



مبادرة وحدة السودان

Unite Sudan Initiative

Dignity, Justice, and Peace

SUDAN GOVERNANCE PLATFORM

A Proposal for a Citizen-Led Transitional Government

Prepared by

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1. Executive Summary

Sudan's young generation — the people who built the December Revolution with their bodies, their voices, and in many cases their lives — are being systematically excluded from the political process that will determine their country's future.

This proposal has one central aim: to create an open, merit-based platform through which qualified Sudanese citizens can apply for any of 24 transitional ministerial positions — and be trained, assessed, and appointed on the basis of competence, integrity, and commitment to democratic governance. Not party membership. Not family connections. Not years spent in European capitals.

We believe Sudan's next government should be chosen by Sudan's people — not assembled by exile politicians who were never elected, never delegated, and never endured what those inside the country have endured.

The Sudan Governance Platform (SGP), prepared by Unite Sudan Initiative, is not a protest movement. It is a structured, transparent, internationally supported governance mechanism with a clear selection process, mandatory training in democratic administration, and binding accountability standards.

This document sets out the historical context of the December Revolution, the current state of the conflict, the structural problems that have blocked civilian rule, and the concrete steps needed to move from proposal to operational platform. It draws directly on the research compiled by Unite Sudan Initiative into Sudan's revolution, the SAF-RSF war, and the IGAD/AU roadmap frameworks.

2. Background: Sudan's December Revolution (2018–2019)

The December Revolution began on 19 December 2018 with street protests across Sudan. What started as an economic grievance — the price of bread had tripled, school meal costs had doubled, and schoolgirls in Atbara were among the first to march — rapidly became a political movement demanding the end of thirty years of Bashir's rule.

The revolution's power came from three sources. First, it was decentralised and leaderless in its early stages, making it nearly impossible for security forces to suppress at a single point. Second, the Sudanese Professionals Association — an alliance of 17 professional groups including doctors, lawyers, and journalists — gave it organizational backbone. Third, it was overwhelmingly nonviolent, building moral authority through strikes, sit-ins, and mass marches rather than confrontation.

The Khartoum sit-in outside military headquarters — sustained by volunteer committees managing protection, provisions, medical care, and community awareness — was one of the most remarkable acts of collective self-organization in modern African history.

On 11 April 2019, after four months of sustained pressure, Omar al-Bashir was deposed. By July and August 2019, the Transitional Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change had signed a Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, defining a 39-month transition to civilian democracy.

The revolution succeeded in removing a dictator. What it could not do — because no mechanism existed to prevent it — was stop the military from capturing the transition that followed.

Why the Transition Failed

The Forces of Freedom and Change accepted power-sharing with the military — a compromise that many supporters of radical change condemned at the time. The June 3rd Khartoum Massacre, in which the Transitional Military Council violently dispersed the sit-in, demonstrated that the deep state had survived Bashir's removal intact.

The Rapid Support Forces, rooted in the feared Janjaweed militias, remained powerful and unaccountable. In October 2021, the civilian government of Prime Minister Hamdok was overthrown. By April 2023, open warfare had broken out between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF, pushing Sudan into one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters.

The structural weaknesses that enabled this collapse — no working mechanism for democratic power transfer, unfair distribution of national wealth, and deep regional imbalances — are precisely what the SGP is designed to address. Understanding how we got here is essential context for the platform we are proposing.

3. The Current Crisis (as of 2026)

Sudan now has two rival governments: the SAF's Hope Government in Port Sudan and the RSF's Government of Peace and Unity in Nyala, Darfur. Both are nominally civilian; both are effectively military-controlled; both are backed by foreign patrons with interests that have nothing to do with the welfare of Sudanese citizens.

The scale of the humanitarian catastrophe is difficult to overstate. Twenty-five million people face severe food insecurity. Four million children are acutely malnourished. Famine has been confirmed across multiple regions. Sudan's health system has near collapsed, with hospitals closed and disease outbreaks going untreated. Millions of Sudanese have been displaced — internally and across borders into Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan.

Sudan has endured twenty coup attempts and multiple civil wars since independence. The institutional culture of militarism runs deep. Without a genuinely civilian alternative — one that neither the SAF nor the RSF can credibly claim — there is no path out of this.

Foreign Interference

A critical dimension of the current crisis is foreign military support for both factions. The UAE has reportedly supplied the RSF with drone technology while publicly calling for civilian rule — a contradiction that the international community has been unwilling to confront directly. Egypt backs the SAF militarily and politically. Russia has obstructed meaningful UN Security Council action. Ethiopia, Libya, and other regional actors have interests that complicate any unified mediation effort.

Any transition framework that does not address the foreign fueling of this war will fail. The SGP works in parallel with — and is designed to complement — the ceasefire and political transition framework described in Section 6.

4. The Problem: A Revolution Without Representation

The December Revolution was made by ordinary Sudanese people — young people, working people, women who marched at extraordinary personal risk and led the movement in numbers that no previous Sudanese political mobilization had seen. It was not made by political parties. It was not made by exile networks. It was not made by the same elite that has recycled itself through Sudanese governance for generations.

The transition, however, has been managed by exactly that class of actors. And the current moment is worse: self-appointed delegations — formed in exile, with no electoral mandate and no formal authorization from civil society inside Sudan — are now travelling across Europe, meeting foreign ministers and international institutions, and positioning themselves as the legitimate voice of Sudan's future.

They were never elected. They were never delegated by the younger generation who remained in Sudan. They did not endure the war. And yet they are the ones making the phone calls to European capitals and being received as credible political interlocutors.

Meanwhile, the young Sudanese who stayed — who are rebuilding communities with their own hands, keeping basic services alive through volunteer networks, supporting families on remittances sent from abroad — have no platform. No formal voice. No mechanism through which their energy and competence can translate into political authority.

This is the gap the Sudan Governance Platform is designed to close. The next section explains why it cannot be closed by the existing political actors.

5. Why Existing Political Actors Cannot Lead This Transition

This is not a criticism made in anger. It is an assessment based on evidence.

5.1 The Legitimacy Problem

Legitimacy in a post-revolutionary context must come from demonstrated proximity to the people being governed — not from diplomatic experience or international recognition. The exile political class has neither a democratic mandate from Sudanese citizens nor a credible governance record that those citizens could evaluate.

Several of the most prominent figures now touring European capitals have held political positions before in Sudan. Those tenures are part of what the December Revolution was rejecting. Returning to power through the back door of international diplomacy rather than through a domestic democratic process does not make them legitimate.

5.2 The Accountability Problem

Political parties formed in exile operate with almost no accountability to the people of Sudan. They are not elected. They cannot be recalled. Their funding sources are often opaque. There is no mechanism by which an ordinary Sudanese citizen — managing daily survival in a war zone — can hold them to account.

Any transitional government built on this foundation will face a legitimacy crisis before it issues its first decree. The 2019 transition showed what happens when governance arrangements are negotiated between elites rather than built on genuine popular mandate: the military filled the vacuum within two years.

5.3 The Competence Problem

Governing a state — especially a state emerging from this level of destruction — requires specific skills: public financial management, humanitarian coordination, constitutional design, international treaty obligations, and anti-corruption frameworks. Being a committed opposition activist or a long-serving party official does not automatically provide these.

We are not arguing that young Sudanese automatically have these skills either. We are arguing that competence should be the selection criterion — and that it can be built through structured training before appointment. What follows is the alternative.

6. The IGAD/AU Roadmap and Its Limits

What is commonly called the IGAD Roadmap is in fact a convergence of two frameworks: the AU/IGAD Roadmap and the September 2025 Quad Declaration (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt). They share the same core architecture and have been mutually endorsed.

The initiative, announced on 12 September 2025, aims for a three-month humanitarian truce, followed by a permanent ceasefire, followed by a nine-month transition period for Sudanese parties to negotiate and establish an independent, civilian-led government. Participants at the April 2025 London Sudan Conference affirmed that it must be Sudanese people — in the widest and most representative sense — who decide the political future of their country.

IGAD's Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu stated plainly: 'More than two and a half years since fighting began, we must speak plainly — there is still no credible peace effort underway, not one that is commensurate with the scale of the crisis.'

Where the Roadmap Falls Short

The roadmap provides the right architecture in principle. Its weakness is the absence of enforcement mechanisms and the absence of any genuine process for determining who fills transitional government positions. Constitutional amendments in February 2025 actually postponed civilian transition to 2028 and increased military power — directly contradicting the roadmap's intent, with no consequences for those responsible.

The Quad proposal fails to impose consequences for non-compliance and stops short of constraining the foreign actors fueling the war. The SAF has not formally agreed to the ceasefire. The RSF accepted it publicly but without verified implementation.

The SGP is designed to complement the roadmap, not replace it. It answers the question the roadmap leaves entirely open: when the ceasefire holds and the transition window opens, how do we ensure the people appointed to govern Sudan are chosen on merit and accountability rather than through the same elite bargaining that has failed Sudan repeatedly?

7. Our Proposal: The Sudan Governance Platform (SGP)

Unite Sudan Initiative is proposing the creation of an open, transparent platform through which any qualified Sudanese citizen between the ages of 25 and 45 can apply for one of 24 transitional ministerial positions.

This idea has been formally analyzed in the context of the IGAD roadmap framework. The conclusion of that analysis is direct: a competitive, transparent, merit-based appointment process for transitional government roles offers several concrete advantages that closed elite bargaining simply cannot.

The Case for Open Recruitment

- Legitimacy without patronage. Positions filled through open application and public vetting carry democratic legitimacy that negotiated appointments cannot match. Citizens would see that ministers were selected for competence, not connections.
- Breaking the patronage cycle. Sudan's governance has historically operated through a spoils system tied to military and tribal power networks. Open recruitment structurally interrupts this cycle rather than working around it.
- Access to diaspora expertise. Sudan has a large, highly educated diaspora — economists, lawyers, public health experts, engineers, and constitutional scholars across Europe, North America, and the Gulf. An open, values-aligned process can attract this talent into service of the transition.
- International credibility. Transparent appointments signal to the IMF, World Bank, and bilateral donors that Sudan is serious about governance reform — a prerequisite for the reconstruction financing the transition will desperately need.

The SGP operates under four principles: open application, merit-based selection, mandatory governance training, and full public accountability. No position is allocated on the basis of party membership, family network, or exile seniority. The people appointed will serve Sudan — and will be held to that standard from day one.

The 24 portfolios that form the backbone of this platform are described in the next section.

8. The 24 Ministerial Positions

The following 24 positions represent the core portfolio of a functional transitional government. They were designed to cover the full spectrum of state function — from security transition and justice, to agriculture, digital infrastructure, and anti-corruption oversight. Several portfolios — particularly Humanitarian Affairs, Housing, and Federal Governance — are designed specifically to address the consequences of the ongoing conflict and mass displacement.

Each position will be filled through the SGP selection process. No single individual may hold more than one portfolio. No position may be allocated to a member of any registered political party without full public disclosure and community sign-off.

#	Ministry	Priority Domain
1	Finance & Economic Planning	Fiscal policy, debt restructuring
2	Foreign Affairs	Diplomacy, regional relations
3	Justice & Rule of Law	Legal reform, transitional justice
4	Interior & Public Safety	Civil security, police reform
5	Defence & Security Transition	Military-civilian oversight
6	Education	Curriculum reform, access
7	Health	Public health infrastructure
8	Agriculture & Food Security	Rural livelihoods, land rights
9	Infrastructure & Transport	Roads, energy, logistics
10	Water & Irrigation	Nile basin management
11	Energy & Natural Resources	Oil, minerals, renewables
12	Trade & Industry	SME development, exports
13	Labor & Social Protection	Employment, welfare
14	Housing & Urban Development	Displacement, urban planning
15	Humanitarian Affairs & Peace	Conflict zones, IDP return
16	Women & Gender Equality	Rights, representation

17	Youth & Sports	Civic engagement, inclusion
18	Culture & National Identity	Heritage, reconciliation
19	Information & Media	Press freedom, communications
20	Science, Technology & Innovation	Digital governance, research
21	Environment & Climate	Desertification, climate adaptation
22	Religious Affairs & Endowments	Civil coexistence, waqf reform
23	Federal Governance & Decentralization	State-federal relations
24	Planning, Monitoring & Anti-Corruption	Public accountability

The composition of these 24 portfolios reflects both Sudan's most urgent governance needs and the requirements of the IGAD/AU transition framework. The selection process for each is described in the following section.

9. Candidate Selection & Governance Training

9.1 Eligibility Criteria

To apply for any ministerial position through the SGP, candidates must meet the following baseline requirements:

- Sudanese citizenship, with a primary connection to communities inside Sudan — diaspora applicants must demonstrate sustained financial or practical engagement with Sudan during the conflict period
- A university-level qualification or equivalent demonstrated professional expertise in a field relevant to the target portfolio
- Age between 25 and 45 at the time of application
- No prior conviction for corruption, human rights abuses, or financial crimes
- No current leadership position in any Sudanese political party formed outside Sudan after 2019
- No documented links to atrocities committed by either warring faction

Active inclusion of women — who led the December Revolution in significant numbers — and of representatives from historically marginalized regions including Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile is a structural requirement of the process, not an afterthought.

9.2 Four-Stage Selection Process

- Stage 1 — Written application: candidates submit a CV, a governance vision statement (max 1,500 words), and responses to scenario-based questions specific to their target portfolio
- Stage 2 — Independent review: a panel of Sudanese technical experts and international governance specialists scores applications against published criteria
- Stage 3 — Public shortlist: the top five candidates per portfolio are published for a 30-day community feedback period — civil society and the media can scrutinize nominees
- Stage 4 — Training and final selection: the final three candidates per portfolio enter the governance training programme; the top-scoring candidate after training is appointed

9.3 90-Day Governance Training Programme

All shortlisted candidates complete a 90-day intensive governance training programme, delivered in partnership with the Carter Center and the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA). The curriculum covers five core areas:

- Constitutional governance and the rule of law
- Public financial management and anti-corruption frameworks
- Humanitarian and transitional justice processes
- International diplomatic engagement and treaty obligations
- Democratic communication, transparency, and public accountability

Candidates who fail to complete the training programme are removed from the process. There are no exceptions. The training programme is a genuine filter, not a formality — and the accountability structure that sustains it is described next.

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10. Governance Standards & Accountability

A governance platform is only as credible as the accountability mechanisms it operates under. Every minister appointed through the SGP signs a binding accountability charter before taking office.

10.1 Mandatory Disclosure

All appointed ministers publicly disclose personal assets before and after their tenure. All ministerial decisions involving public funds above a defined threshold are published within 48 hours. All external meetings with foreign governments, international institutions, or private sector actors are logged and published monthly. There are no private arrangements.

10.2 Independent Oversight Board

An independent Oversight Board — comprising Sudanese civil society representatives, international governance experts, and representatives from partner institutions — has the authority to initiate investigations, request documentation, and recommend the suspension of any minister where evidence of misconduct exists. The Board is not advisory. It has teeth.

10.3 Public Recall

Any minister may be subject to a public recall process if 10,000 verified citizen signatures are submitted to the Oversight Board. The Board reviews the case and determines whether a formal investigation and potential replacement process is triggered. Citizens retain direct accountability power over those governing them.

Accountability is not a constraint on good governance — it is the condition that makes good governance possible. Every minister appointed through this platform will know, from day one, that they serve the people of Sudan and no one else.

These standards align with international best practice in transitional governance — and they create the conditions under which international partners can confidently engage and fund the transitional government.

11. International Support & Partnerships

This initiative cannot succeed without international engagement — but the nature of that engagement matters enormously. We are not asking international partners to choose Sudan's government. We are asking them to support a transparent, open, and merit-based process that gives Sudanese citizens the tools to choose it themselves.

11.1 Institutional Partners

- The Carter Center — governance training, election observation methodology, and anti-corruption frameworks
- The European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) — ministerial training and public sector reform expertise
- The African Union Transition Support Unit — regional legitimacy and the IGAD civilian consultation framework
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — platform funding, technical assistance, and monitoring
- International IDEA — constitutional design and electoral law support

11.2 A Direct Ask of European Governments

European governments are currently meeting with self-appointed Sudanese exile delegations. We ask them to pause and ask a straightforward question: who gave these people the authority to speak for Sudan's 47 million citizens?

We are not asking European governments to disengage from Sudan's political future. We are asking them to redirect that engagement — to support a platform that is genuinely open, transparent, and accountable to the people of Sudan rather than to political parties that were never elected and never faced the consequences of the war they are now positioning themselves to benefit from.

Their political support for the SGP process would send a clear and principled signal: international legitimacy follows democratic process, not diplomatic familiarity. And it would be consistent with the core principle affirmed at the April 2025 London Sudan Conference — that Sudan's political future must be decided by Sudanese people.

12. Implementation Roadmap

The SGP can move from concept to operational platform in 18 months. The phased roadmap below is realistic about capacity constraints inside Sudan while maintaining the momentum the situation demands.

Phase	Timeline	Key Activities
Phase 1 — Foundation	Months 1–3	Establish the SGP Secretariat; secure Carter Center and EIPA partnerships; build the digital application platform; conduct outreach to civil society inside Sudan; engage international funders
Phase 2 — Open Application	Months 4–6	Launch public application process across all 24 portfolios; 30-day open application window; independent review panel constituted and briefed; applications assessed
Phase 3 — Public Review	Months 7–8	Publish shortlists for all 24 portfolios; 30-day community feedback period; Oversight Board constituted; final candidate selection completed and published
Phase 4 — Governance Training	Months 9–12	90-day training programme in partnership with Carter Center and EIPA; five core curriculum modules delivered; final assessments completed; appointed ministers announced
Phase 5 — Transition Government	Months 13–18	Transitional government takes office under SGP accountability charter; first 100-day priority plan published; international recognition sought; IGAD/AU civilian consultation formally engaged

The roadmap is designed to run in parallel with the IGAD/AU ceasefire and political transition process. Phases 1 through 4 can be completed during the ceasefire and transition window. Phase 5 — the transitional government itself — is positioned to be operational within the nine-month political transition window the roadmap envisions.

The funding needed to make this work is set out in the following section.

13. Funding Requirements

The SGP requires an estimated EUR 4.2 million over 18 months to move from concept to operational transitional government. This covers platform development, secretariat operations, training delivery, independent audit, and communications.

Budget Line	Estimated Cost (EUR)
SGP Secretariat — 18 months operations	780,000
Digital platform development and hosting	420,000
Independent review panel and audit	360,000
Carter Center / EIPA governance training	1,200,000
Community outreach inside Sudan	480,000
Communications, translation and accessibility	260,000
Oversight Board operations	300,000
Contingency (10%)	420,000
TOTAL	4,220,000

We are seeking seed funding of EUR 800,000 in Phase 1 to establish the Secretariat and begin platform development. Remaining funding will be raised through multilateral development institutions, bilateral donors, and diaspora fundraising channels.

Every expenditure above EUR 5,000 will be published in real time on the SGP public portal. Donors can see exactly where their contributions go.

14. Sources & References

This proposal integrates research compiled by Unite Sudan Initiative into Sudan's December Revolution, the current SAF-RSF conflict, the IGAD/AU-Quad roadmap frameworks, and international best practice in transitional governance. The primary sources drawn upon include:

- Sudanese Professionals Association — documented accounts and communiques from the December Revolution, 2018–2019
- Human Rights Watch — field reports on the 2019 Khartoum Massacre and subsequent military violence
- Journal of Democracy — 'Sudan's Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator', analysis of the revolution's structure and outcomes
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- IGAD — Executive Secretary statements and roadmap documentation, 2024–2025
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- International IDEA — 'Constitutional Transitions and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Africa', 2023
- United Nations Development Programme — Sudan Crisis Response Framework, 2024
- UN Human Rights Council — Report of the Independent Expert on Sudan, 2024
- World Bank — 'Sudan Economic Update: Reconstruction Pathways', 2025
- Unite Sudan Initiative — civil society correspondence and community testimonies, Sudan, 2023–2026

15. Next Steps

Sudan does not have the luxury of a slow political process. Every month that passes without a credible, representative governance framework is another month in which the exile political class consolidates its international position — and another month in which the people who made the revolution, and who are living with its unfinished consequences, fall further behind.

Unite Sudan Initiative is proposing a 60-minute working session with potential institutional partners and funders — not a presentation, but a working conversation about what it would take to move the SGP from paper to operational platform within 90 days of confirmed seed funding.

Proposed Agenda for the Working Session

- Review of the SGP candidate selection mechanism and accountability charter
- Confirmation of Carter Center or EIPA training partnership — which institution, what timeline, what format
- Discussion of seed funding: EUR 800,000 to launch Phase 1 and build the digital application platform
- Agreement on a coordinated communications strategy directed at European governments currently engaging with unelected exile delegations
- Agreement on how the SGP formally engages with the IGAD/AU civilian consultation forums

What we are offering is not another political platform for another political class. It is a mechanism that gives ordinary, qualified, committed Sudanese citizens a genuine path to governing their own country — transparently, accountably, and on their merits.

If you are ready to support that, please contact the Unite Sudan Initiative Secretariat to schedule the working session. We can have the first stage of the platform operational within three months of confirmed seed funding.

Sudan's young generation has already shown, at enormous personal cost, that they are willing to fight for their country's future. This platform gives them the means to build it.

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