Overview
This proposal by the Unite Sudan Initiative presents a comprehensive transitional justice framework for Sudan amid the ongoing armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which erupted in April 2023. The crisis is not merely a product of the current war — it reflects over 30 years of systemic authoritarianism, corruption, and impunity under Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019), whose regime institutionalized violence and laid the structural groundwork for today’s conflict.
The proposal is designed to function without waiting for a ceasefire, acknowledging that a political settlement may be years away. It is built on a principle of Sudanese ownership — local civil society, resistance committees, women’s movements, legal professionals, and a diaspora of over 4 million educated Sudanese are positioned as the primary drivers of change, with international actors in a supporting role. The estimated budget is $185–240 million USD over 36 months.
Initial Successes
The proposal draws on several genuine foundations of strength that offer meaningful hope.
The 2019 popular uprising that ousted al-Bashir demonstrated extraordinary civil society mobilization and proved that mass-organized civilian resistance can force political change.
The transitional period (2019–2021) provided Sudan’s first practical experience of civilian-led governance, yielding institutional knowledge that can inform the current framework.
Customary justice systems (ajaweed councils) have continued to function in some communities even during active conflict, demonstrating the resilience of local reconciliation traditions.
Sudan retains significant human capital: internationally trained lawyers, academics actively documenting violations, active women’s and youth networks, and an established tradition of resistance committees at neighborhood level.
The ICC has held jurisdiction over Darfur crimes since 2005 (UNSC Resolution 1593) and holds active warrants for al-Bashir and other NCP officials, providing an existing international legal infrastructure to build upon.
Subsequent Failures
These foundations have been undermined by a series of compounding failures.
The 2021 military coup reversed the civilian transition, demonstrating how fragile democratic progress remains when the security sector retains unchecked power.
All ceasefire attempts since April 2023 — mediated by the AU, IGAD, the US, and Saudi Arabia — have collapsed. Neither the SAF nor RSF has shown genuine willingness to negotiate, each believing military victory is achievable.
International humanitarian funding has fallen critically short. Of the $2.7 billion requested for 2024, only 31 percent was funded by late 2024. Donor fatigue following the Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine crises has severely constrained the global response.
“Deep state” remnants of the al-Bashir-era National Congress Party (NCP) and National Islamic Front (NIF) have infiltrated both warring parties, ensuring that the systemic corruption and patronage networks that enabled decades of atrocities remain intact.
The ICC’s limited operational reach and lack of cooperation from Sudanese authorities has meant that despite long-standing warrants, there has been no meaningful accountability for the architects of Darfur’s mass atrocities.
The roadmap: Three Phases Over 36 Months
The proposal is structured around four pillars — Truth and Documentation, Accountability and Justice, Reparations and Healing, and Institutional Reform — implemented across three phases.
Phase 1: Foundation Building (Months 1–12) — Budget: $55–70M
Establish a Sudanese-led National Transitional Justice Steering Committee with broad civil society representation.
Deploy mobile documentation teams to accessible areas and refugee camps using ICC-compliant protocols.
Draft statutes for the Sudanese Truth and Reconciliation Commission (STRC) and a hybrid Special Criminal Court for Sudan (SCCS).
Establish victim support networks, witness protection programmes, and begin a nationwide reparations registration process.
Phase 2: Parallel Justice and Reconciliation (Months 13–24) — Budget: $75–95M
SCCS begins hearing cases against mid-level perpetrators while the ICC simultaneously issues new indictments for senior commanders.
STRC public hearings begin, broadcast nationally and to the diaspora, with thematic hearings on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), economic crimes, and ethnic violence.
First reparations are distributed to priority victim groups including survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, families of the disappeared, and displaced persons.
Community-based justice mechanisms are piloted in more than 30 locations, adapted from traditional ajaweed councils.
Phase 3: Institutional Transformation (Months 25–36) — Budget: $55–75M
The STRC delivers its final report and a transitional parliament debates and legislates on its recommendations.
Comprehensive security sector reform is implemented. The RSF is dismantled as a paramilitary force, the SAF is placed under civilian oversight, and military business interests are audited and restructured.
Constitutional reform is enacted with explicit civilian supremacy, independent judiciary provisions, and strong human rights guarantees.
A National Reconciliation Summit is held and preparation for inclusive democratic elections begins.
Practical Recommendations
- Begin documentation immediately, without waiting for a ceasefire. Evidence of atrocities is being lost daily. Mobile documentation teams should be deployed immediately using ICC-compliant protocols to IDP camps and accessible conflict areas. This is the single most time-sensitive action and the foundation for all subsequent accountability efforts.
- Prioritize establishing the Special Criminal Court for Sudan (SCCS) in Phase 1. A credible hybrid court staffed by Sudanese and international judges signals that accountability is real, not aspirational. Early indictments of mid-level perpetrators, coordinated with ICC prosecutions at the top, will fracture the culture of impunity that has sustained cycles of violence.
- Formalize the diaspora as a strategic partner, not a bystander. Sudan’s diaspora of more than four million people represents a major asset in expertise, funding, and international political leverage. Diaspora representatives should hold formal seats on governance bodies, contribute to financing streams, and serve in technical advisory roles across all four pillars.
- Make security sector reform non-negotiable from the outset. The 2021 coup and the current war both trace back to unchecked military power. Any transitional framework that does not include binding commitments to dismantle the RSF as a paramilitary force, vet SAF officers, and place the military under genuine civilian control will face the same reversals as the 2019–2021 transition.
- Design the reparations programme for breadth and speed, not scale. Victims cannot wait for criminal convictions before receiving recognition and support. The reparations authority should begin victim registration in Phase 1, distribute modest but meaningful cash transfers and service entitlements widely, and fund collective community rehabilitation projects. Asset recovery from convicted perpetrators and a percentage of natural resource revenues should form the primary funding base, reducing dependence on unreliable donor contributions.
