMF/World Bank HIPC Initiative
 - Value: 30% principal reduction (~\$18B)
 - Conditions: Civilian control of key ministries, economic stabilization, SAF civilianization on track
3. **Interim HIPC Relief** (Month 48-54)

- Mechanism: Additional HIPC tranches
- Value: 20% reduction (~\$12B)
- Conditions: Justice process initiated, DDR progress, reparations funded
- 4. **HIPC Completion Point** (Month 78)
 - Mechanism: Full HIPC relief
 - Value: 50% reduction (~\$30B)
 - Conditions: Constitutional referendum, elections scheduled
- 5. **Paris Club Debt Cancellation** (Month 90+)
 - Mechanism: Bilateral debt forgiveness
 - Value: Remaining bilateral debt (~\$5-10B)
 - Conditions: Peaceful transfer of power to elected government

Sanctions Architecture:

Existing Sanctions (Maintain):

- US Executive Order 13067 (SAF/RSF leaders for atrocities)
- EU arms embargo
- UK targeted financial sanctions

Adaptive Sanctions (Incentivize Cooperation):

Actor Category	Cooperation Reward	Spoiler Punishment
SAF Leadership (Reformers)	Sanctions removal, international rehabilitation, military partnerships	Asset freezes, travel bans, ICC referrals
RSF Commanders (Cooperators)	Conditional amnesty, asset legitimization, business opportunities	Full asset seizures, Interpol red notices, prosecutions
Regional Backers (Egypt, UAE)	Economic partnerships, trade benefits, reputational enhancement	Entity sanctions (banks, companies), diplomatic isolation
Gold Networks	Certification, legitimate trade, banking access	Kimberley-style exclusion, sanctions on buyers
Militia Commanders (Local)	DDR benefits, local governance roles, amnesty	Military action, asset confiscation, prosecution

Implementation:

- US Treasury OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) designations
- EU restrictive measures
- UK financial sanctions

- Coordinated (ISSG approval)

Diplomatic Incentives:

Recognition and Normalization:

- Diplomatic relations restoration (embassies, ambassadors)
- International organization participation (UN voting rights, AU, Arab League full engagement)
- Regional integration (AfCFTA benefits, IGAD, East African Community potential membership)

Security Partnerships:

- Military training and equipment (UK, US, France, Egypt for reformed SAF)
- Intelligence sharing (counterterrorism cooperation)
- Peacekeeping contributions (Sudanese troops in AU/UN missions—income and prestige)

Economic Benefits:

- Trade preferences (EU GSP+, AGOA if eligible)
- Investment guarantees (MIGA, OPIC/DFC)
- Tourism promotion (historical sites, Red Sea)

Annex G: Budget and Resource Requirements

Total Transition Cost: \$15.7 billion (Months 1-90)

Detailed Breakdown by Phase and Sector:

Phase I: Security Stabilization (Months 1-18): \$2.8B

- Ceasefire monitoring and verification: \$350M
- Regional Stabilization Force (initial deployment): \$900M
- Humanitarian stabilization: \$1.2B
- Emergency governance setup: \$350M

Phase II: Emergency Governance (Months 12-30): \$3.2B

- Budget support (salaries, operations): \$1.5B
- Basic services (electricity, water, health, education): \$1B
- Subnational administration restoration: \$400M
- Institutional development: \$300M

Phase III: Security Sector Transformation (Months 24-54): \$2.6B

- DDR programs: \$1.4B
- SAF professionalization: \$450M

- Regional Stabilization Force (ongoing): \$600M
- Border security: \$400M
- Community policing: \$250M

Phase IV: Justice and Reconciliation (Months 36-66): \$2.2B

- Prosecutions and courts: \$400M
- Reparations fund: \$1.2B
- Truth Commission: \$150M
- Traditional justice: \$100M
- National healing programs: \$250M
- International cooperation: \$100M

Phase V: Civilian Platform Activation (Months 42-60): \$75M

- Registration infrastructure: \$35M
- Selection process: \$25M
- Oversight and transparency: \$10M
- Public engagement: \$5M

Phase VI: Constitutional Development (Months 60-78): \$350M

- Constitutional Conference: \$120M
- Public consultations: \$80M
- Drafting and technical: \$50M
- Referendum: \$100M

Phase VII: Electoral Transition (Months 78-90): \$280M

- Voter registration: \$50M
- Local elections: \$40M
- State elections: \$60M
- Parliamentary elections: \$80M
- Presidential election: \$30M
- Observation and monitoring: \$20M

Economic Recovery (Parallel, Months 1-90): \$4.2B

- Emergency stabilization: \$1B
- War economy transformation: \$800M
- Infrastructure reconstruction: \$1.5B
- Youth employment: \$600M
- Private sector and trade: \$300M

Total GIZ Contribution Across All Phases: €900 million

GIZ Sectoral Breakdown:

- Agriculture and rural development: €230M

- TVET and youth employment: €120M
- Water, energy, infrastructure: €130M
- Governance and transparency (PFM, EITI): €90M
- Private sector and trade facilitation: €90M
- Justice, reconciliation, and GBV: €110M
- Elections and civic participation: €90M
- Monitoring and evaluation: €40M

Other Major Donors (Estimated Contributions):






- World Bank/IFIs: \$4-5B (concessional loans and grants)
- UN System: \$2B (humanitarian, peacekeeping, development)
- United States: \$1.5-2B (humanitarian, development, security)
- United Kingdom: £300-400M (~\$400-500M)
- European Union (collective): €800M (~\$900M)
- Saudi Arabia: \$1B
- UAE: \$500M-1B (post-rehabilitation)
- Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada (collective): \$600M
- Other bilaterals: \$500M

Annex H: Visual Timeline (Gantt Chart Specification)

For graphic designers/project management software:

Format: Horizontal Gantt chart, Months 0-96 on X-axis, Phases/Activities on Y-axis

Color Coding:

-  Blue: Civilian capacity building and governance
-  Green: Security (DDR, SSR, peacekeeping)
-  Yellow: Economic recovery
-  Purple: Justice and reconciliation
-  Red: Political transition (platform, constitution, elections)

Major Milestones (Diamond Markers):

- Month 1: Phase I begins (preconditions met)
- Month 12: Transitional authority formed
- Month 24: HIPC Decision Point (debt relief)
- Month 30: SAF civilianization milestone (Sovereignty Council seats reduced)
- Month 42: Civilian platform launches
- Month 54: SAF fully civilian-subordinate
- Month 60: Constitutional Conference convenes
- Month 66: Full civilian authority
- Month 78: Constitutional referendum
- Month 90: Elections and power transfer

Dependencies (Arrows Between Phases):

- Preconditions → Phase I (must meet criteria)
- Phase I → Phase II (ceasefire must hold)
- Phase II → Phase III (transitional authority must stabilize)
- Phase III → Phase IV (DDR progress before prosecutions)
- Phase V → Phase VI (platform operational before constitutional conference)
- Phase VI → Phase VII (constitution approved before elections)

Overlapping Phases (Visual Representation):

- Economic recovery (yellow bar spanning entire timeline, Months 1-90+)
- Phases III and IV overlap (Months 36-66)
- Phases V and VI overlap (Months 42-78)

Software Compatibility:

- Microsoft Project
- GanttProject (open-source)
- Smartsheet
- Web-based: DHTMLX Gantt, FullCalendar
- Export formats: PNG, SVG, PDF

Annex I: Comparison with Regional Transitions

Learning from Neighbors:

Country	Transition Type	Duration	Key Success Factors	Key Failures	Lessons for Sudan
South Africa (1990-1994)	Negotiated (Apartheid → Democracy)	4 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusive negotiations - Truth & Reconciliation - Constitutional genius - Mandela's leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic inequality persists - Land question unresolved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusive process essential - Truth before justice - Address economic grievances
Kenya (2008-2013)	Post-election violence → Reform	5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Power-sharing (temporary) - New constitution - Devolution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICC cases collapsed - Elite impunity continues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Federalism for diversity - Justice takes time

Country	Transition Type	Duration	Key Success Factors	Key Failures	Lessons for Sudan
			(federalism) - ICC accountability		- Need robust prosecution
Tunisia (2011-2019)	Arab Spring → Democracy	8 years	- Inclusive constitution - Civil society strength - Compromise culture	- Economic stagnation - Democracy backsliding (2021)	- Economic recovery critical - Institutions over individuals - Address grievances
Liberia (2003-2006)	Civil war → Elections	3 years (transition)	- Regional intervention (ECOWAS) - DDR success - Women's leadership (Sirleaf)	- Too rushed (capacity weak) - War criminals unpunished	- Don't rush - Build capacity first - Balance peace and justice
Sierra Leone (2002-2007)	Civil war → Democracy	5 years	- Special Court (hybrid justice) - DDR linked to community - Regional support	- Corruption persists - Youth unemployment	- Hybrid justice works - Community reconciliation - Employ ex-combatants
Democratic Republic of Congo (2003-2006)	Civil war → Elections	3 years	- Regional agreement (Sun City) - Elections held	- Armed groups persist - East still unstable - Governance weak	- Elections ≠ peace - Must disarm first - Capacity building essential

Country	Transition Type	Duration	Key Success Factors	Key Failures	Lessons for Sudan
Somalia (2012-present)	State collapse → Rebuilding	12+ years (ongoing)	- Federal model - AU support (AMISOM)	- Al-Shabaab persists - Fragmented authority - Very slow progress	- Patience required - Bottom-up (local first) - Security prerequisite

Sudan-Specific Lessons:

1. **Don't Rush:** Liberia and DRC elections were premature—capacity must precede democracy
2. **Federalism Works:** Kenya, Somalia show devolution addresses diversity
3. **Economic Recovery Critical:** Tunisia's democratic backsliding followed economic stagnation
4. **Justice Takes Time:** ICC failures in Kenya, delays don't mean abandonment
5. **Truth Before Justice:** South Africa's TRC model, sequencing matters
6. **Security First:** Somalia's lesson—cannot build while fighting continues
7. **Regional Support Essential:** All successful cases had ECOWAS, AU, or regional backing
8. **Hybrid Justice Can Work:** Sierra Leone's Special Court balanced peace and accountability

Annex J: Frequently Asked Questions

Q1: Why does transition take 7-10 years? Can't we have elections sooner?

A1: Elections during conflict or without security are exclusionary and destabilizing. Example: DRC held elections in 2006 while armed groups persisted—violence continued. Sequencing matters: Security → Institutions → Elections. Rushing produces failed states, not democracies.

Q2: Why should SAF have any role in transitional governance?

A2: Realism. SAF controls territory, weapons, and institutions. Two options: (1) Defeat them militarily (unlikely, costly), or (2) Negotiate civilianization timeline (pragmatic). Temporary role with clear sunset clauses better than perpetual military rule or state collapse. Egypt, Kenya examples: Military participated temporarily, then subordinated.

Q3: Won't armed groups just rearm after DDR?

A3: Risk exists, mitigated by: (1) Economic incorporation (legitimate livelihoods reduce incentive), (2) Regional Stabilization Force (deterrent), (3) Community security (local

monitoring), (4) Prosecution threats (commanders know consequences). Sierra Leone's DDR succeeded with similar approach.

Q4: How can justice avoid destabilizing the transition?

A4: Sequencing. Start with economic crimes (less explosive), build judicial capacity, then war crimes when security permits. South Africa's TRC model: Truth first, selective prosecutions later. Also: Amnesty for cooperation, not impunity for atrocities.

Q5: Is this framework pro-military or pro-civilian?

A5: Pro-civilian with realistic path. Ultimate goal: Full civilian control by Month 66, elections by Month 90. But acknowledges current reality: Military has guns. Pragmatic path to civilian primacy, not idealistic denial of power dynamics.

Q6: What if regional powers (Egypt, UAE) don't cooperate?

A6: Leverage and consequences. Egypt needs Nile security and economic benefits; UAE wants legitimate commercial access. Both face sanctions, isolation if they spoil. Incentivize cooperation, punish obstruction. Also: Saudi Arabia mediates (Gulf unity vs. competition).

Q7: Can Sudan afford this transition? Where does \$15-18 billion come from?

A7: International community (\$10-12B grants and concessional loans), debt relief (\$45B fiscal space), private investment (\$2-3B), Sudan budget post-recovery (\$2B). Affordable compared to perpetual conflict costs. Also: Much cheaper than state collapse or regional instability spillover.

Q8: Why such a large role for Germany/GIZ? What about other partners?

A8: GIZ has decades of Sudan experience (agriculture, water, governance programs since 1960s-70s). Institutional memory and relationships critical. Also, GIZ technical excellence in TVET, rural development, governance—Sudan's needs. NOT exclusive: UK leads SSR, US counterterrorism, World Bank macro, etc. Complementary, coordinated.

Q9: What happens if this framework fails?

A9: Contingencies built in (Section 14.5). But ultimate failure scenarios: (1) Prolonged conflict (Libya model), (2) State collapse (Somalia model), (3) Military dictatorship (Myanmar model). All worse than this framework's challenges.

Q10: How can ordinary Sudanese participate?

A10: Multiple entry points:

- Register in civic platform (Month 42+)
- Participate in consult
- Monitor and report (civil society oversight)
- Vote in elections (Month 78+)
- Demand accountability (protests, advocacy)

This is Sudanese transition—international community supports, but Sudanese lead.

Q11: Is the timeline flexible?

A11: Yes, with justification. Adaptability built in (Section 15.4). Minor adjustments (± 3 months) common; major adjustments ($\pm 6+$ months) require ISSG approval. But: Flexibility \neq indefinite delay. Benchmarks enforce progress.

Q12: What about South Sudan relations?

A12: Not detailed here (complex topic), but: (1) Border demarcation and cooperation, (2) Oil revenue sharing (Sudanese pipeline), (3) Refugee and population movements, (4) Regional security. Bilateral engagement parallel to transition.

End of Document

Document Statistics:

- Budget: \$15.7 billion detailed
- GIZ Contribution: €900 million across all phases
- Timeline: 90 months (7.5 years) post-conflict resolution
- Implementation: Phased, adaptive, monitored

Next Steps for Stakeholders:

1. **Sudanese Diaspora and Civil Society:** Review, provide feedback, begin organizing
2. **SAF Leadership:** Engage confidentially (what guarantees needed for cooperation?)
3. **Regional Powers:** Diplomatic consultations (align interests, coordinate)
4. **International Partners:** ISSG formation, resource mobilization
5. **Technical Partners (GIZ, etc.):** Detailed program design, deployment readiness
6. **Academic and Research:** Refine monitoring frameworks, conflict analysis

Acknowledgment: This framework synthesizes decades of peacebuilding and transitional justice experience globally, adapted to Sudan's specific context. It honors the sacrifices of Sudanese who have died, suffered, and struggled for a better future. May their vision of a peaceful, democratic Sudan be realized.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Organizations and Institutions:

- AU – African Union

- **AfCFTA** – African Continental Free Trade Area
- **AfDB** – African Development Bank
- **AMISOM** – African Union Mission in Somalia
- **BMZ** – German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)
- **CAR** – Central African Republic
- **CDC** – Commonwealth Development Corporation (UK)
- **DFC** – U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
- **DPPA** – UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
- **DRC** – Democratic Republic of Congo
- **DUP** – Democratic Unionist Party (Sudan)
- **ECOWAS** – Economic Community of West African States
- **EITI** – Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
- **EU** – European Union
- **FAO** – Food and Agriculture Organization
- **FEWS NET** – Famine Early Warning Systems Network
- **FGM** – Female Genital Mutilation
- **GBV** – Gender-Based Violence
- **GIZ** – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Development Cooperation)
- **GSP+** – Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus (EU trade preferences)
- **G7/G20** – Group of Seven/Group of Twenty (leading industrialized nations)
- **HIPC** – Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
- **ICRC** – International Committee of the Red Cross
- **ICC** – International Criminal Court
- **IDA** – International Development Association (World Bank)
- **IDEA** – International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
- **IDP** – Internally Displaced Person
- **IFC** – International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)
- **IFES** – International Foundation for Electoral Systems
- **IFI** – International Financial Institution
- **IGAD** – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- **ILO** – International Labour Organization
- **IMF** – International Monetary Fund
- **IOM** – International Organization for Migration
- **ISSG** – International Sudan Support Group
- **MHPSS** – Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
- **MIGA** – Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
- **MOD** – Ministry of Defence (UK)
- **MSME** – Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises
- **NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- **NGO** – Non-Governmental Organization

Sudanese Organizations and Groups:

- **RSF** – Rapid Support Forces
- **SAF** – Sudanese Armed Forces
- **SPLM-N** – Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
- **TCD** – Transitional Constitutional Declaration

Programs and Processes:

- **ACLED** – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
- **AGOA** – African Growth and Opportunity Act (US trade preferences)
- **ASM** – Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining
- **C3I** – Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
- **CSO** – Civil Society Organization
- **DDR** – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
- **GDP** – Gross Domestic Product
- **ICT** – Information and Communication Technology
- **M&E** – Monitoring and Evaluation
- **OCHA** – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- **OFAC** – Office of Foreign Assets Control (US Treasury)
- **OHCHR** – Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
- **OPIC** – Overseas Private Investment Corporation (now DFC)
- **PFM** – Public Financial Management
- **PPP** – Public-Private Partnership
- **PTSD** – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
- **PVT** – Parallel Vote Tabulation
- **SECO** – Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
- **SMP** – Staff-Monitored Program (IMF)
- **SMS** – Short Message Service
- **SSR** – Security Sector Reform
- **TRC** – Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- **TVET** – Technical and Vocational Education and Training
- **UAE** – United Arab Emirates
- **UK** – United Kingdom
- **UN** – United Nations
- **UNAMID** – UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
- **UNDP** – United Nations Development Programme
- **UNESCO** – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- **UNHCR** – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- **UNICEF** – United Nations Children's Fund
- **UNODC** – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
- **UNPOL** – United Nations Police
- **US** – United States
- **USD** – United States Dollar
- **VAT** – Value Added Tax
- **WFP** – World Food Programme
- **WHO** – World Health Organization

Financial and Economic Terms:

- **€** – Euro (European currency)
- **£** – British Pound Sterling
- **\$** – United States Dollar
- **FDI** – Foreign Direct Investment

Sudanese Cultural/Traditional Terms:

- **Ajaweed** – Native Administration (traditional local leaders)
- **Diya** – Blood money (traditional compensation)
- **Judiya** – Reconciliation conferences (traditional dispute resolution)
- **Nazir/Omda** – Traditional tribal leaders/authorities

Restricted Draft